Collaborative Research: The Nonatomic-Game Approach to Revenue Management Under Competition

合作研究：竞争下收入管理的非原子博弈方法

• 批准号: 0854803
• 负责人: Jian Yang
• 金额: $ 24.96万
• 依托单位: New Jersey Institute of Technology
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-09-01 至 2012-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0854803&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Nonatomic; Game; Approach

Abstract of Proposal ?Collaborative Research: The Nonatomic-game Approach to Revenue Management under Competition?The grant provides funding for the characterization of nonatomic-game equilibria of revenue management problems. Due to its innate difficulty, revenue management problems in competitive settings have not been adequately examined. This project will avoid complexities posed by multi-firm interactions by going to the infinite-firm extreme, considering a continuum of firms among whom none has any discernible impact on the overall evolution of the market. The focus of the project will be the establishment and characterization of equilibrium market processes and pricing policies that mutually sustain one another. Two types of problems involving stochastic and price-sensitive demand arrivals will be tackled, with each posing its unique challenges. In one type, firms can freely choose from a menu of prices, while in another type, firms cannot revisit prices they have themselves charged. Deterministic counterparts will be studied as benchmarks for heavy-volume limits, and computational studies will be conducted to assess the appropriateness of the infinite-firm approximation. If successful, results of this research will lead to a deeper understanding of competitive revenue management problems. General methods, specific tools, and intermediate results of this research will likely be applicable to theoretical endeavors elsewhere. In particular, novel uses of the Knaster-Taski and Kakutani-Glicksberg-Fan fixed point theorems may inspire further research. Equilibrium pricing policies identified by the project will serve as useful guidelines to real firms practicing dynamic price adjustments in response to competitors? price movements. The proposed computational study will address the problem of how accurate the infinite-firm approximation of the real finite-firm setting can be. Research outcomes will prove to be more practicable if it turns out that fewer firms are needed in order to realize strong incentives for real firms to adopt nonatomic-game pricing equilibria.

提案摘要？协作研究：竞争下的非原子游戏方法？该赠款为非原子游戏均衡收入管理问题的表征提供了资金。 由于其天生的困难，竞争环境中的收入管理问题尚未得到充分检查。 考虑到连续的公司，该项目将避免通过到无限实施的极端情况下，避免由多公司互动带来的复杂性。 该项目的重点是建立和表征平衡市场过程以及相互维持的定价政策。 将解决涉及随机和价格敏感需求到达的两种类型的问题，每种问题都面临其独特的挑战。 在一种类型中，企业可以自由从价格菜单中进行选择，而在另一种类型中，公司无法重新审视自己收取的价格。 确定性对应物将作为重量限制的基准进行研究，并将进行计算研究以评估无限确定的近似值的适当性。 如果成功，这项研究的结果将导致对竞争收入管理问题的更深入了解。 这项研究的一般方法，特定工具和中间结果可能适用于其他地方的理论努力。 尤其是，担为担为式 - 塔斯基（Kakutani-Glicksberg-Fan）固定点定理的新颖用途可能会激发进一步的研究。 该项目确定的均衡定价政策将成为对竞争者进行动态价格调整的实际公司的有用指南？价格变动。 拟议的计算研究将解决真正有限确保设置的无限实用近似的问题。 如果事实证明需要更少的公司来实现真正的企业采用非原子游戏定价均衡，则研究结果将被证明更可行。