Optimal Contracts with Private Monitoring

具有私人监控的最佳合同

• 批准号: 0752200
• 负责人: William Fuchs
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Chicago
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2008
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2008-03-01 至 2010-01-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0752200&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Optimal; Contracts; Private; Monitoring

This research will extend an important kind of economic theory to consider a real world problem. The vast majority of the work in contract theory has focused on the case where both employers and employees can directly observe employee output. In contrast this research examines the situation where the worker's output is privately observed by the employer. There are many environments where this assumption is a closer approximation to reality and therefore it is vital to understand the best kinds of contracts to use under these conditions. The research provides a comprehensive analysis of the optimal provision of incentives with private monitoring. The results of this research generates a new perspective on an important class of economic problems called agency problems. Since agency problems are present in most subfields of economics, political economics and corporate finance, the research has substantial broader impact.The research shows that many features we observe in labor markets, such as wage compression, involuntary unemployment, efficiency wages, review periods and tournaments, can be explained as part of the way employers provide strong incentives to their employees. Lastly, important macroeconomic questions can be addressed by embedding this model in a general equilibrium job search model. Does the presence of employment relationships with private monitoring generate different responses of equilibrium wages and unemployment to vacancies ratios in response to aggregate shocks? Are there new roles for government policy in this environment?

这项研究将扩展一种重要的经济理论来考虑现实世界的问题。契约理论的绝大多数工作都集中在雇主和雇员都可以直接观察雇员产出的情况。 相比之下，本研究考察了雇主私下观察工人产出的情况。在许多环境中，这种假设更接近现实，因此了解在这些条件下使用的最佳合约类型至关重要。 该研究对私人监督的最佳激励措施进行了全面分析。这项研究的结果为一类重要的经济问题（称为代理问题）提供了新的视角。由于代理问题存在于经济学、政治经济学和公司金融的大多数子领域，因此该研究具有更广泛的影响。研究表明，我们在劳动力市场中观察到的许多特征，例如工资压缩、非自愿失业、效率工资、审查期和锦标赛，可以解释为雇主为员工提供强有力激励方式的一部分。 最后，可以通过将该模型嵌入到一般均衡求职模型中来解决重要的宏观经济问题。受私人监督的雇佣关系的存在是否会导致均衡工资和失业率与空缺比率对总体冲击的不同反应？在这种环境下，政府政策是否会发挥新的作用？