Collaborative Research on Binding Agreements

约束性协议的合作研究

• 批准号: 9414114
• 负责人: Debraj Ray
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Trustees of Boston University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing grant
• 财政年份: 1994
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1994-10-15 至 1997-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9414114&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Binding; Agreements

9414114 Ray This project studies the nature of binding agreements in strategic situations. A model is considered in which binding agreements can, in principle, be written among any group of agents. The project rigorously analyzes the agreements that occur in an equilibrium of free and unrestricted negotiation. At the most fundamental level, the investigators address the issue of how to conceptualize the series of negotiations that ultimately lead to the signing of an agreement. This will make an important contribution to bargaining theory because the literature on bargaining over actions of games is nonexistent. The principal focus of the research is on the question of efficiency in binding agreements. This project challenges the consensus among economists that if binding agreements can be written in the absence of informational asymmetries, then the gains from cooperation will be fully exploited. The investigators will generalize examples from their previous work of binding agreements in the presence of external effects that do not correspond to an efficient or cooperative outcome. These results arise only when there are three or more agents. The emergence of inefficiency is closely related to the assignment of property rights. This line of basic research is relevant to the Human Dimensions of Global Change because it will provide new insights and better tools for analyzing negotiations needed to reach binding environmental agreements. For example, the famous Coase Theorem was used to show that competitive markets will produce efficient agreements in the presence of pollution. The investigators' research shows that there is a breakdown of efficiency when the right to pollute is the assigned status quo.

9414114 Ray这个项目在战略情况下研究具有约束力协议的性质。 考虑到一个模型，可以原则上可以将具有约束力的协议写在任何一组代理中。 该项目严格分析以自由和不受限制的谈判的均衡中发生的协议。 在最基本的层面上，调查人员解决了如何将最终导致协议签署的一系列谈判概念化的问题。 这将为议价理论做出重要贡献，因为关于游戏的议价文献不存在。 该研究的主要重点是在具有约束力协议中的效率问题。 该项目挑战了经济学家之间的共识，即如果在没有信息不对称的情况下可以写有约束力协议，那么合作的收益将得到充分利用。 研究人员将在存在外部效果的情况下从其以前的约束协议工作中概括实例，这些效应与有效或合作的结果不符。 这些结果仅在有三个或更多代理时才出现。 效率低下的出现与财产权的分配密切相关。 这一基础研究系列与全球变化的人类层面有关，因为它将提供新的见解和更好的工具，用于分析达成具有约束力的环境协议所需的谈判。 例如，著名的COASE定理被用来表明竞争市场将在污染存在下产生有效的协议。 调查人员的研究表明，当污染权是指定的现状时，效率已经破裂。