Economic Analysis of Sequential Vertical Contracting Environments

连续垂直承包环境的经济分析

• 批准号: 0001903
• 负责人: Greg Shaffer
• 金额: $ 10.51万
• 依托单位: University of Rochester
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2000
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2000-07-15 至 2002-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0001903&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Economic; Analysis; Sequential; Vertical; Contracting

This research will provide an economic analysis of sequential contracting among vertically related firms. The goal of the research is to develop new theory, integrate existing theory, shed new light on some important contracting strategies, and offer guidance for antitrust policy makers.The agenda is timely in that it addresses some of the major current policy concerns in antitrust, including the use of exclusivity agreements (exclusive dealing and exclusive territories) in monopolization cases, the role of countervailing buyer power in merger analysis, the economic effects of slotting allowances (lump-sum payments from manufacturers to retailers), and whether and why large buyers might negotiate most-favored-customer clauses in their supply contracts. In addition, it will shed new light on when price discrimination in intermediate goods markets may be harmful and, hence, when enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act may be in the social interest.

这项研究将对垂直相关的公司之间的顺序收缩提供经济分析。 The goal of the research is to develop new theory, integrate existing theory, shed new light on some important contracting strategies, and offer guidance for antitrust policy makers.The agenda is timely in that it addresses some of the major current policy concerns in antitrust, including the use of exclusivity agreements (exclusive dealing and exclusive territories) in monopolization cases, the role of countervailing buyer power in merger analysis, the economic effects of slotting allowances （从制造商到零售商的一次性付款），以及为什么大型买家可以在其供应合同中谈判最喜欢的客户条款。此外，它将阐明何时中间商品市场的价格歧视可能有害，因此，何时执行《鲁滨逊 - 帕特曼法案》可能符合社会利益。