Design of Markets

市场设计

• 批准号: 9511209
• 负责人: Robert Wilson
• 金额: $ 26.06万
• 依托单位: Stanford University
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Continuing Grant
• 财政年份: 1995
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1995-11-01 至 2000-10-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=9511209&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Design; Markets; Design; Markets

Robept Wilson Stanford University SBR-9511209 The proposal consists of four projects involving the design of markets. The first project concerns the design of multi-item auctions and other mechanisms for allocating multiple units of an indivisible good. Among the issues that will be addressed are: (I) the conjecture that the oral double auction is a "universal mechanism" for at least some preferences, and (ii) the modeling of the puzzling outcomes of some experimental auctions. The second project continues current research by the P.I. on game theoretic analysis of legal discovery. The third project will study multidimensional mechanism design. The fourth project continues current research by the P.I. on the efficient computation of behavioral strategies of extensive-form games. This will make use of the discovery by von Stengel of a scheme that is linear in the number of information sets.

Robept Wilson Stanford University SBR-9511209该提案由四个涉及市场设计的项目组成。 第一个项目涉及多项目拍卖的设计和其他机制，用于分配不可分割的商品的多个单位。 在将要解决的问题中包括：（i）至少在某些偏好中，口头双重拍卖是一种“通用机制”的猜想，以及（ii）某些实验拍卖的令人困惑的结果的建模。 第二个项目继续由P.I.在游戏理论分析法律发现中。 第三个项目将研究多维机理设计。 第四个项目继续由P.I.关于广泛形式游戏的行为策略的有效计算。这将利用von Stengel的发现，该方案在信息集数量中是线性的。