TWC: TTP Option: Small: Differential Introspective Side Channels --- Discovery, Analysis, and Defense

TWC：TTP 选项：小：差异内省侧通道 --- 发现、分析和防御

• 批准号: 1526455
• 负责人: Zhuoqing Mao
• 金额: $ 60.53万
• 依托单位: Regents of the University of Michigan - Ann Arbor
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2015
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2015-10-01 至 2021-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1526455&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: TWC; TTP; Option; Small; Differential

Side channels in the security domain are known to be challenging to discover and eliminate systematically. Nevertheless, they can lead to a variety of stealthy attacks seriously compromising cybersecurity. This work focuses on an important class of side channels that are fundamental to the operations of networked systems. Rather than constantly reacting to newly discovered side channels because of security breaches with ad-hoc patches, this work enables the automated discovery of an important class of side channels that exist due to the inherent goal of exposing information to enable debugging and management of computing systems. This project is expected to bring a paradigm shift to the security area of side channel investigation that can bring significant economic benefits of preventing a diverse set of cyberattacks. This project also has important educational and workforce training benefits for both undergraduate and graduate students, in addition to the broader dissemination of the findings through applicable standards processes to ensure operational adoption.This research investigates an entirely new class of side channel attacks against networked systems such as network stacks that can lead to significant damage to user privacy, network security, and application integrity. An example feature about this class of attacks is the requirement of actively injecting carefully crafted and potentially incorrect events to trigger error conditions in a program so as to reveal their internal sensitive states, which can indirectly expose critical information. Interestingly, the attacks are inherent byproducts of network and operating system design and implementation, which are fundamentally hard to modify. In contrast to other well-known side channels that can be directly observed through passive monitoring, e.g., power and timing, this class of side channels is much more subtle to discover and also more challenging to defend against. The proposed security work helps introduce a more rigorous approach to discovering a new class of side channels, that have direct impact on the security assurance of both small systems such as mobile devices as well as large network systems such as enterprise networks. This research develops methods to systematically and rigorously detect and eliminate such side channels by leveraging both program analysis and network measurement science. The investigation to understand the tradeoffs between security guarantee and manageability of network systems leads to more practical and usable security solutions that can be deployed in practice.

众所周知，安全域中的侧渠道是具有挑战性的，要系统地发现和消除。然而，它们可能导致各种隐秘攻击严重损害了网络安全。这项工作着重于一系列重要的侧渠道，这些渠道是网络系统运营基础的重要渠道。这项工作并没有因为对临时补丁的安全漏洞而不断对新发现的侧渠道做出反应，而是可以自动发现一类重要的侧渠道，而这些侧面渠道的存在是由于固有的目标是公开信息以实现计算系统的调试和管理。预计该项目将带来范式调查的安全区域的范式，这可以带来巨大的经济利益，以防止各种各样的网络攻击。该项目还通过适用的标准流程更广泛地传播发现结果，以确保运营采用，还对本科生和研究生都具有重要的教育和劳动力培训优势。本研究还研究了一类全新的侧渠道攻击，这是针对网络堆栈（例如网络堆栈）的全新类别的侧面渠道攻击，这些系统可以对用户隐私，网络安全性，网络安全性和应用程序进行重大损害。有关此类攻击的一个示例功能是主动注入精心设计的事件，并可能触发程序中的错误条件，以揭示其内部敏感状态，以揭示其内部敏感状态，这可以间接暴露出关键信息。有趣的是，这些攻击是网络和操作系统设计和实施的固有副产品，从根本上讲，它们很难修改。 与其他众所周知的侧渠道相反，可以通过被动监控（例如功率和时间安排）直接观察到，这类侧渠道更加微妙，并且更具挑战性地防御。 拟议的安全工作有助于引入更严格的方法，以发现新的侧渠道，这些渠道直接影响了两个小型系统（例如移动设备）以及大型网络系统（例如企业网络）的安全保证。这项研究开发了通过利用程序分析和网络测量科学来系统，严格地检测和消除此类侧渠道的方法。 了解安全保证与网络系统可管理性之间的权衡的调查导致可以在实践中部署的更实际和可用的安全解决方案。