SaTC: CORE: Small: Automatic Software Patching against Microarchitectual Attacks

SaTC：核心：小型：针对微架构攻击的自动软件修补

• 批准号: 1956032
• 负责人: Mahmut Kandemir
• 金额: $ 50万
• 依托单位: Pennsylvania State Univ University Park
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2020-07-01 至 2024-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1956032&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: SaTC; CORE; Small; Automatic; Software

Cybersecurity attacks are estimated to cost businesses trillions of dollars in 2019 and microarchitectural attacks are becoming an increasingly important attack surface. Microarchitectural attacks reveal confidential information by taking advantage of weaknesses in how hardware manage data to maximize efficiency. For example, the high-profile Spectre and Meltdown attacks are microarchitectural attacks that make nearly all modern CPUs exploitable. To close the root of microarchitectural attacks, new secure hardware designs are promising in a long term, but they are unlikely to be adopted in any close future. On the other hand, very few of existing software-based solutions target Spectre-like attacks or automatically fix vulnerabilities. The project will develop an application-level toolchain so that the patched applications are secure on existing commodity operating systems and hardware. The developed toolchain will significantly strengthen the security of applications currently vulnerable to microarchitectural attacks.This award investigates an automated approach to detecting and mitigating microarchitectural attacks for applications running on existing commodity operating systems and hardware. More specifically, the project leverages novel language- and compiler-based strategies, which include program analysis techniques that identify sensitive memory requests and characterize them as a new concept called differential sets; compiler-level automated patching techniques for removing differential sets or vulnerabilities when it is possible to do so; and an end-to-end evaluation of the proposed approach using a variety of architectures, attack models, and application programs. With these strategies and techniques, side-channel based microarchitectural attacks can be largely mitigated.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

估计网络安全攻击在2019年损失了数万亿美元的损失，并且微体系攻击正成为越来越重要的攻击表面。微体系式攻击通过利用硬件如何管理数据以最大化效率的弱点来揭示机密信息。例如，备受瞩目的幽灵和崩溃攻击是微体系攻击，几乎使所有现代的CPU都可以利用。为了结束微体系攻击的根源，长期有希望的新安全硬件设计是有希望的，但是在任何紧密的将来都不太可能被采用。另一方面，很少有现有的基于软件的解决方案针对类似于光谱的攻击或自动修复漏洞。该项目将开发应用程序级工具链，以便在现有的商品操作系统和硬件上进行修补的应用程序安全。开发的工具链将大大加强目前容易受到微体系攻击的应用程序的安全性。该奖项调查了一种自动化方法，用于检测和减轻在现有商品操作系统和硬件上运行的应用程序的微体系攻击。更具体地说，该项目利用新颖的语言和编译器的策略，其中包括识别敏感内存请求并将其描述为一种称为差异集的新概念的程序分析技术；编译器级自动修补技术，用于删除差分集或漏洞的情况；以及使用各种架构，攻击模型和应用程序程序对拟议方法的端到端评估。通过这些策略和技术，可以在很大程度上减轻基于侧通道的微构造攻击。该奖项反映了NSF的法定任务，并被认为是值得通过基金会的知识分子和更广泛影响的评估评估标准来通过评估来支持的。

项目成果

SpecSafe: detecting cache side channels in a speculative world

• DOI: 10.1145/3485506
• 发表时间: 2021-10
• 期刊: Proceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages
• 作者: Robert Brotzman;Danfeng Zhang;M. Kandemir;Gang Tan

Ghost Thread: Effective User-Space Cache Side Channel Protection

• DOI: 10.1145/3422337.3447846
• 发表时间: 2021-04
• 期刊: Proceedings of the Eleventh ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy
• 作者: Robert Brotzman;Danfeng Zhang;M. Kandemir;Gang Tan