CSR: Small: A Multi-Layered Deniable Steganographic File System

CSR：小型：多层可否认的隐写文件系统

基本信息

批准号：
1814347
负责人：
Darrell Long
金额：
$ 50万
依托单位：
University of California-Santa Cruz
依托单位国家：
美国
项目类别：
Standard Grant
财政年份：
2018
资助国家：
美国
起止时间：
2018-07-01 至 2023-06-30
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1814347&HistoricalAwards=false
关键词：
CSR Small Multi Layered Deniable

项目摘要

Journalists, aid workers, and democracy advocates all put themselves in harm's way for the benefit of others. Yet, there is a glaring need for them to store data securely. Typically, secret data is protected with encryption that is assumed unbreakable. Yet, if those in a hostile environment are caught with encrypted data, they could be forced to comply through coercion or threats of bodily harm. The investigators propose to secure data in plain sight by hiding it so that the operating system does not even know it is there. Therefore, the owner can completely deny the existence of the data.The Steganographic file system operates through the use of an external virtual block device driver. It utilizes secret sharing, external entropy sources, and erasure coding to store data deniably and reliably within the unallocated space of an existing file system. A set of data blocks to be hidden are combined with entropy blocks through erasure coding to produce a set of obfuscated carrier blocks that are then indistinguishable from other pseudorandom blocks on the disk. A subset of these blocks is then required to reconstruct the data. The system is information theoretically secure without knowledge of the entropy blocks.This system will be the first fully deniable, secure, and tunable steganographic file system. All previous attempts might attain security or performance but sacrifice deniability. The project will not only push the boundaries of modern steganography, but the investigators will build a fully working system that can survive intensive forensic examination. This will allow users in the field to have a reliable, secure means of carrying information where the presence of that information does not endanger their lives.The investigators plan to maintain the project well beyond the project period through publicly available sources such as Bitbucket or Github, as well as on the Storage and Systems Research Center's web page. At some point the investigators intend to include the system in the Linux source tree.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

记者、救援人员和民主倡导者都为了他人的利益而将自己置于危险之中。然而，他们迫切需要安全地存储数据。通常，秘密数据通过假定无法破解的加密进行保护。然而，如果那些处于敌对环境中的人被发现拥有加密数据，他们可能会通过胁迫或身体伤害威胁来被迫遵守。研究人员建议通过隐藏数据来保护数据的安全，这样操作系统甚至不知道它的存在。因此，所有者可以完全否认数据的存在。隐写文件系统通过使用外部虚拟块设备驱动程序进行操作。它利用秘密共享、外部熵源和纠删码在现有文件系统的未分配空间内可靠且可否认地存储数据。一组要隐藏的数据块通过纠删码与熵块组合，产生一组混淆的载体块，然后这些载体块与磁盘上的其他伪随机块无法区分。然后需要这些块的子集来重建数据。该系统理论上是信息安全的，无需了解熵块。该系统将是第一个完全可否认、安全且可调节的隐写文件系统。之前的所有尝试都可能获得安全性或性能，但会牺牲可否认性。该项目不仅将突破现代隐写术的界限，而且研究人员将建立一个可以通过密集法医检查的完整工作系统。这将使现场用户能够拥有一种可靠、安全的方式来携带信息，而这些信息的存在不会危及他们的生命。研究人员计划在项目期结束后通过 Bitbucket 或 Github 等公开来源来维护该项目，以及存储和系统研究中心的网页。在某个时候，调查人员打算将该系统纳入 Linux 源代码树中。该奖项反映了 NSF 的法定使命，并且通过使用基金会的智力价值和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估，被认为值得支持。

项目成果

期刊论文数量（5）

专著数量（0）

科研奖励数量（0）

会议论文数量（0）

专利数量（0）

Lethe: Secure Deletion by Addition

Lethe：通过添加安全删除

DOI：
发表时间：
2023
期刊：
Workshop on Challenges and Opportunities of Efficient and Performant Storage Systems
影响因子：
0
作者：
Chou, Eugene;Conrad-Shah, Leo;Barker, Austen;Quinn, Andrew;Miller, Ethan L.;Long, Darrell D.
通讯作者：
Long, Darrell D.

Rethinking the adversary and operational characteristics of deniable storage

重新思考可拒绝存储的对手和操作特征

DOI：
10.20517/jsss.2020.22
发表时间：
2022
期刊：
Security and Safety
影响因子：
0
作者：
Barker, Austen;Gupta, Yash;Hughes, James;Miller, Ethan L.;Lon, Darrell D.
通讯作者：
Lon, Darrell D.

Artifice: Data in Disguise

技巧：伪装的数据

DOI：
发表时间：
2020
期刊：
Proceedings of the Conference on Massive Storage Systems and Technologies (MSST ‘20
影响因子：
0
作者：
Barker, Austen;Gupta, Yash;Au, Sabrina;Chou, Eugene;Miller, Ethan;Long, Darrell
通讯作者：
Long, Darrell

A Multiple Snapshot Attack on Deniable Storage Systems

针对可拒绝存储系统的多重快照攻击