Collaborative Research: Electoral Systems as Incentive Structures for Interparty and Intraparty Politics
合作研究:选举制度作为党际和党内政治的激励结构
基本信息
- 批准号:2048531
- 负责人:
- 金额:$ 7.52万
- 依托单位:
- 依托单位国家:美国
- 项目类别:Standard Grant
- 财政年份:2021
- 资助国家:美国
- 起止时间:2021-07-01 至 2023-06-30
- 项目状态:已结题
- 来源:
- 关键词:
项目摘要
Why does the nature of representation vary across countries, states, and localities? Despite the fact that most politicians work hard to prove they deserve re-election, citizens often express frustration with the behavior of their elected officials. This project develops a new data set based on at least 2750 elections for national legislatures in nearly 150 countries for a 75 year period. The data will be used to test to what extent the type of representation citizens receive is a function of the electoral rules used to choose their representatives. Specifically, the project examines whether electoral rules explain variation in interparty politics — the number of parties and the variety of the policies they promise — and intraparty politics — the balance representatives strike between offering their constituents programmatic policy or particularistic rewards and constituency service.This project tests whether electoral rules explain variation in interparty politics — the effective number of parties, parties’ locations in the policy space, congruence between citizens’ preferences and policy — and intraparty politics — the content of campaigns, the amount of constituency service provided, the design of legislative institutions, levels of party discipline, and the balance struck between programmatic policy and pork barrel politics. The effort is unique in two ways. First, the project compiles a dataset with the details of the systems used to conduct more than 2,750 elections for national legislatures in nearly 150 countries for a 75-year-period. Second, it uses simulations to transparently generate interval-level indicators of the extent to which , on the interparty dimension, electoral systems encourage voters to express their heterogeneous preferences for a wide array of offerings and, on the intraparty front, allow voters to fill legislatures with noteworthy individuals as opposed to party automatons.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.
为什么不同国家、州和地方的代表性性质不同?尽管大多数政客努力证明自己值得连任,但公民经常对当选官员的行为表示失望。该项目开发了一个新的数据集。基于 75 年期间近 150 个国家的至少 2750 次国家立法机构选举,这些数据将用于测试公民获得的代表权类型在多大程度上取决于用于选择其代表的选举规则。该项目审查是否选举规则解释了政党间政治的变化——政党的数量和它们承诺的政策的多样性——以及党内政治——代表为选民提供纲领性政策或特殊奖励和选区服务之间的平衡。这个项目测试了选举规则是否解释了变化在政党间政治中——政党的有效数量、政党在政策空间中的位置、公民偏好和政策之间的一致性——以及党内政治中——竞选活动的内容、提供的选区服务的数量、立法机构的设计、党纪,首先,该项目在两个方面取得了独特的成果:编制了一个数据集,其中包含用于为近 150 个国家的 75 个国家进行 2,750 多次选举的系统的详细信息。其次,它使用模拟来透明地生成区间级别的指标,表明选举制度在多大程度上鼓励选民表达对各种产品的不同偏好。该奖项反映了 NSF 的法定使命,并通过使用基金会的智力优点和更广泛的影响审查标准进行评估,被认为值得支持。
项目成果
期刊论文数量(0)
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会议论文数量(0)
专利数量(0)
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Santiago Olivella其他文献
COUNTER-STEREOTYPICAL MESSAGING AND PARTISAN CUES: MOVING THE NEEDLE ON VACCINES IN A POLARIZED U.S.
反刻板印象和党派暗示:在两极分化的美国推动疫苗发展
- DOI:
- 发表时间:
2022 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:0
- 作者:
B. Larsen;Marc J Hetherington;S. Greene;T. Ryan;Rahsaan Maxwell;S. Tadelis;Cameron Ballard;James Chu;Isabella de;Vere Hunt;P. Dupas;Brigham Fransden;Matt Gentzkow;Paul Gertler;Bryan Graham;Guido Imbens;Joshua Kalla;Pat Kline;Lars Lefgren;Randall Lewis;Eleni Linos;Mike MacKuen;Santiago Olivella;Linda Ong;Christopher Palmer;K. Ribisl;Jason Roberts;Darcy Sawatski;H. Varian - 通讯作者:
H. Varian
Recalibration of Predicted Probabilities Using the “Logit Shift”: Why Does It Work, and When Can It Be Expected to Work Well?
使用“Logit Shift”重新校准预测概率:为什么它有效,什么时候可以有效?
- DOI:
- 发表时间:
2023 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:5.4
- 作者:
Evan T. R. Rosenman;Cory McCartan;Santiago Olivella - 通讯作者:
Santiago Olivella
Atmospheric formation of the NO3radical from gas-phase reaction of HNO3acid with the NH2radical: proton-coupled electron-transferversushydrogen atom transfer mechanisms
- DOI:
10.1039/c4cp02792b - 发表时间:
2014-08 - 期刊:
- 影响因子:3.3
- 作者:
Josep M. Anglada;Santiago Olivella;Albert Solé - 通讯作者:
Albert Solé
Santiago Olivella的其他文献
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