Collaborative Research: CISE-MSI: RPEP: CPS: A Resilient Cyber-Physical Security Framework for Next-Generation Distributed Energy Resources at Grid Edge

合作研究：CISE-MSI：RPEP：CPS：电网边缘下一代分布式能源的弹性网络物理安全框架

• 批准号: 2219733
• 负责人: Taesic Kim
• 金额: $ 73.74万
• 依托单位: Texas A&M University-Kingsville
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2022-10-01 至 2025-09-30
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2219733&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; CISE; MSI; RPEP

This award is funded in whole or in part under the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (Public Law 117-2).Current electric power grid is undergoing transition due to the rapid penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) including renewable energy systems, energy storage systems, and electric vehicles. However, new cybersecurity threats arise. It is still challenging to model and manage a cross-layered security perimeter in multiparty-involved DER systems. Maloperation or malicious control of DERs will be caused by advanced attackers (e.g., hackers and insiders) as seen the real-world attack cases using the expanded attack surfaces. Besides, quantum era is coming soon and it is anticipated that quantum computing attacks will be possible within 5–10 years. In addition, many inverter-based DERs exposed to the public are vulnerable to physical attacks. To address major threats facing the cyber-physical DERs, this project aims to develop a resilient cyber-physical security framework with a collaborative partnership across multidisciplinary team members from two minority serving institutions, Texas A&M University-Kingsville and University of Illinois Chicago, and Sandia National Laboratories. Moreover, this partnership supports an integrative research and education program of the MSIs for training skilled next-generation workforce in the cyber-physical power and energy systems areas.The technical goal of this project is to launch a major research direction to develop an innovative resilient cyber-physical security framework that addresses imminent challenges in both future cyber-physical security requirements and power engineering designs and resilient operational strategies for DER-rich power systems. Specific integrated research thrusts are as follows: (a) developing a blockchain security governance model for DER systems operating under multiparty and system of systems environments; (b) developing a quantum secure DER network by studying a lightweight post quantum cryptography against quantum computing attacks; (c) realizing DER inverter hardware hardening by investigating a new DER smart inverter security design; and (d) achieving controlled resilience at grid edge using event-triggered resilient self-learning control with retrieval strategy ensuring reduced dependency and susceptibility to communication during security breach.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

该奖项是根据2021年《美国救援计划法》的全部或部分资助（公共法117-2）。由于分布式能源（DERS）的快速渗透，包括可再生能源系统，能源系统，储能系统和电动汽车，电力电网正在过渡。但是，出现了新的网络安全威胁。建模和管理多方涉及的DER系统中的跨层安全周边仍然具有挑战性。通过使用扩展的攻击表面的现实世界攻击案例，对DER的失误或恶意控制将是由高级攻击者（例如黑客和内部人士）引起的。此外，量子时代即将到来，预计将在5 - 10年内进行量子计算攻击。此外，许多暴露于公众的基于逆变器的DER容易受到物理攻击的影响。为了应对网络物理DERS面临的主要威胁，该项目旨在开发一个依赖的网络物理安全框架，该框架与来自两个服务于德克萨斯州A＆M University-Kingsville的少数民族机构的多学科团队成员建立了合作合作伙伴关系，该团队成员伊利诺伊州芝加哥大学和伊利诺伊州芝加哥大学和桑迪亚国家实验室。此外，该伙伴关系支持MSI的一项综合研究和教育计划，用于在网络物理能力和能源系统领域培训熟练的下一代劳动力。该项目的技术目标是为开发具有创新性的网络物理式安全框架开发一个主要的研究指导，以解决将来在未来的网络机构安全需求和强制性操作性的范围内挑战的挑战。特定的集成研究推力如下：（a）为在多方和系统环境系统下运行的DER系统开发区块链安全治理模型； （b）通过研究针对量子计算攻击的轻量级量子加密来开发量子安全网络； （c）通过研究新的智能逆变器安全设计来实现逆变器硬件硬件； （d）使用事件触发的弹性自我学习控制，通过检索策略在网格边缘实现受控的弹性，以确保在安全违规过程中降低依赖性和对沟通的易感性。该奖项反映了NSF的法定任务，并通过使用该基金会的知识分子和更广泛的影响来评估NSF的法定任务，并通过评估诚实地表示支持。

项目成果

Blockchain-Integrated Resilient Distributed Energy Resources Management System

区块链集成弹性分布式能源管理系统

• DOI: 10.1109/smartgridcomm52983.2022.9961046
• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm
• 作者: Ahmad, Seerin;Ahn, Bohyun;Kim, Taesic;Choi, Jinchun;Chae, Myungsuk;Han, Dongjun;Won, Dongjun
• 通讯作者: Won, Dongjun