SaTC: CORE: Small: Building Resilience into LEO Satellite Networks by Exploiting Network Layer Characteristics

SaTC：核心：小型：通过利用网络层特征构建 LEO 卫星网络的弹性

• 批准号: 2308761
• 负责人: Tao Shu
• 金额: $ 30万
• 依托单位: Auburn University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2023
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2023-10-01 至 2026-09-30
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2308761&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: SaTC; CORE; Small; Building; Resilience

Being a critical infrastructure of our society, the security of low Earth orbit (LEO) satellite networks has a high stake. A satellite network may be subject to excessive attacks launched by strongly motivated adversaries, some of whom are state sponsored with potentially unlimited computing and intelligence resources thus seriously challenging existing security measures, quite often under the assumption that attackers are resource constrained. Assuming this updated threat model, this project will explore new counter-measure defense approaches. The novelties of proposed efforts are to take considerations of the intrinsic resources possessed by a LEO satellite system at its network layer, such as rich and dense satellite connectivity and high satellite mobility, to develop a suite of physical-constrained, rather than computation-constrained, security methods that can improve LEO satellite network’s resilience against attacks. The project's broader significance and importance are to directly address the security threats faced by LEO systems in order to protect the social and economic benefits of this critical infrastructure.This project will fundamentally advance the state of art LEO satellite network security research from several aspects. In particular, by exploiting the global spatial distribution of LEO satellites and their dense connectivity and high mobility, this project will propose physical-constrained randomized multi-path-routing-based secret key generation methods that are immune to resource-unconstrained attacks. This project will also study cyberattacks on the availability of the LEO networks by considering stealthy, intermittent, and selective packet dropping attacks. A novel detection method will be developed to accurately identify those stealthy packet droppers under harsh inter-satellite communication environment caused by the high mobility. Evaluation of all proposed methods will be performed on a scale-down snapshot-oriented static testbed, complemented by computer simulations on satellite-orbiting-trace data of real LEO systems such as Starlink and OneWeb.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

作为我们社会的关键基础设施，低地轨道（LEO）卫星网络的安全具有很高的股份。卫星网络可能会受到强烈积极进取的对手发起的过度攻击，其中一些国家是由潜在的无限计算和情报资源赞助的国家，因此严重挑战了现有的安全措施，这通常是在攻击者是资源受到限制的假设下。假设此更新的威胁模型，该项目将探索新的应对防御方法。拟议的努力的新颖性是要考虑LEO卫星系统在其网络层上假定的内在资源，例如丰富而密集的卫星连接性和高卫星移动性，以开发一套物理约束的，而不是计算受限的，可以改善LEO卫星网络对攻击的弹性络合力的安全性。该项目的更大意义和重要性是直接解决LEO系统所面临的安全威胁，以保护这种关键基础设施的社会和经济利益。该项目将从几个方面从多个方面促进Leo卫星网络安全研究的最重要状态。特别是，通过利用LEO卫星的全局空间分布及其密集的连接性和高移动性，该项目将提出受到资源不受限制攻击的物理约束的随机限制的随机限制的基于多条路线路由的秘密密钥生成方法。该项目还将通过考虑隐秘，间歇性和选择性的数据包删除攻击来研究有关LEO网络的可用性的网络攻击。将开发一种新颖的检测方法，以准确地识别由高移动性引起的卫星间通信环境下的那些隐形数据包滴管。对所有提出的方法的评估将在面向快照的静态测试台上进行，该式静态测试台，由计算机模拟在卫星 - 孔路跟踪中的计算机模拟完成，例如Starlink和OneWeb。该奖项反映了NSF的稳定任务，以使用基金会的智力效果和宽阔的评估来评估支持，并被认为是珍贵的支持。