AF: Small: Towards More Realistic Models in Algorithmic Mechanism Design

AF：小：算法机制设计中迈向更现实的模型

• 批准号: 1420381
• 负责人: Anna Karlin
• 金额: $ 45万
• 依托单位: University of Washington
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2014
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2014-08-01 至 2018-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1420381&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: AF; Small; Towards; More; Realistic

Algorithmic mechanism design, or  "incentive engineering", is a topic of great importance at the intersection of game theory, economics and computer science. Research in this field focuses on the design and analysis of algorithms or protocols that are explicitly designed so that rational participants, motivated solely by their self-interest, will end up achieving the designer's goals. In the age of the Internet, the set of important mechanism design applications is vast, including online auctions, advertising auctions, file sharing, routing and scheduling, among others. This project is aimed at developing the foundations of algorithmic mechanism design and its applications.More specifically, the primary goal of the project is to develop simple and robust mechanisms for fundamental problems in algorithmic mechanism design under more realistic modeling assumptions than those used in the past. Building on the theoretical foundations of game theory and computer science, the research will explore auction design in the fundamental setting of agents whose values are correlated or common, and in more realistic settings where agents that do not know their values can spend time and money to learn about them. The PI will also explore mechanism design in repeated and online settings, as well as game-theoretic matching problems.This research has a great potential to influence mechanisms employed in online auctions, a huge societal benefit.

算法机制设计，或称“激励工程”，是博弈论、经济学和计算机科学交叉领域的一个非常重要的课题，该领域的研究重点是明确设计的算法或协议的设计和分析，以便理性的参与者。仅仅出于自身利益的动机，最终会实现设计者的目标。 在互联网时代，重要的机制设计应用非常广泛，包括在线拍卖、广告拍卖、文件共享、路由和调度等。 .这个项目的目的是更具体地说，该项目的主要目标是在比过去使用的模型假设更现实的建模假设下，为算法机制设计中的基本问题开发简单而稳健的机制。以博弈论和计算机科学的理论基础为基础，该研究将在价值观相关或共同的代理人的基本设置中探索拍卖设计，以及在更现实的设置中，不知道自己价值观的代理人可以花费时间和金钱PI还将探索重复和在线的机制设计。这项研究对于影响在线拍卖中采用的机制具有巨大的潜力，具有巨大的社会效益。