The Cognitive Science of Self-Awareness

自我意识的认知科学

• 批准号: 0924523
• 负责人: Peter Carruthers
• 金额: $ 21.9万
• 依托单位: University of Maryland, College Park
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-08-15 至 2011-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0924523&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Cognitive; Science; Self; Awareness

This award is funded under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-5).The goal of the project is to develop a new psychological model of our access to our own propositional attitudes (our beliefs, desires, intentions, judgments, decisions, supposings, and the rest), integrating a wide range of results from across cognitive science. According to this model, our knowledge of our own attitudes is always interpretative, and is no different in kind from the access that we have to the attitudes of other people. (The model allows, however, that our access to our own experiences and feelings is more direct.) The main result of this research will be an interdisciplinary book.Philosophers have traditionally assumed that we have immediate, non-inferential, ?introspective? access to our own propositional attitudes, and most ordinary folk agree. Even most cognitive scientists believe that this traditional model is partially correct. Yet there is extensive evidence from different areas of cognitive science that people will often confabulate attributions of attitudes to themselves while remaining under the impression that they are introspecting. There is also plenty of scientific data of other sorts that challenges the traditional account of the character of our self-knowledge. These forms of evidence will be surveyed and evaluated, and the proposed model will be developed, compared with a range of relevant alternatives, and defended in the light of the evidence.The project will marshal a wide array of scientific evidence in support of a clearly delineated and bold hypothesis, which is radically in conflict with common sense and with the views of virtually all philosophers (alive or dead). Since few cognitive scientists have appreciated the theoretical significance and revolutionary implications of their own discoveries, the project will also make an important contribution to cognitive science.

该奖项是根据2009年的《美国复苏与再投资法》（公法111-5）资助的。该项目的目的是开发一种新的心理模型，以了解我们获得自己的命题态度（我们的信念，欲望，欲望，判断，判断，决策，决定，抑制和其他态度），从而整合了跨认知科学的成果范围。根据这个模型，我们对自己态度的了解始终是解释性的，并且与我们对其他人的态度所能获得的访问没有什么不同。 （但是，该模型允许我们对自己的经验和感觉的访问更为直接。）这项研究的主要结果将是一本跨学科的书。传统上，philosophophers认为我们具有即时，无关紧要的，内在的？获得我们自己的命题态度，大多数普通人都同意。甚至大多数认知科学家都认为，这种传统模型是部分正确的。然而，从不同领域的认知科学领域有广泛的证据表明，人们经常会在自己内省的印象下，在保持自己的态度归因。还有许多其他类型的科学数据挑战了我们自我知识特征的传统叙述。将对这些证据形式进行调查和评估，并将提出的模型与一系列相关的替代方案相比，并根据证据进行辩护。该项目将在支持清晰划定和大胆的假设的广泛科学证据中，与共同的意义和虚拟哲学家（活着或死亡）的观点发生了巨大的冲突。由于很少有认知科学家对自己发现的理论意义和革命性意义赞赏，因此该项目还将为认知科学做出重要贡献。