TWC: Small: Collaborative: Advancing Anonymity Against an AS-level Adversary

TWC：小型：协作：针对 AS 级对手推进匿名性

• 批准号: 1423163
• 负责人: Jiang Ming
• 金额: $ 25万
• 依托单位: University of Texas at Arlington
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2014
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2014-09-01 至 2018-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1423163&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: TWC; Small; Collaborative; Advancing; Anonymity

Autonomous systems (AS) are key building blocks of the Internet's routing infrastructure. Surveillance of AS may allow large-scale monitoring of Internet users. Those who aim to protect the privacy of their online communications may turn to anonymity systems like Tor, but Tor is not designed to protect against such AS-level adversaries. AS-level adversaries present unique challenges for the design of robust anonymity systems and present a very different threat model from the ones used to design and study systems like Tor. Thus, new research is needed to understand this threat and to defend against it. This project is investigating the design of anonymity systems that are resilient against AS-level adversaries. First, the project aims to quantify the capabilities of AS-level adversaries, who are powerful eavesdroppers and also capable of active attacks, but also have some limitations in practice. Second, the project is designing new route-selection strategies for anonymity systems that can limit how much of the anonymized traffic the AS-level adversary can observe and attack. Finally, the project is investigating how anonymity systems can hinder an AS-level adversaries' ability to analyze encrypted traffic by injecting spurious cover traffic and timing delays. The findings and new anonymity system designs from this research will impact the privacy of a broad class of users in the context of forms of large-scale monitoring of online communications.

自主系统（AS）是Internet路由基础架构的关键构件。 AS的监视可能允许对互联网用户进行大规模监视。那些旨在保护其在线沟通隐私的人可能会转向像Tor这样的匿名系统，但Tor并非旨在防止诸如级别的对手。作为对手的对手，对强大的匿名系统的设计提出了独特的挑战，并与设计和研究系统（如Tor）提出了非常不同的威胁模型。因此，需要新的研究来了解这一威胁并捍卫它。该项目正在调查针对ASELEVEVERSARIES的匿名系统的设计。首先，该项目旨在量化强大的窃听者且能够积极攻击，但在实践中也有一些局限性。其次，该项目是针对匿名系统设计新的路线选择策略，这些策略可以限制AS级对手可以观察和攻击的匿名流量中的多少。最后，该项目正在调查匿名系统如何阻碍AS级对手通过注入虚假的流量和时机延迟来分析加密流量的能力。这项研究的发现和新的匿名系统设计将影响大量用户的隐私，以大规模监控在线通信的形式。

项目成果

DeNASA: Destination-Naive AS-Awareness in Anonymous Communications

DeNASA：匿名通信中的目的地朴素 AS 意识

• DOI: 10.1515/popets-2016-0044
• 发表时间: 2016
• 期刊: Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
• 作者: Barton, Armon;Wright, Matthew
• 通讯作者: Wright, Matthew

Exploiting Temporal Dynamics in Sybil Defenses

在女巫防御中利用时间动力学

• DOI: 10.1145/2810103.2813693
• 发表时间: 2015
• 期刊: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
• 作者: Liu, Changchang;Gao, Peng;Wright, Matthew;Mittal, Prateek
• 通讯作者: Mittal, Prateek