NSF-BSF: Collaborative Research: Market Conduct in Technology Adoption in the Automobile Industry

NSF-BSF：合作研究：汽车行业技术采用的市场行为

• 批准号: 2049263
• 负责人: Jing Li
• 金额: $ 18.99万
• 依托单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2021
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2021-03-01 至 2025-02-28
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2049263&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: NSF; BSF; Collaborative; Research; Market

AbstractAntitrust enforcement research has mostly focused on price and quantity collusion, even though antitrust law encompasses more ways to collude. This project will explore the causes and welfare consequences of automakers colluding on the adoption of emission control technologies. The project focuses on automakers that have been alleged to have colluded on adopting Diesel Exhaust Fluid (DEF) tanks that were too small to effectively clean up nitrogen oxide (NOx), a major contributor to air pollution. The project will investigate how the alleged collusion by automakers concealed violation of NOx emissions regulation. The project will quantify the effects of the alleged collusion on NOx pollution damages, car buyer surplus, and firm profits. These effects inform the proper amount of antitrust penalties to remedy welfare damages of such collisions. Finally, the project will examine whether and how environmental and antitrust regulation can mitigate inefficiencies from technology collusion. The project will build and estimate a structural model of consumer vehicle demand and automaker technology choice, and simulate counterfactual policies. The project utilizes a comprehensive new data set on vehicle prices, sales, and characteristics. A novel feature of the employed structural model is that the probability of non-compliance detection for one firm depends on other firms' behavior as well as its own. A more dispersed distribution in choices may cause a regulator to question why some firms need to use large DEF tanks while others apparently manage with small tanks. By coordinating on small tanks, the automakers simultaneously reduce the probability of being detected by the regulator and make their vehicles more attractive to car buyers (as the tank reduces cargo space, a valuable vehicle feature). With the model and estimates of consumer tastes and automaker costs, the project will conduct counterfactual simulation to explore the following issues: (i) quantify the benefit of strengthening the enforcement of emission standards; (ii) calculate the anti-competitive damage of technology collusion compared to the competitive counterfactual; and (iii) identify the demand and supply conditions most conducive to technology collusion. The project advances the economics research and has regulatory and policy implications on firm collusion, antitrust enforcement, and industry standards.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

AbstractItrust执法研究主要集中于价格和数量勾结，即使反托拉斯法律涵盖了更多的勾结方式。该项目将探讨汽车制造商对采用排放控制技术的原因和福利后果。 该项目的重点是据称是在采用柴油排气液（DEF）罐中串通的汽车制造商，这些油箱太小，无法有效地清理氮氧化物（NOX），这是导致空气污染的主要贡献者。 该项目将调查汽车制造商所谓的勾结如何掩盖违反NOX排放法规的行为。该项目将量化所谓的勾结对NOX污染损失，购买者剩余和企业利润的影响。 这些效果为弥补此类碰撞的福利损害的适当数量的反托拉斯罚款。 最后，该项目将研究环境和反托拉斯法规如何减轻技术勾结的效率低下。该项目将建立和估计消费车辆需求和汽车制造商技术选择的结构模型，并模拟反事实政策。该项目利用了有关车辆价格，销售和特征的全面新数据。 所采用的结构模型的一个新颖特征是，一家公司不遵守的可能性取决于其他公司的行为及其本身。 选择更分散的分布可能会导致监管机构质疑为什么有些公司需要使用大型DEF坦克，而另一些公司显然是用小型坦克来管理的。 通过在小型坦克上进行协调，汽车制造商同时降低了监管机构检测到的可能性，并使他们的车辆对购车者更具吸引力（因为坦克减少了货物空间，这是一项有价值的车辆功能）。 通过对消费者口味和汽车制造商成本的模型和估计，该项目将进行反事实模拟以探索以下问题：（i）量化加强执行排放标准的好处； （ii）与竞争性反事实相比，计算技术勾结的反竞争损害； （iii）确定最有利于技术勾结的需求和供应条件。该项目推进了经济学研究，并对公司勾结，反托拉斯执法和行业标准产生了监管和政策的影响。该奖项反映了NSF的法定任务，并被认为是值得通过基金会的知识分子和更广泛影响的审查标准通过评估来获得支持的。