Doctoral Dissertation Research in Political Science/Law and Social Science: Neglected Portions of Separation of Powers Interactions

政治学/法学和社会科学博士论文研究：权力分立互动中被忽视的部分

• 批准号: 0719945
• 负责人: Micheal Giles
• 金额: $ 0.77万
• 依托单位: Emory University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2007
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2007-09-01 至 2008-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0719945&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Political; Science

Primary Investigators: Bethany Blackstone and Micheal W. GilesThe Neglected Portions of Separation of Powers Interactions0719945AbstractThis research project assesses two research questions. First, under what conditions does Congress alter its decision to enact legislation because of negative treatment by the Supreme Court? Second, is Congress able to effectively countermand the directives of the Supreme Court? The overwhelming majority of empirical work in the separation of powers (SOP) tradition focuses on either the decision of the Supreme Court to exercise review or the decision of Congress to respond to Supreme Court decisions. I extend the consideration of strategic behavior backwards to the initial decision of Congress to enact legislation and forward to the aftermath of passage of responsive legislation. To assess the hypothesis of a judicial constraint on Congress, I will collect data on all bills granted hearings in the House and Senate Judiciary Committees between 1970 and 2002 and on all bills granted hearings in any committee between 1954 and 1995 that contain provisions that would overrule, modify, or clarify constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court between 1954 and 1995. I will assess the effect of Supreme Court ideology on the decision to enact these proposed bills. To evaluate the ability of Congress to nullify the decisions of the Supreme Court, I will consider the substance and aftermath of legislation passed in response to the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions between 1954 and 2005. In addition to the significant amounts of new data that will be collected, the dissertation project will make methodological contributions that will be of value to other scholars of Congress and the separation of powers. Methodological innovations include a new measure of the congressional agenda that is based on bills granted hearings in committees and accessible methods scholars can employ to locate policy outcomes in a unidimensional policy space.The broader impacts of the project include the advancement of understanding of the relationship between Congress and the Court that has implications for scholars of interbranch relations and the American public. The project addresses theoretical and empirical issues of interest to legal academics and political scientists but also contributes to the more practical evaluation of the relative influence of Congress and the Court on policy outcomes and analysis of the extent to which the Court acts as a countermajoritarian force in American politics.

主要研究人员：Bethany Blackstone和Micheal W. Gilesthe被忽视的部分权力互动分离的一部分071945Abtracttractracterthis这项研究项目评估了两个研究问题。首先，在什么条件下，国会会因最高法院的否定待遇而改变其制定立法的决定？其次，国会是否能够有效地反对最高法院的指示？大多数在权力分离（SOP）传统中的经验工作的绝大多数侧重于最高法院决定行使审查或国会对最高法院做出回应的裁决的裁决。我将战略行为倒退的考虑扩展到国会制定立法的最初决定，并在通过响应迅速立法的情况下进行。为了评估对国会的司法限制的假设，我将收集有关众议院和参议院司法委员会在1970年至2002年之间以及1954年至1995年间任何委员会中授予听证的所有法案的所有法案的数据，这些委员会在1954年至1995年之间，这些规定包含否决，修改或澄清1954年和1995年在1954年和1995年之间的裁定宪法裁决的规定。制定这些提议的法案。为了评估国会无效最高法院的裁决的能力，我将考虑对1954年至2005年之间最高法院在1954年至2005年之间的宪法决定而获得的立法的实质和后果。除了将收集大量的新数据外，该方法还将为其他学者和国会的分离者和王牌提供了方法，这些方法还将为其他核心和国有的权力提供价值。方法论创新包括基于国会议程的新衡量标准，该衡量基于委员会中授予的法案，可以采用可访问的方法来在一项一维政策空间中找到政策成果。该项目解决了法律学者和政治学家的理论和经验问题，但也有助于对国会和法院对政策成果的相对影响以及法院在美国政治中充当反对派力量的程度的相对影响。