Doctoral Dissertation Research: Structural Independence of Administrative Adjudicators and Justice System Stakeholders' Views of Procedural Justice

博士论文研究：行政审判者的结构独立性与司法系统利益相关者的程序正义观

• 批准号: 0550758
• 负责人: James Richardson
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: Board of Regents, NSHE, obo University of Nevada, Reno
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2006
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2006-04-01 至 2008-05-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0550758&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Doctoral; Dissertation; Research; Structural; Independence

Abstract of SES-0550758: "Structural Independence of Administrative Adjudicators and Justice System Stakeholders' View of Procedural Justice"Summary: Social science has for some time now recognized the importance of procedural justice i.e., the fairness of the judicial process in predicting participant trust and confidence in judicial systems. Research by Lind & Tyler in the 1980s identified core components of procedural justice, and the doctrine itself has been empirically tested in judicial and business organizational settings. What happens, however, when the adjudicator is not independent i.e., when the person in charge of fact-finding and applying the law is not a neutral party, but instead is employed by the agency and is thus intimately connected to one side of such a dispute? This research will explore whether the independence of a governmental agency adjudicator has a measurable and predictable impact on participant perceptions of fairness in administrative hearings. Importance of the Research Every day and throughout the nation, thousands of citizens will be required to appear in front of some kind of judge. We are most familiar with judges of the judicial branch those whose positions are structurally separated from the executive and legislative branches of government. We expect fairness from these judges and presume their independence. In terms of sheer numbers, however, far more litigants appear before adjudicators who are not part of the judicial branch: they are administrative law judges, hearing examiners, or any number of other designated fact-finders who serve state administrative agencies, like the Department of Motor Vehicles and the Bureau of Workers Compensation. And in about half of the states, these adjudicators are hired by, supervised by, and can be fired by, the agencies for whom they hear cases. The question posed by this research is: does this make a difference to participant perception of fairness? Can we apply the Lind & Tyler paradigm for testing procedural justice to help predict whether agency adjudicators will be perceived as being fair, even though they are part of the agency? Do some structures better facilitate participant perception that the hearing was fair?Questions the Research Will Address This research will look at two kinds of administrative adjudication structures: one, the traditional institutional model, uses adjudicators who are employees of the agency; the other, representing a growing trend, uses adjudicators who are part of the executive branch but are not hired by nor controlled by the agency: they work in a centralized panel of full-time employees who hear cases for any number of different agencies. The questions addressed will be: does it matter to participants (including the citizens, the agencies, the adjudicators, and the lawyers) whether the adjudicator is structurally tied to the agency and is thus not an independent adjudicator? Do the theories of procedural justice, which have been thoroughly tested in the context of independent judicial-branch adjudications, apply as well in the case where the adjudicator is not independent? Are there structural variables that allow predictions about participant perceptions of fairness? How the Research Will Address these Questions Forty-one states currently permit drivers to challenge administrative license suspensions associated with driving while under the influence of alcohol. About half of these states use adjudicators who are employed by the Department of Motor Vehicles; the rest use adjudicators who are part of central panels, not directly tied to the DMV. Through literature review, core fairness indicators will be identified, and research instruments will be created to gather participant perceptions of fairness in these suspension hearings. Using these instruments and applying appropriate statistical tools, the researchers will gather and analyze data from central panel states and non-central panel states to see whether the participants believe the process was fair (as Lind & Tyler and successor analysts have defined fairness). Broader Social Value of the Research The judicial branch of government depends heavily on the delegation of fact-finding to administrative agencies, which explains in part why so many cases are heard by agencies and not by courts. For this delegation to be effective, however, all stakeholders need to have at least a minimum amount of trust and confidence in the fairness of the system. If the central panel adjudicator better serves this need, then executive officers at all levels of government would benefit from knowing this, particularly given the substantial cost savings thats associated with the consolidation of agency adjudicators. If, on the other hand, the public is largely unaffected by the structure of agency adjudicators, then change from the status quo may be unwarranted, in those states that rely on in-house adjudicators. Broader still, however, is the value in exploring whether notions of procedural justice apply in agency adjudications. The more we know how structure affects stakeholder perceptions of fairness, the better equipped we are to develop systems that enjoy the trust and confidence of all participants.

SES-0550758的摘要：“行政裁决者和司法系统利益相关者对程序正义的看法的结构独立”摘要：社会科学一段时间以来已经认识到程序正义的重要性，即司法程序在预测参与者信任和对司法系统的信心方面的公平性。 Lind＆Tyler在1980年代的研究确定了程序正义的核心组成部分，并且该学说本身已在司法和业务组织环境中经过经验检验。但是，当审判员不是独立的情况下，即当审核事实调查和申请法律的人不是中立政党时，会发生什么情况，而是由该机构雇用并因此与此类争议的一方紧密相关？这项研究将探讨政府机构审判员的独立性是否对参与者对行政听证会公平性的看法产生可衡量的可预测影响。每天和全国各地的研究的重要性，将需要成千上万的公民出现在某种法官面前。我们最熟悉司法部门的法官，这些法官在结构上与政府的行政和立法部门分开。我们期望这些法官公平，并假设他们的独立性。然而，就庞大的数量而言，诉讼人更多地出现在不属于司法部门的审判员面前：他们是行政法法官，听证会审查员或许多其他指定的事实接触者，他们为国家行政机构提供服务，例如汽车部和工人局局赔偿。在大约一半的州中，这些审判员由他们听到案件的机构雇用，监督和可以被解雇。这项研究提出的问题是：这是否会影响参与者对公平性的看法？我们是否可以将Lind＆Tyler范式应用于测试程序正义，以帮助预测机构审判员是否会被认为是公平的，即使他们是该机构的一部分？某些结构是否可以更好地促进参与者对听证会公平的看法？研究将解决这项研究将研究两种行政裁决结构：一种，传统的机构模式，使用该机构的雇员审判员；另一个代表增长趋势的人使用裁判员，这些裁决者是行政部门的一部分，但并未由该机构雇用或控制：他们在集中的全职员工小组中工作，他们听取了任何数量的不同机构的案件。解决的问题将是：对参与者（包括公民，机构，裁判员和律师）是否重要，是否与该裁决者在结构上与该机构有联系，因此不是独立的审判者？在独立司法分支裁决的背景下，在审判者不是独立的情况下，适用于独立的司法分支裁决的程序公法理论是否适用？是否有结构变量可以预测参与者对公平性的看法？该研究将如何解决这些问题，目前四十一个州允许驾驶员在酒精影响下与驾驶相关的行政许可证暂停。这些州中约有一半使用汽车部雇用的裁决者；其余的使用是中央面板的一部分，而不是直接与DMV绑定的裁决者。通过文献综述，将确定核心公平指标，并将创建研究工具，以收集参与者对这些暂停听证会的公平感。研究人员使用这些工具并应用了适当的统计工具，将收集和分析中央小组各州和非中央面板状态的数据，以查看参与者认为该过程是否公平（正如Lind＆Tyler和继任分析师确定了公平性的那样）。研究的更广泛的社会价值政府的司法部门在很大程度上取决于向行政机构授权的事实，这在某种程度上解释了为什么机构而不是法院听到如此多的案件。但是，要使该代表团有效，所有利益相关者都必须至少对系统的公平性具有最低信任和信心。如果中央小组审判员更好地满足了这一需求，那么各级政府的执行官就会受益，尤其是考虑到与代理机构审判员合并相关的大量成本节省。另一方面，如果公众在很大程度上不受代理审判员的结构的影响，那么在那些依靠内部裁决者的州，可能会改变现状。然而，更广泛的是探索程序正义概念是否适用于机构裁决的价值。我们越了解结构如何影响利益相关者对公平性的看法，我们将为开发享受所有参与者的信任和信心的系统所提供的更好的装备。