Multiagent Incentives, the Limits of Coordination, and Efficiency

多主体激励、协调的限制和效率

• 批准号: 8821723
• 负责人: Charles Kahn
• 金额: $ 13万
• 依托单位: National Opinion Research Center
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1989
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1989-06-01 至 1991-11-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8821723&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Multiagent; Incentives; Limits; Coordination; Efficiency

It is now well understood that in economies with asymmetric information, a contract between a principal and an agent typically generates informational externalities. The goal of this research is to understand the interaction between two important restrictions on economic agents' abilities to reach efficient outcomes: incentive problems resulting from imperfect information and the difficulties of coordinating the actions of groups of individuals. An example of such an environment is one in which agents are subject to moral hazard and trades cannot be publically monitored. Criteria will be developed for describing constrained efficiency in such environments and for use in analyzing models of market games played by agents subject to this combination of restrictions. Cooperative and non-cooperative solution concepts will be developed to investigate the sense in which the outcomes of such games are or are not constrained efficient. The extent to which the outcomes in such economies can be characterized in terms of competitive equilibria or Lindahl equilibria of Arrow-Debreu economies for a suitably augmented commodity space also will be studied. The results will be used to reinterpret the role played by government in improving the allocations in economies subject to these restrictions and how the government's role varies, depending upon its monitoring powers. The issues of asymmetric information addressed in this research are fundamental but potentially also they have great practical importance. The proposed modelling of the advantages the government has in monitoring vis-a-vis private agents can reshape the advice given to policy makers concerning appropriate government intervention in the presence of informational asymmetries.

现在众所周知，在信息不对称的经济体中，委托人和代理人之间的合同通常会产生信息外部性。 本研究的目的是了解经济主体实现有效结果的能力的两个重要限制之间的相互作用：不完全信息导致的激励问题和协调个体群体行为的困难。 这种环境的一个例子是代理人面临道德风险并且交易无法受到公开监控。 将制定标准来描述此类环境中的受限效率，并用于分析受这种限制组合影响的代理商所玩的市场博弈模型。 将开发合作和非合作解决方案概念，以研究此类博弈的结果是否受限有效的意义。 还将研究这些经济体的结果在多大程度上可以用阿罗-德布鲁经济体的竞争均衡或林达尔均衡来表征，以适当扩大商品空间。研究结果将用于重新解释政府在改善受这些限制的经济体的分配方面所发挥的作用，以及政府的作用如何根据其监督权力而变化。 本研究中解决的信息不对称问题是根本性的，但也可能具有重大的实际意义。 拟议的政府相对于私人机构在监督方面的优势模型可以重塑向政策制定者提供的有关在存在信息不对称的情况下进行适当政府干预的建议。