复杂产品研制阶段外协系统的质量激励契约设计及应用研究

A novel quality contract design method is developed for the main manufacturers of complex products in the engineering development stage, which can effectively control the outsourcing quality risk for the supply chains of complex products. Specifically, the cooperation processes of outsourcing system and the economic mechanism is analyzed to achieve mutual transactions, which can be employed to obtain the "quality - income" equilibriums. Additionally, the "principal-agent" relation between the main manufacturer and its system suppliers is established on the base of the quality loss and inspect deviation, which can be changed to a kind of dynamic game under asymmetric information. Consequently, the relationship and effectiveness of quality incentive contract on system suppliers' quality assurance behavior can be obtained. Moreover, the differences of participants' cooperation status is described as a conflict evolution competing for cooperation initiative, which can be treated as an additional benefits constraint and used to explore the quality contract design method under the participants' unequal status with interactive optimization theory.Furthermore, the dynamic adjustment and correction mechanism of the outsourcing quality contract is studied on the base of real-time quality information existing in Milestones. The design predictive control method can be designed to adjust the quality of incentives and penalties, as well as enhance the system's real-time and adaptive capacity.At last, the commercial aircraft C919 is selected as a case study to demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the new method, which furnishes a fresh perspective on the supply chain quality management of a complex product.

针对复杂产品研制阶段的供应链体系，为复杂产品主制造商在小批量订购模式下探索出一套质量激励契约设计方案，有效管控复杂产品供应链质量风险。分析复杂产品外协系统质量合作的基本流程，探寻参与方实现互惠交易的经济机理和"质量-收益"均衡点；以质量损失和质检偏差为纽带分析主制造商与系统供应商开展质量合作的"委托-代理"关系，构建不对称信息下动态博弈模型，分析质量激励契约对供应商质量保障行为的作用效果；将参与方合作地位的差异描述为一类争夺合作主动权的冲突演化过程，将冲突均衡状态描述为附加利益约束，以交互优化的思想探寻合作地位差异下外协系统质量契约的设计方法；研究里程碑实时质量信息下外协系统质量契约的动态调整和修正机理，设计预测控制模型调整质量激励和惩罚强度，增强系统的实时性和自适应能力。选取国产C919大型商用客机开展案例研究，验证课题重要的理论成果，为其实际质量管理工作提供一类崭新的分析思路和解决方案

复杂产品主要通过组建大规模企业战略同盟开展供应链质量合作，系统供应商提供外协系统的质量水平极大地影响复杂产品的质量水平。本课题综合采用了Edgeworth 盒形图、委托-代理理论、冲突分析法、灰色合作博弈等方法，以广义质量损失的视角对复杂产品供应链质量契约设计的若干关键问题开展一系列相关研究。主要研究内容集中在以下4个方面：.（1）复杂产品供应链质量合作实现机理研究。本部分结合Edgeworth box理论分析主制造商和供应商质量合作过程的“质量-收益”均衡解，为之后定量研究提供基本的定性分析支持。.（2）复杂产品供应链质量激励措施研究。构建“主制造商-供应商”的委托-代理分析框架，分别研究对称信息和不对称信息下“委托-代理”博弈均衡问题，通过设置“强制性”质量合同并探求合同中关键质量奖惩参数设计，诱使供应商在追求自身收益最大化的过程中主动、自觉地实现主制造商最满意的产品质量，消除不对称质量信息的负面影响。.（3）复杂产品质量契约谈判过程冲突分析研究。以Petri网模型作为图论分析工具，描述复杂产品合同谈判过程中质量冲突及参与人的可能选择；根据理性人假设设计Petri网生成算法，探求冲突发展的均衡状态和各参与人可选的行动选择，分析冲突未来发展趋势.（4）复杂产品质量契约的利益分配研究。将供应链中不确定质量合作收益信息设计为区间灰数，构建灰色Shapley模型并验证其性质；针对海量信息搜集和高纬度计算问题，结合Raffia解法求解灰色Shapley模型的白化值，为主制造商制定契约标底提供重要参考。.本文相关研究成果可辅助复杂产品主制造商有针对性地开展供应链质量管理工作，组织并构建高水平质量链，激励供应商质量保障行为，控制供应链中质量损失，进而有效地规避质量合作风险，实现最大限度地提升复杂产品供应链整体质量水平的目的。

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