Collaborative Research: Asymmetric Power in Paired Common Pool and Public Good Games: Experiments, Institutions, and Behavior

合作研究：配对公共池和公共物品博弈中的不对称权力：实验、制度和行为

• 批准号: 0849590
• 负责人: James Cox
• 金额: $ 32.95万
• 依托单位: Georgia State University Research Foundation, Inc.
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-07-15 至 2013-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0849590&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Collaborative; Research; Asymmetric; Power; Paired

This award is funded under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-5). Social dilemmas characterize environments in which individuals' exclusive pursuit of their own material self-interest can produce inefficient aggregate outcomes. Two such environments are those characterized by public goods and common pool resources, in which the social dilemmas can be manifested in free riding and tragedy of the commons outcomes. In public goods games, individuals decide how much of their endowments to contribute to the public good. In common-pool resource games, individuals decide how much to withdraw from the common-pool. In both settings, group resources are undermined if decision makers act non-cooperatively. Much field and laboratory research has focused on the effectiveness of alternative political-economic institutions in counteracting individuals' tendencies to under-provide public goods and over-exploit common pool resources. Previous research, however, has not focused on the implications of power asymmetries in these settings. The research proposed here begins with settings in which agents move simultaneously, without knowledge of other agents' actions. The settings are designed for pair-wise comparisons in which payoff consequences of alternative strategies are held constant across treatments. This initial analysis allows us to examine behavioral differences across public good and common pool settings that are linked to asymmetries in norms of behavior, as opposed to differences in payoff consequences of strategies. The research then moves to experiments with pairs of sequential move games in which second movers with asymmetric power make their decisions after first movers. The opportunities for these "bosses and kings" to exploit cooperative choices of first movers is systematically varied across design settings. The central questions are whether the powers associated with these bosses and kings lead to exploitation, and to what extent this power has significant effects on the willingness of first movers to behave cooperatively. We examine whether these effects differ across the paired public good and common pool resource settings. This research provides important insights into how community collective action depends critically on the design of institutions that allows for transparency, as well as control over the exploitive powers associated with agents with administrative control. It will also yield important insights into how decision makers' norms of behavior may be importantly linked to the structure of the social dilemma and how such norms interact with institutions designed to facilitate cooperation.

该奖项是根据2009年《美国复苏与再投资法》（公法111-5）资助的。社会困境是环境的特征，即个人对自己物质自身利益的独家追求可以产生效率低下的总成果。有两个这样的环境是以公共物品和共同集合资源为特征的环境，在这种环境中，社会困境可以在自由骑行和下议院成果的悲剧中体现出来。在公共物品游戏中，个人决定了他们为公共利益做出贡献的捐赠中的多少。在普通池资源游戏中，个人决定从普通池中撤出多少。在这两种情况下，如果决策者采取非合作行动，则会破坏组资源。许多现场研究和实验室研究都集中在替代政治经济机构在抵消个人倾向于公共物品和过度探索公共池资源的趋势方面的有效性。然而，先前的研究并未集中在这些环境中权力不对称的含义上。此处提出的研究始于代理人同时移动的设置，而没有其他代理商的行动。这些设置设计用于配对比较，在跨处理中，替代策略的回报后果不断。这种初步分析使我们能够检查与行为规范中不对称相关的公共商品和普通池环境之间的行为差​​异，而不是策略的回报后果差异。然后，该研究转向了一对连续移动游戏的实验，其中第二次动力的第二搬家在第一次推动后做出了决策。这些“老板和国王”利用第一搬家合作选择的机会在设计环境中有系统地不同。核心问题是与这些老板和国王有关的权力是否导致剥削，以及这种权力在多大程度上对第一个推动者的合作意愿产生重大影响。我们检查了这些效果在配对的公共商品和共同的池资源设置中是否有所不同。这项研究提供了有关社区集体行动如何批判性地取决于允许透明度的机构的设计以及对与具有行政控制代理相关的剥削权力的控制的重要见解。它还将对决策者的行为规范如何与社会困境的结构以及这些规范与旨在促进合作的机构相互作用的重要性进行重要见解。