The Evolution of Investment Conventions

投资惯例的演变

• 批准号: 0095606
• 负责人: W. Bentley MacLeod
• 金额: $ 10.96万
• 依托单位: University of Southern California
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 2001
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2001-06-01 至 2003-08-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=0095606&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Evolution; Investment; Conventions

Project Description for "The Evolution of Bargaining Conventions" byHerbert Dawid and W. Bentley Macleod Legal scholars and economic historians have long recognized theimportance of social conventions and norms for the efficient and smoothoperation of the economy. For example, if an employee feels that his orher employer is fair, then conflict is reduced, and the individual willinvest more into the relationship. However, it is extremely difficult toprecisely define the notion of a fair convention. One approach is to study the evolution of coventions in anexplicit bargaining problem where individuals have to decide how to dividethe gains from trade. The current literature has shown that the 50/50split is a stable convention in a variety of situations. That rule howeverdoes not reward individuals who may contribute more to a relationship, apoint that Grossman and Hart argue may explain why ownership is structuredto make one party a residual claimant to the profits of a firm. What hasnot been studied, and is the object of the current project, is theevolution of bargaining conventions in the presence of relationshipspecific investments. We show that that the addition of relation specific investmentscan result in social conventions that are very different from the 50/50split. Moreover, this research addresses an important open question raisedby Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, namely why is it efficient forownership to be concentrated in the hands of a single individual or group.We show that depending upon the information structure, both ownership andthe bargaining conventions evolve to a "fair rule" that encouragesefficient relationship specific investments, and low levels of conflict.In particular, we demonstrate that it depends crucially oncomplementarities between the specific investments of the individualswhether such fair and efficient conventions are developed. This work is theoretical and uses an abstract framework that mightnot be directly applicable in its current form. However, it does study theconditions that give rise to norms which encourage efficient behavior in adecentralized, anonymous economy. Understanding the structure ofefficient social norms may also have implications for the efficientrunning of exchange mediated through the internet. Elucidating the type ofinformation needed to ensure efficient exchange in these cases may help usbetter understand the rules that need to be used in "New Economy" toensure its continued success and growth.

Byherbert Dawid和W. Bentley MacLeod法律学者和经济历史学家的项目描述长期以来认识到社会公约和规范的有效和平稳性的重要性。例如，如果雇员认为他的Orher雇主是公平的，那么冲突就会减少，并且个人将更多地投入到关系中。但是，这是极其困难的最佳定义公平惯例的概念。 一种方法是研究反应讨价还价问题中的共和国的演变，其中个人必须决定如何从贸易中分开收益。目前的文献表明，在各种情况下，50/50Split是稳定的惯例。但是，这一规则并不是奖励可能对关系做出更多贡献的个人，格罗斯曼和哈特认为，求职者可能会解释为什么所有权是结构化的，以使一个政党成为公司利润的残留索赔。没有研究的内容，而是当前项目的对象，是在有特定关系的投资在场的情况下进行谈判惯例的进化。 我们表明，增加关系的特定投资会导致社会惯例与50/50split截然不同。此外，这项研究解决了亨利·汉斯曼（Henry Hansmann）和雷米尔·克拉克曼（Reinier Kraakman）提出的一个重要的开放问题，即为什么要集中在一个个人或群体的手中，这是有效的遗体。我们表明，取决于信息结构，取决于所有权和讨价还价的公约，都可以依赖于“公平的统治”，以鼓励其特定的投资和低级别的范围。在个人服务的具体投资之间，开发了这样的公平和高效的惯例。 这项工作是理论上的，并使用了一个抽象框架，该框架可能直接以当前形式直接适用。但是，它确实研究了导致规范的条件，这些规范鼓励了匿名经济的有效行为。 了解效率的社会规范的结构也可能对通过互联网介导的交换的有效进行有影响。阐明在这些情况下确保有效交换所需的信息类型可能有助于Usbetter了解在“新经济”中需要使用的规则，以表明其持续的成功和增长。