RINGS: Resilience of NextG Communication Systems to Malicious Modification Attacks

RINGS：NextG 通信系统对恶意修改攻击的恢复能力

基本信息

批准号：
2148211
负责人：
Aria Nosratinia
金额：
$ 99.82万
依托单位：
University of Texas at Dallas
依托单位国家：
美国
项目类别：
Continuing Grant
财政年份：
2022
资助国家：
美国
起止时间：
2022-05-01 至 2025-04-30
项目状态：
未结题

来源：
https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=2148211&HistoricalAwards=false
关键词：
RINGS Resilience NextG Communication Systems

项目摘要

The next generation of wireless communication systems (NextG) presents a larger attack surface to malicious actors. The increased vulnerability is driven by many factors including the rising complexity of systems and algorithms, the blurring of the line between computing and communication, and the introduction of new technologies such as Internet of Things (IoT) that introduce devices from a globalized supply chain, whose provenance and security may be difficult to verify or guarantee. This project investigates the emerging risks from malicious modifications in hardware or software of NextG wireless communication systems, and devises techniques that improve the resilience of the next generation of communication systems against these risks. Malicious modifications can find their way into a communication system via software or firmware updates, which are nowadays common. Malicious hardware modifications have also evolved into a credible threat, due to the stretching of the integrated circuit (IC) fabrication supply chain that creates many opportunities for vulnerabilities to be inserted into a communication IC from design to fabrication. The project’s broader significance and importance are the protection of NextG systems against cyber threats, electrical and computer engineering curriculum development, and K-12 outreach.More specifically, this project concentrates on the modification threats that infiltrate the physical layer of wireless communication systems, inflicting harm by compromising data, or hampering legitimate communication via jamming and denial of service. New classes of modification threats in the physical layer are identified, and their threat is quantitatively analyzed. The research project further studies methods to detect the presence of malicious modifications, an important step for their removal or neutralization. The performance of these detection techniques is studied under adversarial uncertainty. The project demonstrates and verifies the attacks, as well as detection and mitigation strategies, via a custom-designed hardware platform.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

下一代无线通信系统（NextG）为恶意演员提供了更大的攻击表面。增加的脆弱性是由许多因素驱动的，包括系统和算法的复杂性上升，计算和通信之间的界限模糊以及引入新技术（例如物联网（IoT）），这些新技术（IoT）引入了全球化供应链中的设备，这些供应链的设备可能很难验证或保证或保证。该项目调查了Nextg无线通信系统硬件或软件中恶意修改的新兴风险，并设计了提高下一代通信系统应对这些风险的弹性的技术。恶意的修改可以通过软件或固件更新进入通信系统，这些更新是常见的。由于综合电路（IC）制造供应链的伸展，恶意硬件修改也发展成为可靠的威胁，这为从设计到制造的通信IC插入了许多漏洞。该项目更广泛的意义和重要性是保护NextG系统免受网络威胁，电气和计算机工程课程的开发以及K-12外展的保护。更具体地说，该项目集中在无线通信系统的物理层面的修改威胁上，通过损害数据来侵蚀危害，或通过损害损害数据，或通过损害通过Jamming和Denial niragimand of jamming和disnial sereanial和否认的危害。确定了物理层中的新的修改威胁，并对它们的威胁进行了定量分析。该研究项目进一步研究了检测恶意修改的存在的方法，这是其去除或中和的重要步骤。这些检测技术的性能在对抗性不确定性下进行了研究。该项目通过定制设计的硬件平台展示并验证了攻击以及检测和缓解策略。该奖项反映了NSF的法定任务，并通过使用该基金会的知识分子优点和更广泛的影响评估标准来通过评估来诚实地支持。