Emotion and Cognition in Moral Judgment

道德判断中的情感和认知

• 批准号: 0351996
• 负责人: Jonathan Cohen
• 金额: $ 10万
• 依托单位: Princeton University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 2004
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2004-04-01 至 2006-09-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0351996&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Emotion; Cognition; Moral; Judgment

Drs. Cohen, Darley, and Greene's research funded by NSF on neuroscientific moral psychology was inspired by a puzzling set of moral dilemmas posed by philosophers. Consider the following case: A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if it proceeds on its present course. The only way to save them is to flip a switch that will turn the trolley onto an alternate set of tracks where it will kill one person instead of five. Ought you to turn the trolley in order to save five people at the expense of one? Most people say yes. Now consider a similar dilemma: As before, a trolley threatens to kill five people. You are standing next to a large stranger on a footbridge spanning the tracks, in between the oncoming trolley and the five people. This time, the only way to save the five people is to push this stranger off the bridge and onto the tracks below. He will die if you do this, but his body will stop the trolley from reaching the others. Ought you to save the five others by pushing this stranger to his death? Most people say no. For over twenty years, moral philosophers have been puzzling over cases such as these, wondering what makes it acceptable to sacrifice lives in some cases but not others. In their research, Drs. Cohen, Darley, and Greene attack these problems from the point of view of social psychology and cognitive neuroscience: What goes on in people's brains that makes them say "yes" to the first case and "no" to the second case? Existing theories of moral psychology suggest strikingly different answers to this question. According to the rationalist tradition in moral psychology, moral judgments are caused by episodes of reasoning and reflection. More specifically, a rationalist would say that people arrive at different answers in these two cases by applying abstract moral principles that explain why these cases are importantly different. A more recent trend in moral psychology places increased emphasis on emotion. According to an emotivist model, differences in emotional response are to explain people's divergent answers in these two cases. Drs. Cohen, Darley, and Greene believe that rationalists and emotivists are both partly correct. Their NSF-supported research is aimed at understanding how emotional and "cognitive" processes interact to produce moral judgments. Their research uses both traditional methods such as questionnaires and measurements of reaction time in conjunction with cutting-edge neuroimaging techniques that allow them to see what is going on in people's brains while they make moral decisions.This research has natural connections to matters of both private and public concern. First, understanding the psychological and biological bases of human morality is of fundamental humanistic importance. Like research concerning the origins of life on Earth or the large-scale structure of the universe, this research addresses questions that are of intrinsic interest to people around the world. Our capacity for moral judgment is central to our humanity, and yet it is not well understood by science at this time. This research is an important step toward remedying this ignorance. Second, moral judgment is of immense practical importance. Many of the great public debates of our time such as those concerning abortion, stem cell research, the limits of justifiable war, the appropriate response to terrorism, etc. exist because different people have different intuitions about these and other matters of right and wrong. To make progress on these issues it may be useful, if not essential, to understand the psychology and underlying biology that produces moral judgments, and different moral judgments in different people. One of the goals of this research is to study culturally-based differences in moral judgment, which has the additional benefit of ensuring the participation of groups who are underrepresented in American science. This research will also explore differences in moral judgment based on gender and individual temperament. At the same time, however, this research is aimed at understanding that which is universal in human moral judgment.

博士。 NSF资助的关于神经科学的道德心理学资助的Cohen，Darley和Greene的研究受到了哲学家构成的一系列令人困惑的道德困境的启发。 考虑以下案件：一辆失控的手推车将前往五个人，如果它在目前的路线上进行，他们将被杀死。 拯救它们的唯一方法是翻转开关，该开关将手推车转向一组备用的轨道，它将杀死一个人而不是五个。 您应该转动手推车以拯救五个人，而牺牲一个人？ 大多数人说是。 现在考虑类似的困境：和以前一样，手推车威胁要杀死五人。 您正站在一个横跨轨道的人行人桥上，在即将到来的手推车和五个人之间。 这次，拯救这五个人的唯一方法是将这个陌生人从桥上推开，然后将其推向下面的轨道。 如果您这样做，他会死的，但是他的身体将阻止手推车到达其他人。 您应该通过将这个陌生人推到他的死亡来拯救其他五个？ 大多数人拒绝。 二十多年来，道德哲学家一直在困惑这样的案件，想知道是什么使在某些情况下牺牲生命而不是其他情况而不是其他情况。 在他们的研究中，博士。科恩（Cohen），达利（Darley）和格林（Greene）从社会心理学和认知神经科学的角度攻击了这些问题：人们的大脑中发生了什么使他们对第一种情况说“是”，而第二种情况是“否”？ 现有的道德心理学理论提出了这个问题的明显不同的答案。 根据道德心理学的理性主义传统，道德判断是由推理和反思的情节引起的。更具体地说，理性主义者会说，在这两种情况下，人们通过采用抽象道德原则来解释为什么这些案件重要的不同。 道德心理学的最新趋势越来越强调情绪。 根据情感主义模型，情感反应的差异是在这两种情况下解释人们的不同答案。 博士。科恩（Cohen），达利（Darley）和格林（Greene）认为，理性主义者和情感主义者都是部分正确的。 他们的NSF支持的研究旨在了解情感和“认知”过程如何相互作用以产生道德判断。 他们的研究使用了传统方法，例如问卷和反应时间的测量以及最先进的神经影像学技术，使他们可以在人们做出道德决定的同时查看人们的大脑中发生了什么。这项研究与私人和公众关注的事项具有自然的联系。 首先，了解人类道德的心理和生物学基础是具有根本的人文主义重要性。 就像关于地球生命的起源或宇宙大规模结构的研究一样，这项研究解决了世界各地人们具有内在兴趣的问题。 我们的道德判断能力对我们的人性至关重要，但是目前科学对此并没有很好地理解。 这项研究是解决这种无知的重要一步。 其次，道德判断至关重要。 我们这个时代的许多伟大的公众辩论，例如有关堕胎，干细胞研究，合理战争的局限性，对恐怖主义的适当反应等。存在，因为不同的人对这些和其他对和错的事项具有不同的直觉。 为了在这些问题上取得进展，了解产生道德判断的心理学和潜在生物学可能是有用的，即使不是必不可少的，在不同的人中产生了道德判断和不同的道德判断。 这项研究的目标之一是研究基于文化的道德判断差异，该差异具有确保在美国科学中人数不足的群体的参与的其他好处。 这项研究还将探索基于性别和个体气质的道德判断差异。 然而，与此同时，这项研究旨在了解人类道德判断中普遍存在的研究。