Doctoral Dissertation Research on Administrative Law Judge Decision Making in a Political Environment: 1991 - 2006

政治环境下行政法法官决策的博士论文研究：1991年-2006年

• 批准号: 0719274
• 负责人: Robert Howard
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Georgia State University Research Foundation, Inc.
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2007
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2007-07-01 至 2008-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0719274&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Administrative; Law

David C. Nixon and Cole D. Taratoot Doctoral Dissertation Research: Administrative Law Judge Decision Making in a Political Environment, 1991 to 2006SES - 0719274 Project AbstractAn increased reliance on expert bureaucrats in an increasingly complex society combined with the insulation from politics afforded to administrators has created a dilemma in determining the proper role for unelected bureaucrats in a democratic society. Judicial scholars have demonstrated that the independence of the judicial branch enables judges to base decisions largely on their own political preferences. It is possible that the insulation from political involvement that is afforded to federal civil servants similarly enables bureaucrats to insert their own personal political preferences into policy decisionsUsing a variety of statistical methods, this study systematically examines one set of bureaucratic experts, Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) at the National Labor Relations Board, to determine whether personal political preferences play a role in bureaucratic decision making. Additionally, the study examines the reach of the influence of ALJ preferences by examining the extent to which ALJ decisions are adopted by reviewing bodies when cases are appealed to the agency's Board members and the relevant U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. Results help to determine the nature and pervasiveness of political decision making by bureaucrats in American government. Lastly, I examine the extent to which ALJs act strategically in their decision making when considering review by the political appointees of the Board and the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, and whether strategic considerations can limit or mask political decision making by ALJs. The results speak to the degree to which judicial controls provide a means of limiting bureaucratic discretion.These statistical analyses are based on a collection of nearly 6,000 initial decisions issued by over 100 ALJs as well as all subsequent appeals to the Board and Courts of Appeals, since 1991. The project identifies ALJ political party affiliation by contacting state and local boards of elections and searching FEC records. Party affiliation data are gathered primarily at locations surrounding the four Divisions of Judges of the NLRB: Atlanta, New York, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. This project makes exciting new contributions to literature in both bureaucratic and judicial politics. It extends our understanding of the judicial process into the realm of the bureaucracy, an arena we know to be highly legalistic. It also augments our understanding of bureaucratic incentives, by specifically examining political preferences. If the public's desire to have complex decisions made on the basis of expertise is instead met with bureaucrats who rely on their own political preferences to solve problems, this prompts us to reassess our increasing reliance on unelected government officials to make decisions that impact Americans.

David C. Nixon和Cole D. Taratoot博士论文研究研究：政治环境中的行政法法官决策，1991年至2006年-0719274 -0719274 Project Abstractan Project在一个日益复杂的社会中，对专家官僚的依赖，与政治中的隔离相结合，政治的隔离使行政人员为无与伦比的社会确定了一个艰巨的角色，这使得无效的官员在一个专业的社会中确定了一个民主党。 司法学者表明，司法部门的独立性使法官能够在很大程度上以自己的政治偏好为基础。联邦公务员提供的政治参与中的绝缘措施可能会使官僚们能够将自己的个人政治偏好插入通过各种统计方法的政策决定中，该研究系统地研究了一套官僚专家，行政法法官（ALJ）在国家工人关系委员会中扮演个人政治偏好，以确定是否扮演个人政治偏好，是否扮演官方裁决。 此外，该研究通过检查ALJ偏好的影响，通过检查ALJ偏好的影响，通过审查机构董事会成员和相关的美国巡回上诉法院在案件上提出上诉时通过审查机构的范围。 结果有助于确定官僚在美国政府中政治决策的性质和普遍性。 最后，我研究了ALJ在考虑董事会和美国巡回上诉法院的政治任命者审查时在决策中进行战略性行动的程度，以及战略考虑是否可以限制ALJ的政治决策或掩盖政治决策。 结果表达了司法控制提供的一种限制官僚主义酌处权的手段。这些统计分析基于近6,000多个ALJ发出的近6,000个初步决定，以及随后对董事会和上诉法院的所有呼吁，自1991年以来。 党派隶属关系数据主要集中在围绕NLRB法官四个部门的地点：亚特兰大，纽约，旧金山和华盛顿特区。该项目为官僚和司法政治中的文学作出了令人兴奋的新贡献。 它将我们对司法程序的理解扩展到了官僚主义的领域，我们知道是高度合法的。它还通过专门研究政治偏好来增强我们对官僚激励措施的理解。如果公众希望根据专业知识做出复杂决定的愿望与依靠自己的政治偏好解决问题的官僚建立，这促使我们重新评估了我们对未当选政府官员的日益严重的依赖，以做出影响美国人的决策。