Collaborative Research: Should Regulators Have Independence from Political Pressures? Politics, Banking, and Bankruptcies During the Progressive Era, 1890s to 1920s

合作研究：监管机构是否应该独立于政治压力？

• 批准号: 2214557
• 负责人: Marco Antonio Martinez del Angel
• 金额: $ 15.84万
• 依托单位: California State L A University Auxiliary Services Inc.
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2022-09-01 至 2024-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2214557&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Should; Regulators; Independence

Should government regulators, particularly those that supervise financial institutions, be subject to the whims of politicians, who might demand actions in their personal or partisan interests, or should regulators operate independent of politicians in the short run? Independent regulators are appointed by politicians to accomplish tasks defined by legislatures but can only be fired for “good cause,” which means that the regulators serve their terms in office as long as they fulfill their duties and do not violate the law. Today, regulatory independence is the norm. It forms a cornerstone of the financial system. All federal agencies that regulate banks, like the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Federal Reserve System, operate independently. Questions, however, have been raised about the effectiveness and constitutionality of regulatory independence. The effectiveness of regulatory independence is difficult to study today. So, we study historical analogies, particularly during the Progressive Era, when U.S. state governments experimented with the structure of regulatory agencies and transitioned from politically independent to politically dependent regulators. To assess the impact of these political experiments, we gather new data that will allow scholars to better understand the history of the Progressive Era and the impact of government intervention on the financial system and rest of the economy.This research will examine how political control of bank supervision affected financial institutions and firms, and how financial and political instability contributed to the spread of political polarization during the Progressive Era. To answer these questions, the project will build a new dataset on business and bank foundation and failure rates by state and quarter from the 1890s through the 1930s as well as the aggregate liabilities and assets of these institutions. The project will also build a new dataset on the structure of financial regulation in the 50 states. This information will be merged with existing data on politics, political structures, voting by the public and political representatives, and the state of the national and local economies. The new dataset will advance knowledge of the Progressive Era, lifting a veil on relationships between economics and politics that existing data obscures. The data will also advance knowledge related to current policy debates, particularly the optimal design of institutions regulating financial institutions.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

政府监管机构，特别是那些监督金融机构的监管机构是否受到政治家的低语，他们可能要求其个人或党派利益行动，或者监管机构在短期内应独立于政治家行动？政治家任命独立监管机构来完成立法机关定义的任务，但只能为“良好理由”开除，这意味着，只要他们履行职责并且不违反法律，监管机构就职于其任期。如今，监管独立性是常态。它构成了金融系统的基石。所有规范银行的联邦机构，例如联邦存款保险公司和美联储系统，都独立运营。但是，关于监管独立性的有效性和合宪性提出了问题。今天的监管独立性的有效性很难研究。因此，我们研究了历史类比，尤其是在进步时代，当时美国州政府试验监管机构的结构并从政治独立到政治依赖的监管机构过渡。为了评估这些政治实验的影响，我们收集了新的数据，这些数据将使学者能够更好地了解进步时代的历史以及政府干预对金融体系和其他经济的影响。这项研究将研究银行监督的政治控制影响金融机构和公司的政治控制，以及如何在整个进步时代的政治化过程中贡献了政治化的蔓延。为了回答这些问题，该项目将建立一个有关商业和银行基金会的新数据集，并按照州和四分之一的限制，从1890年代到1930年代，以及这些机构的总负债和资产。该项目还将在50个州建立有关金融监管结构的新数据集。这些信息将与有关政治，政治结构的现有数据合并，由公众和政治代表以及民族和地方经济的状况合并。新数据集将促进对进步时代的了解，从而揭示现有数据掩盖的经济学与政治之间的关系的面纱。这些数据还将推进与当前政策辩论有关的知识，尤其是监管金融机构的机构的最佳设计。该奖项反映了NSF的法定使命，并使用基金会的知识分子优点和更广泛的影响审查标准，通过评估被认为是宝贵的支持。