Economic Analysis of Environmental R&D and Competition Policy in Oligopolistic Market

环境研究的经济分析

• 批准号: 22730200
• 负责人: OUCHIDA Yasunori
• 金额: $ 1.25万
• 依托单位: Hiroshima University
• 依托单位国家: 日本
• 项目类别: Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
• 财政年份: 2010
• 资助国家: 日本
• 起止时间: 2010 至 2012
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-22730200/
• 关键词: 競争政策; ゲーム理論; 環境政策; 環境R&D; 寡占市場; スピルオーバー効果; 環境規制; 独占禁止法; 環境R＆D; 共同研究開発

This research presents the investigation of the effects generated by the timing of taxation and R&D investment in the case where the regulator’s policy variable is emission tax, market structure is Cournot duopoly, and firm’s activity excluding production is emission abatement R&D. Furthermore, this study also examines whether the semi-collusive production by Cournot duopolists is socially allowable when firm’s R&D is carried out in order to improve the environmental quality of the good.

本研究调查了在监管机构的政策变量为排放税、市场结构为古诺双头垄断、企业不包括生产的活动为减排研发的情况下，税收和研发投资的时机产生的影响。研究了当企业进行研发以改善商品的环境质量时，古诺双寡头的半合谋生产是否是社会允许的。

项目成果

A note on environmental R&D under time-consistent emission tax

关于环境 R 的说明

• 发表时间: 2012
• 作者: 大内田康徳・後藤大策

What is the socially desirable formation of environmental R&D ?

什么是社会期望的环境 R 形成？

• 发表时间: 2012
• 作者: Ouchida; Yasunori;Goto; Daisaku
• 通讯作者: Daisaku

Environmental R&D and Semi‐collusion in a differentiated duopoly

差异化双头垄断中的环境研发与半共谋

• 发表时间: 2011
• 作者: 大内田康徳

Quality‐improving R&D and Semi‐collusive Production Cartel in Differenciated Duopoly

差异化双寡头中的质量改进研发与半共谋生产卡特尔

• 发表时间: 2012
• 作者: Ouchida; Ya sunori
• 通讯作者: Ya sunori

The organization of R&D and environmental policy: So does emission subsidy reduce emissions?

R的组织

• 发表时间: 2012
• 作者: 大内田康徳