Collaborative Research: SaTC: CORE: Medium: Game Theory, Economics, and Mechanism Design for Blockchains

协作研究：SaTC：核心：媒介：区块链的博弈论、经济学和机制设计

• 批准号: 2212746
• 负责人: Elaine Shi
• 金额: $ 46万
• 依托单位: Carnegie-Mellon University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2022
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2022-07-01 至 2026-06-30
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2212746&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; SaTC; CORE; Medium

Blockchains, and their capability of enforcing property rights for digital data, have the potential to unlock the next incarnation of the Internet and a new wave of important applications. Modern blockchains rely on incentives for cooperative behavior differently than do classical distributed systems, such as our traditional banking system. Decentralized blockchains usually rely on a native cryptocurrency to motivate independent actors to run them correctly, whereas classical distributed systems are typically deployed in directed and closed environments. There is therefore an urgent need to develop rigorous foundations of the economic and incentive factors in blockchains and cryptocurrencies in general. The project team is also developing new and freely available educational materials on blockchains, in order to make this important but complex topic more accessible to all.The project has three research thrusts. The first thrust concerns transaction fee mechanism design (that is, how to select which pending transactions are included for execution on the blockchain, and at what prices). The goals here are to understand the welfare and revenue approximation guarantees for different transaction fee mechanisms, to leverage cryptographic primitives to overcome impossibility results, and to achieve robustness to long-term collusion by cartels of block producers. The second thrust pursues cryptographic protocols that possess strong game-theoretic guarantees, with a focus on the design of cryptographic mechanisms that are resilient to side contracts and game-theoretically fair multi-party computation. The final thrust investigates how to design decentralized blockchains with desirable economic properties. Specific goals here include determining simple modifications to Nakamoto consensus that improve its security, formulating a definition of economic security against liveness (as opposed to safety) attacks, and rigorously comparing the economic security offered by proof-of-work and proof-of-stake mechanisms. Together, these research thrusts develop significant foundations for a theory of blockchains and cryptocurrencies.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

区块链及其为数字数据执行财产权的能力，有可能解锁Internet的下一个化身和新一波重要应用程序。 现代区块链依靠对合作行为的激励措施与经典分布式系统（例如我们的传统银行系统）不同。分散的区块链通常依靠本地加密货币来激励独立参与者正确运行它们，而经典的分布式系统通常部署在有导和封闭的环境中。因此，迫切需要建立严格的基础，以扩展区块链和加密货币的经济和激励因素。 项目团队还正在开发有关区块链的新的且免费的教育材料，以使所有人更容易获得这个重要但复杂的主题。该项目具有三个研究作用。 第一个推力涉及交易费用机制的设计（也就是说，如何选择哪些待处理交易包括在区块链上执行，以及以什么价格执行）。 这里的目标是了解不同交易费用机制的福利和收入近似保证，以利用加密原始词来克服不可能的结果，并实现稳健性的稳健性，以对块生产商的卡特尔进行长期勾结。 第二个推力追求具有强大游戏理论保证的加密协议，重点是设计加密机制的设计，这些机制对侧合同有抵抗力和游戏理论上公平的多方计算。 最终推力研究了如何使用理想的经济特性设计分散的区块链。 此处的具体目标包括确定对中amoto共识的简单修改，以提高其安全性，从而对经济安全的定义（与安全性）进行了定义，并严格比较了工作证明和证明机制提供的经济安全。 这些研究的推力共同为区块链和加密货币的理论创造了重要的基础。该奖项反映了NSF的法定任务，并被认为是值得通过基金会的知识分子优点和更广泛影响的评估标准通过评估来支持的。