Doctoral Dissertation Research: Cooperation in Stochastic Games: A Prisoner's Dilemma Experiment

博士论文研究：随机博弈中的合作：囚徒困境实验

• 批准号: 1260840
• 负责人: Andrew Schotter
• 金额: $ 1.36万
• 依托单位: New York University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2013
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2013-04-01 至 2015-03-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1260840&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Cooperation; Stochastic

One question that economists and social scientists have contemplated for some time is what are the proper prerequisites for societal cooperation when private incentives conflict with social ones? One answer to this question comes from the theory of repeated games, the study of decision making amongst members of a group (the game) where the decision is made over and over again. More precisely, the specific game associated with this answer is the repeated prisoner's dilemma. In the prisoner's dilemma, cooperation is socially beneficial but it is in the private best interest of each player to not cooperate and thus, when only played once, no cooperation occurs. However, when the prisoner's dilemma is repeated, cooperation can be sustained by linking future choices to current choices so that the gain that one would obtain by deviating from cooperation in the present period is offset by a loss in future periods. Specifically, the gain is deterred by the credible threat of mutual non-cooperation by all players in the future.Repeated games, however, are a drastic simplification of the real world. Realistically, while many economic situations feature repeated interaction, the nature of the interaction changes through time. This feature is captured by stochastic games, a generalization of repeated games in which the game played each period changes and is determined, at least partially, by chance.This project is a laboratory experiment in the field of stochastic games. In particular, the experiment utilizes a repeated prisoner's dilemma in which the payoffs of the prisoner?s dilemma are stochastically determined each period. Most importantly, given the link between future choices and current choices that is established to sustain cooperation, altering the nature of future choices is a substantial step towards understanding how people behave in these environments.From a broader perspective, the main economic example for the stochastic prisoner?s dilemma in the experiment is collusion among firms over the business cycle. In this environment, firms desire collusion, cooperation on non-competitive prices or quantities, and compete over many periods. The demand fluctuates because of booms and busts in the economy, which changes the exact interaction they face each period. This experiment can potentially guide antitrust law by providing insight into conditions where firms may find it easier to collude.

经济学家和社会科学家已经考虑了一段时间的一个问题是，当私人激励措施与社会方面冲突时，社会合作的适当先决条件是什么？ 这个问题的一个答案来自重复游戏的理论，即一遍又一遍地做出决定的小组成员（游戏）中决策的研究。 更确切地说，与此答案相关的特定游戏是囚犯的一再困境。 在囚犯的困境中，合作在社会上是有益的，但每个玩家不合作符合私人利益，因此，当只玩一次时，就不会发生合作。 但是，当重复囚犯的困境时，可以通过将未来的选择与当前选择联系起来来维持合作，从而使人们通过在当前时期偏离合作而获得的收益被未来时期的损失所抵消。 具体而言，将来所有玩家的相互不合作的可信威胁都会阻止收益。但是，重复的游戏是对现实世界的极大简化。 实际上，尽管许多经济情况都具有反复的互动，但交互的性质会随着时间的流逝而变化。 此功能是由随机游戏捕获的，重复游戏的概括在该游戏中，每个时期都会进行更改，并且至少是偶然地确定的。该项目是随机游戏领域的实验室实验。 特别是，该实验利用了一再的囚犯困境，在这种困境中，囚犯的困境的收益是随机确定的。 最重要的是，鉴于未来的选择与当前选择以维持合作的联系，改变未来选择的本质是了解人们在这些环境中如何行事的重要一步。从更广泛的角度来看，从更广泛的角度来看，随机囚犯的主要经济示例是公司在商业周期中的实验中的困境。 在这种环境下，企业希望勾结，非竞争价格或数量的合作，并在许多时期竞争。 需求由于经济中的繁荣和破产而波动，这改变了他们每个时期面临的确切相互作用。 该实验可以通过洞悉企业可能更容易串通的条件来指导反托拉斯法。