基于TCP/IP的未知动态信息物理系统的数据驱动隐蔽攻击方法研究

To reveal the potential security risks of cyber-physical systems (CPS) and develop more advanced security technologies for CPS, the study of stealthy attack methods has gotten more attention in recent years. Most of the existing stealthy attack schemes are presented under the precondition that the model parameters of CPS are known to attackers. At present, there are only a few model-independent stealthy attack approaches, which are applicable only to the CPS without reference signals and need the assumption that attackers know sensor readings. This project aims to remove the aforementioned two conservative assumptions and further give a stealthy attack methodology for more general CPS, i.e., the closed-loop CPS with reference signals. To this end, under the condition that the model parameters of CPS are unknown and such systems have control delays, a platform (i.e. a TCP/IP-based networked AC servo position control system) used for the verification of the stealthy attack technology is firstly constructed via data-driven methods. Then, a plan is made, which is utilized for eavesdropping the information of the CPS built by employing, respectively, Ethernet hubs and switches. On this basis, an approach to blocking network communications and injecting the false sensor data into CPS is explored. After that, according to data-driven methods, a closed-loop recursive identification strategy for the dynamic characteristic matrix of CPS is designed. Finally, with the aid of all the above-obtained results, the data-driven stealthy attack scheme for the CPS is proposed, and subsequently, its effectiveness and practicability are validated by experiment.

为揭示信息物理系统（CPS）潜在的安全风险并牵引出更先进的CPS安全技术，隐蔽攻击方法研究近年来备受关注。已有的隐蔽攻击方案大部分都是在攻击者已知CPS模型参数的假设下给出的；仅有的几种不依赖模型参数的隐蔽攻击方法需要假定攻击者已知CPS传感器测量值，而且它们的适用对象都是无给定信号CPS。本项目旨在移除以上两条保守假设，进而给出更一般的CPS（即具有给定信号闭环CPS）的隐蔽攻击策略。为此，在CPS模型参数未知且存在控制延迟的条件下，首先基于数据驱动技术建立隐蔽攻击技术验证平台（即基于TCP/IP的网络化交流伺服位置控制系统）；其次，针对分别由集线器和交换机组建的CPS，深入探讨实现信息侦听的技术途径，进而探索阻断网络通信以及插入伪造数据的方法；然后，论证CPS动态特性矩阵的数据驱动闭环迭代辨识方法；最后，利用以上研究结果给出数据驱动隐蔽攻击方案，并通过实验核实该方案的有效性和实用性。

本项目研究了装备有攻击检测器的基于TCP/IP的信息物理系统（CPS）的数据驱动隐蔽攻击问题。首先，在CPS的模型参数未知的条件下，基于数据驱动方法构建了隐蔽攻击技术验证平台。该平台包括攻击检测器和基于TCP/IP网络化电机伺服控制系统。其次，开发了基于TCP/IP的CPS数据侦听技术。进而，设计了阻断网络通信并将伪造数据插入CPS的方法。然后，提出了CPS动态特性矩阵的闭环迭代辨识技术。基于以上研究成果设计了CPS的数据驱动隐蔽攻击方案，并在隐蔽攻击技术验证平台上通过实验验证了该方案的有效性和实用性。此外，针对具有大惯性和大滞后的工业过程，基于数据驱动技术设计了由在线闭环数据确定其动力学特性的方法，继而提出了变参数PID系统的数据驱动残差生成器设计方案。针对具有非线性和负载波动的电机伺服控制系统，基于数据驱动技术提出了在线迭代辨识其动力学特性的方法，进而在具有随机测量噪声和过程噪声的背景下，基于前置滤波器和ADP技术设计了近似最优跟踪控制器。而且，基于数据驱动技术，提出了模型未知的固定参数PID系统中传感器漂移故障的补偿方法。另外，针对带有不匹配扰动的未知非线性系统，为完成精确的轨迹跟踪控制并确保闭环信号有界，本项目通过受限处理技术设计了一种低计算复杂度的自适应模糊控制策略。为了在特定时间内实现指定精度的轨迹跟踪控制，结合新的界函数和受限处理方法设计了容错跟踪控制策略。并且，将一个新的误差界引入到控制器设计过程中，提出了使未知Euler-Lagrange系统满足给定跟踪精度要求的容错输出受限控制技术。该项目的研究为揭示CPS潜在的安全风险并牵引出更先进的CPS安全控制技术具有重要意义。

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