Collaborative Research on Binding Agreements

约束性协议的合作研究

• 批准号: 9414114
• 负责人: Debraj Ray
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Trustees of Boston University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing grant
• 财政年份: 1994
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1994-10-15 至 1997-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9414114&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Binding; Agreements

9414114 Ray This project studies the nature of binding agreements in strategic situations. A model is considered in which binding agreements can, in principle, be written among any group of agents. The project rigorously analyzes the agreements that occur in an equilibrium of free and unrestricted negotiation. At the most fundamental level, the investigators address the issue of how to conceptualize the series of negotiations that ultimately lead to the signing of an agreement. This will make an important contribution to bargaining theory because the literature on bargaining over actions of games is nonexistent. The principal focus of the research is on the question of efficiency in binding agreements. This project challenges the consensus among economists that if binding agreements can be written in the absence of informational asymmetries, then the gains from cooperation will be fully exploited. The investigators will generalize examples from their previous work of binding agreements in the presence of external effects that do not correspond to an efficient or cooperative outcome. These results arise only when there are three or more agents. The emergence of inefficiency is closely related to the assignment of property rights. This line of basic research is relevant to the Human Dimensions of Global Change because it will provide new insights and better tools for analyzing negotiations needed to reach binding environmental agreements. For example, the famous Coase Theorem was used to show that competitive markets will produce efficient agreements in the presence of pollution. The investigators' research shows that there is a breakdown of efficiency when the right to pollute is the assigned status quo.

9414114 Ray 该项目研究战略形势下具有约束力的协议的性质。 考虑一种模型，原则上任何代理组之间都可以签订具有约束力的协议。 该项目严格分析在自由和无限制谈判的平衡中达成的协议。 在最基本的层面上，调查人员解决了如何概念化最终导致签署协议的一系列谈判的问题。 这将对讨价还价理论做出重要贡献，因为关于博弈行为讨价还价的文献并不存在。 研究的主要焦点是具有约束力的协议的效率问题。 该项目挑战了经济学家的共识，即如果能够在没有信息不对称的情况下签订具有约束力的协议，那么合作的收益将得到充分利用。 研究人员将从他们之前的工作中总结出在存在与有效或合作结果不对应的外部影响的情况下具有约束力的协议的例子。 仅当存在三个或更多代理时才会出现这些结果。 无效率的出现与产权的分配密切相关。 这一基础研究与全球变化的人文因素相关，因为它将提供新的见解和更好的工具来分析达成具有约束力的环境协议所需的谈判。 例如，著名的科斯定理被用来表明竞争市场在存在污染的情况下会产生有效的协议。 调查人员的研究表明，当污染权维持现状时，效率就会崩溃。