The material basis of function in the brain: Connections to philosophy of biology and phenomenology

大脑功能的物质基础：与生物学哲学和现象学的联系

• 批准号: 1026632
• 负责人: Sean Kelly
• 金额: $ 5.95万
• 依托单位: Harvard University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2010
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2010-09-15 至 2012-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1026632&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: material; basis; function; brain; Connections

IntroductionThis project brings together two distinct perspectives on the mind and the brain, one based in neuroscience and the other in philosophy. The Co-PI (a neuroscientist) will bridge these perspectives by exploring connections between neuroscientific work on cellular mechanisms in the brain and work in phenomenology on the experience of the body in mind-like activities; the PI will do so in collaboration with the PI, a philosopher. The proposed project will serve to articulate and expand the conceptual underpinnings of neuroscience to fit new data using insights from phenomenology.Intellectual meritThree central themes of neuroscience are at issue in this project. They are the following. The central purpose of the brain is to process information, neurons are the key functional constituents of the brain, and information processing is performed by patterns of neuron activation. The discovery of an active role for astrocytes and other non-neuronal elements in shaping the brain's activities is straining the central themes of neuroscience indicated above since these discoveries suggest that information processing may not be so easily divorced from other material elements such as the surrounding astrocytes and blood flow, the roles of particular molecules, or cellular processes within the neuron that make it possible. The Co-PI will draw parallels to similar debates in the nature of biological information, where it has been argued that genetic information is an oversimplification that is meaningless except in the particular cellular context in which it appears. The Co-PI will do so by exploring ways in which the phenomenologist's notion of embodiment may apply not just at the level of an individual organism, but at the cellular and cell-assembly level in the brain as well. Phenomenologist has long argued that mental activities like perception must also be intensely and intrinsically physical and bound to our bodies and engagement with their physical environments.Potential Broader impactsThe project promises to improve communication between the field of neuroscience and philosophy. It will provide an expanded definition of the core endeavor of neuroscience, and it will also provide an articulation of the advantages and dangers of a functionalist or computational approach to the brain that abstracts away the biological details of functions. The goal is to enhance awareness of these implications among scientists and philosophers, as well as sponsors of large new projects that depend on the computational approach, such as the Human Connectome Initiative of NIH.

介绍这个项目汇集了思想和大脑的两个不同的观点，一个基于神经科学，另一个基于哲学。 Co-Pi（神经科学家）将通过探索神经科学方面的工作在大脑中的细胞机制上的联系与现象学从事身体体验的现象学上的联系，来弥合这些观点。 PI将与哲学家Pi合作。拟议的项目将有助于使用现象学的见解来阐明和扩大神经科学的概念基础，以适应新数据。在该项目中，Intlectual feasitthree feasthree中心主题在此项目中引起了问题。他们是以下内容。大脑的核心目的是处理信息，神经元是大脑的关键功能成分，信息处理是通过神经元激活模式执行的。在塑造大脑活动中的星形胶质细胞和其他非神经元元素中发现的积极作用正在扭曲上述神经科学的中心主题，因为这些发现表明，信息处理可能不会很容易与其他物质元素离婚，例如周围的星形胶质细胞和血液，即在特定的分子或细胞的过程中，或者是neurarex of neuron的角色。 CO-PI将与生物学信息性质的类似辩论相似，在这种辩论中，人们认为遗传信息是一种过度简化，除非在特定的蜂窝情况下出现。 Co-Pi将通过探索现象学家的实施概念不仅适用于单个生物体的水平，还适用于大脑中的细胞和细胞组件水平的方法来做到这一点。现象学家长期以来一直认为，诸如感知之类的心理活动也必须在本质上和本质上是身体上的，并与我们的身体束缚，并与他们的身体环境互动。积极的更广泛影响该项目有望改善神经科学领域和哲学领域之间的沟通。它将为神经科学的核心努力提供扩展的定义，还将提供对大脑功能主义者或计算方法的优势和危险的表达，从而将功能的生物学细节抽象出来。目的是提高科学家和哲学家之间对这些含义的认识，以及依赖计算方法的大型新项目的赞助商，例如NIH的人类Connectome倡议。