中国商业银行治理结构微观模拟研究

After China's entry into the WTO, the domestic commercial banks are faced with keen competition from the banks abroad and therefore in great need for improved efficiency and competitiveness, which can only be achieved by making dramatic reforms in them. As to the many reasons behind the low efficiency of China's state-owned commercial banks, the problem of no real title to property and the lack of complete corporate governance stand out as the fundamental ones..Using modern financial game theory model and computer simulation technology, this paper is aimed to provide a theoretical base for the build-up of a complete corporate governance for China's commercial banks by the way of multi-dynamic simulation analysis and comparison of its object variables and various routes. It is of great practical significance to the promotion of domestic bank's reform and improvement of its efficiency..1) The comparison of the corporate governance of the commercial banks of USA and German reveals that: A. The corporate governance should be analyzed dynamically, and be adjusted in terms of the specific situations of the economy development and of commercial banks. The adjustment of the corporate governance should be on the basis of the different stock structure of commercial banks and take into account the development of China's security market. C. The composition, title and responsibility of directorate　have great effect on the bank's corporate governance. D. An effective incentive and discipline mechanism must be built up to be indeed helpful for the improvement of the banks' performance. E. Attentions should be paid to the positive role played by the staff. In this term, some German experiences can be use for reference to so as to maintain the interest of bank's staff and to inspire their activeness..2) The empirical studies of the corporate governance of our country's commercial banks conclude that: firstly, the degree of the perfection of corporate governance is positively proportional to the performance. That is, the better the performance, the more perfect the inner corporate governance. Secondly, the corporate governance of joint-stock commercial banks runs explicitly beyond that of state-owned commercial banks. Thirdly, among the joint-stock commercial banks, those having their stocks dealt in the stock market toast better corporate governance than those having not. Lastly, as there exist in distinct drawbacks in the outer government environment encounter by China's commercial banks, the improvement of the corporate governance of China's commercial banks still have many things to do.3) We use the asymmetric information game method to separately construct the state-owned commercial bank game model under controlled financial market, the non-state-owned commercial bank game model under controlled financial market, the commercial bank game model under free financial market. Then we compare the influence of different property rights and market structure, and draw the following conclusion: A. The government should separate the commonality authority department from the department that exert the state property rights, and endow them with specific administration goal or exact function orientation. B. Which kind of property structure is more effective depends on the managers' ability to influence the commercial bank's management. C. The commercial bank's stock is apt to be dispersed with the managers' risk bearing competence, so if the managers' risk bearing competence is low, the proportion of the stock held by institution investors should be increased. D. Under the condition of the same manager ability, the disperse public held commercial bank is superior to the concentrated institutional investor held commercial bank.4) We use the incomplete information dynamic game theory to construct a long run commercial bank's incentive and discipline mechanism model, and studies the influence of the bank owner and manager's pursuit of their own maximum utility upon the bank's management under the incomplete and asymmetric information circums

本课题采用非对称信息博弈分析模型和微观模拟方法，分析中国商业银行的治理问题。通过讨论商业银行股权结构、董事会、监事会、管理者与投资者的关系，内部人控制、投资者利.益保护和商业银行竞争力问题，寻求最优对策，提出政策建议..

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