SaTC: CORE: Small: A Secure Processor that Exploits Multicore Parallelism while Protecting Against Microarchitecture State Attacks

SaTC：CORE：小型：利用多核并行性同时防止微架构状态攻击的安全处理器

• 批准号: 1929261
• 负责人: Omer Khan
• 金额: $ 50万
• 依托单位: University of Connecticut
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2019
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2019-10-01 至 2024-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1929261&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: SaTC; CORE; Small; Secure; Processor

Microprocessors are widely deployed in cloud, fog, edge, and mobile computing platforms. In all cases, the economies of scale stem from our ability (through the use of mature virtualization technologies) to host large sets of applications from diverse domains. These applications increasingly operate on private or confidential user data. A major hurdle for exposing and exploiting virtualization capabilities in next generation processors is the lack of a clear vision for how to address the security challenges associated with co-locating applications that share hardware. This project singles out the challenge of controlling leakage of speculative and non-speculative microarchitecture state information: the ability of an adversary to glean sensitive information about a co-located workload by observing patterns of communication or resource utilization at various layers of the processor hardware stack. The importance of this problem is exacerbated by recent attacks on commercial microprocessors, where hardware resource sharing is exploited to expose microarchitecture state information to an adversary that is otherwise inaccessible or not directly visible in the system state.The project develops a new abstraction for securing the microarchitecture state vulnerabilities in multicore processors. Today's processors assume temporal execution of secure (victim) and insecure (potentially malicious) applications under the purview of virtualization. For strong isolation, at each context switch, a secure processor must clean the microarchitecture state from all shared hardware resources. This project re-thinks secure processor designs, and challenges these assumptions in the context of multicore processors. A spatio-temporal execution model is envisioned, where the cores are spatially partitioned into secure and insecure clusters (or domains). The secure cluster and its accompanying software and hardware is envisioned to become the only trusted component in the multicore processor trusted computing base (TCB). This allows the concurrently executing domains to fully exploit their allocated hardware resources for performance, while guaranteeing bounded information leakage through the hardware sharing of microarchitecture state. The incorporation of security to tackle microarchitecture state vulnerabilities at various levels of the processor hardware is timely, as it ensures that the consideration of security concerns in the still-evolving hardware stack is not an afterthought. Doing so will speed up the adoption of emerging safety-critical secure applications, thus improving the hardness and certification of the US cyber infrastructure, with significant benefits to our economy and society.This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

微处理器广泛部署在云，雾，边缘和移动计算平台中。在所有情况下，规模经济都源于我们的能力（通过使用成熟的虚拟化技术）托管来自不同领域的大量应用程序。这些应用程序越来越多地在私人或机密用户数据上运行。在下一代处理器中揭示和利用虚拟化功能的一个主要障碍是缺乏明确的愿景，即如何应对与共享硬件的共同确定应用程序相关的安全挑战。该项目解决了控制投机性和非规范微体系结构状态信息的泄漏的挑战：对手通过观察处理器硬件堆栈各个层的通信或资源利用模式通过观察通信或资源利用模式来收集有关共同工作量的敏感信息的能力。最近对商业微处理器的攻击使此问题的重要性加剧了，在这些攻击中，硬件资源共享被利用，以将微体系结构状态信息暴露于对手中，否则该项目在系统状态下是无法访问或不直接可见的。该项目在多核心处理器中开发了一种新的抽象，以确保一种新的抽象。当今的处理器假设在虚拟化的权限下对安全（受害者）和不安全（潜在恶意）应用程序进行时间执行。对于强隔离，在每个上下文开关处，安全处理器必须从所有共享硬件资源中清洁微结构状态。该项目重新考虑了安全的处理器设计，并在多层处理器的背景下挑战了这些假设。设想了一个时空执行模型，其中将核心划分为安全和不安全的群集（或域）。设想安全集群及其随附的软件和硬件成为多核心处理器受信任计算基础（TCB）中唯一受信任的组件。这使得同时执行域可以充分利用其分配的硬件资源来进行性能，同时通过微体系结构状态的硬件共享来确保有限的信息泄漏。在处理器硬件的各个级别上解决安全状态漏洞的安全性是及时的，因为它可以确保在仍在不断发展的硬件堆栈中考虑安全问题并不是事后的想法。这样做将加快采用新兴安全至关重要的安全应用程序，从而改善美国网络基础设施的硬度和认证，并对我们的经济和社会产生重大好处。该奖项反映了NSF的法定任务，并被认为是值得通过基金会的知识绩效和更广泛影响的审查审查的评估来通过评估来获得支持的。

项目成果

Timing-based side-channel attack and mitigation on PCIe connected distributed embedded systems

• DOI: 10.1109/hpec49654.2021.9622848
• 发表时间: 2021-01-01
• 期刊: 2021 IEEE HIGH PERFORMANCE EXTREME COMPUTING CONFERENCE (HPEC)
• 作者: Khaliq, Salman Abdul;Ali, Usman;Khan, Omer
• 通讯作者: Khan, Omer

MultiCon: An Efficient Timing-based Side Channel Attack on Shared Memory Multicores

MultiCon：对共享内存多核的有效的基于定时的侧通道攻击

• DOI: 10.1109/iccd56317.2022.00024
• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: 2022 IEEE 40th International Conference on Computer Design (ICCD
• 作者: Ali, Usman;Khan, Omer
• 通讯作者: Khan, Omer

ASM: An Adaptive Secure Multicore for Co-located Mutually Distrusting Processes

ASM：用于共置互不信任进程的自适应安全多核

• DOI: 10.1145/3587480
• 发表时间: 2023
• 期刊: ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization
• 影响因子: 1.6
• 作者: Sahni, Abdul Rasheed;Omar, Hamza;Ali, Usman;Khan, Omer
• 通讯作者: Khan, Omer

SSE: Security Service Engines to Accelerate Enclave Performance in Secure Multicore Processors

SSE：安全服务引擎可提高安全多核处理器中的 Enclave 性能

• DOI: 10.1109/lca.2022.3210149
• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: IEEE Computer Architecture Letters
• 影响因子: 2.3
• 作者: Nye, Jared;Khan, Omer
• 通讯作者: Khan, Omer

IRONHIDE: A Secure Multicore that Efficiently Mitigates Microarchitecture State Attacks for Interactive Applications

IRONHIDE：一种安全多核，可有效缓解交互式应用程序的微架构状态攻击

• DOI: 10.1109/hpca47549.2020.00019
• 发表时间: 2020
• 期刊: 2020 IEEE International Symposium on High Performance Computer Architecture (HPCA
• 作者: Omar, Hamza;Khan, Omer
• 通讯作者: Khan, Omer