Explaining "Unexplained" Grade Inflation in the UK's Universities

解释英国大学“无法解释的”成绩膨胀

• 批准号: ES/X006883/1
• 负责人: Robertas Zubrickas
• 金额: $ 21.43万
• 依托单位: University of Bath
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Research Grant
• 财政年份: 2023
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2023 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FX006883%2F1
• 关键词: Explaining; Unexplained; Grade; Inflation; UK

The UK's higher education (HE) sector has recently come under much criticism in public debate and from policymakers over grade inflation. According to the Office for Students (2019), 29% of students obtained a first-class honours degree in 2018, up from 16% in 2011. Comparing this rise with changes in students' prior attainment, the authors conclude that increases in top grades are "unexplained" for three-quarters of universities.The observed grade inflation has coincided with two developments: (i) HE expansion, and (ii) increases in tuition fees. Both developments were Government initiatives to meet growing demand for HE whilst funding it by tuition fee income (HM Treasury, 2013; UCAS, 2013). As a result, the student population increased from 222,430 in 2010/11 to 259,185 in 2017/18, with the tuition fee cap raised to £9,000. The Government also encouraged competition among universities in attracting more students (HM Treasury, 2013, provision 1.202). Consequently, the cause of grade inflation is widely believed to be the artificial lowering of grading standards by universities in competition for students and, thus, tuition income (Turner, 2019). The over 50% increase in 'good' degrees among students with the A-level entry qualifications of DDD or below (Coughlan, 2019) seems impossible to explain by anything but opportunistic grade inflation. This opinion is shared by the Government, which issued stark warnings to universities against "unfair practices" and proposed interventions aimed at restoring the value of grades (Department for Education, 2019).In this project, we contrast this popular explanation for grade inflation with an alternative explanation that recognises the role of lecturers as educators (Zubrickas, 2015). We argue that the cause of grade inflation may lie in the expansion of HE, which brought in more students from the lower end of the ability spectrum (Belfield et al., 2018), while acknowledging that the approach to teaching is not constant but depends on the composition and needs of a class. Lecturers may have made their teaching and, accordingly, grading standards more accessible for more numerous weaker students with implications for grade inflation. These adjustments are not opportunistic and artificial but made for the good cause of facilitating learning.For illustration, consider a lecturer teaching a strong class of students. To challenge them, the lecturer introduces some harder topics and reserves the highest grades for students who coped well with challenging material. Now suppose that the following year the same lecturer teaches a class of lower-ability students. In response to this change, the lecturer scraps harder topics in favour of more accessible topics so that most students are engaged in learning. The outcome of more accessible teaching is coarser grading and, consequently, grade inflation despite the adverse change in class composition. Such an approach pursues learning objectives to enhance the "average" student's knowledge rather than to generate more income.We will empirically test these two competing explanations of grade inflation using data from the Higher Education Statistics Agency. The explanations make different predictions about grade inflation within a university. If grade inflation is driven by university administrations, then it should take place across all the departments of a university. However, if grade inflation is driven by lecturers' adjustments of teaching standards, then it should take place only in those departments that attracted a larger number of less able students. Our findings on the causes of grade inflation will be important for policy responses. If the popular explanation is true, then policymakers need to clamp down on the opportunistic behaviour of universities and implement policies to restore standards. If the alternative explanation finds support, then such a response would be unnecessary and potentially damaging to the sector.

英国的高等教育（HE）部门最近在公开辩论中受到了许多关键主义的限制，而政策制定者就成绩通货膨胀而言。根据学生办公室（2019年）的说法，2018年有29％的学生获得了一流的荣誉学位，从2011年的16％增加到。将这一兴趣与学生事先成绩的变化进行比较，作者包括，高年级的增加是“无法解释的”，即在大学的四分之三大学的成绩中，观察到的成绩的膨胀与两次发展相吻合。这两项发展都是政府的举措，旨在满足他对他的需求不断增长，同时凭借学费收入为其提供资金（HM财政部，2013年； UCAS，2013年）。结果，学生人数从2010/11的222,430增加到2017/18年度的259,185，学费上限提高到9,000英镑。政府还鼓励大学之间竞争吸引更多的学生（HM财政部，2013年，规定1.202）。因此，普遍认为，年级通货膨胀的原因被认为是大学对学生竞争以及学费收入的人工降低标准的人为降低（Turner，2019年）。具有DDD或以下A级入境资格的学生中“好”学位的50％以上（Coughlan，2019年）似乎无法通过机会主义年级通货膨胀来解释。该意见由政府分享，政府向大学发出了明显的警告，以指出“不公平实践”，并提出了旨在恢复成绩价值的干预措施（教育部，2019年）。在这个项目中，我们将这种对等级通货膨胀的流行解释与另一种解释与一种替代性解释与认识讲师为教育者（Zubrickas，2015年）的作用的替代解释。我们认为，等级通货膨胀的原因可能在于HE的扩张，这使更多的学生从能力谱系的低端吸引了更多的学生（Belfield等，2018），同时承认教学方法不是恒定的，而是取决于班级的组成和需求。讲师可能已经进行了教学，因此，对更多较弱的学生更容易访问评分标准，对年级通货膨胀产生影响。这些调整不是机会主义的和人为的，而是为支持学习的良好原因而造成的。为了插图，考虑讲师教一类强大的学生。为了挑战他们，讲师介绍了一些更艰难的话题，并为应对挑战材料的学生提供最高的成绩。现在，假设第二年同一年的讲师教一级较低的能力学生。为了应对这一变化，讲师将更加艰难的主题删除，以支持更容易获得的主题，以便大多数学生从事学习。更容易获得的教学的结果是更粗糙的评分，因此，尽管班级组成发生了不利的变化，但等级通货膨胀。这种方法追求学习目标，以增强“平均”学生的知识，而不是产生更多的收入。我们将使用高等教育统计局的数据急剧测试这两个相互竞争的年级通货膨胀解释。这些解释对大学内的年级通货膨胀做出了不同的预测。如果年级通货膨胀是由大学政府驱动的，则应在大学的所有部门进行。但是，如果年级通货膨胀是由讲师对教学标准的调整所驱动的，那么它只能在那些吸引更多能力不足的学生的部门发生。我们关于等级通货膨胀原因的发现对于政策响应至关重要。如果流行的解释是正确的，那么政策制定者需要限制大学的机会主义行为，并实施政策以恢复标准。如果替代解释得到了支持，那么这种反应将是不必要的，并且可能会对该行业造成损害。