AF: Small: New Directions in Cryptography: Non-Black-Box Techniques against Non-Black-Box Attacks

AF：小：密码学的新方向：针对非黑盒攻击的非黑盒技术

• 批准号: 1218461
• 负责人: Ran Canetti
• 金额: $ 48.02万
• 依托单位: Trustees of Boston University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2012
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2012-09-01 至 2016-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1218461&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: AF; Small; New; Directions; Cryptography

Traditionally, cryptographic algorithms and protocols are geared towards protecting against attacks that interact with the designed algorithms via well specified interfaces (such as I/O and communication). However, the increasingly sophisticated ways in which computing devices are currently used completely shatter the traditional boundaries between the attacker and the "private internals" of the cryptographic algorithm under attack. Algorithms are run over small and exposed machines that leak information on their internal state; they are transported to other, potentially adversarial machines which may inspect all the internal state and also misreport the result; their code is exposed and subject to adversarial tinkering.This project is aimed at developing new algorithmic and analytical techniques for dealing with this new reality. This includes cryptographic algorithms and protocols that are resilient to leakage from and tampering with the internal states of the host machines, program obfuscation techniques, and techniques for verifying computation done on untrusted machines. A basic premise of this project is that new analytical techniques, that no longer treat the adversary as black-box, are essential. Consequently, special effort is dedicated to developing such techniques.The project tackles a set of problems that are central to the security of modern computer systems and consequently also to the well-being and stability of modern society. But even disregarding practical applicability, the tackled problems lie at the heart of our understanding of the notion of computation, the interplay between code and data, and the ability to algorithmically "understand" arbitrary code.

传统上，加密算法和协议旨在防止通过明确指定的接口（例如 I/O 和通信）与设计的算法交互的攻击。然而，当前计算设备的使用方式日益复杂，完全打破了攻击者与受攻击的加密算法的“私有内部结构”之间的传统界限。算法在小型且暴露的机器上运行，这些机器会泄露其内部状态信息；它们被传输到其他潜在的敌对机器，这些机器可能会检查所有内部状态并误报结果；他们的代码被暴露并受到对抗性修补。该项目旨在开发新的算法和分析技术来应对这一新现实。这包括能够抵御主机内部状态泄漏和篡改的加密算法和协议、程序混淆技术以及验证在不可信机器上完成的计算的技术。该项目的一个基本前提是，不再将对手视为黑匣子的新分析技术至关重要。因此，人们特别努力开发此类技术。该项目解决了一系列对于现代计算机系统安全至关重要的问题，从而也关系到现代社会的福祉和稳定。但即使不考虑实际适用性，所解决的问题仍然是我们理解计算概念、代码与数据之间的相互作用以及通过算法“理解”任意代码的能力的核心。