Information Processing in Interactive Organizations

交互式组织中的信息处理

• 批准号: 8813371
• 负责人: James Jordan
• 金额: $ 10.93万
• 依托单位: University of Minnesota-Twin Cities
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 项目类别: Standard Grant
• 财政年份: 1988
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 1988-08-15 至 1991-07-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=8813371&HistoricalAwards=false
• 关键词: Information; Processing; Interactive; Organizations

Most economic theories specify equilibrium relationships among economic variables, and, at least implicitly, the equilibrium information flows among economic decision-makers. However, the adjustment process which moves the system to an equilibrium position is usually not specified. This research proposes a method for analyzing a general class of such adjustment processes. The principal goal of this analysis is to determine the minimal communication and coordination among economic decision-makers needed to achieve equilibrium. This can be compared with the information flow generated by the economic institutions under study. If the latter is less than the former, equilibrium cannot generally be achieved, and the equilibrium relationships cannot reliably approximate actual economic behavior. This information analysis is proposed as a new source of discipline in the evaluation of economic models. When the convergence to equilibrium requires information which cannot easily be communicated in an ongoing fashion, two directions of research are suggested. First, the additional information might be inferred from the historical behavior of observable variables, and this information might then be used in the design of the adjustment process. Second, the equilibrium concept might be changed to embody more modest optimality criteria. The latter approach is proposed specifically for the theory of the firm when communication is limited to accounting information.

大多数经济理论都指定了经济变量之间的平衡关系，至少是隐式的，经济决策者之间的平衡信息流动。 但是，通常未指定将系统移至平衡位置的调整过程。这项研究提出了一种分析此类调整过程的一般类别的方法。 该分析的主要目的是确定实现平衡所需的经济决策者之间的最小交流和协调。 这可以与正在研究的经济机构产生的信息流相提并论。 如果后者小于前者，则通常无法达到平衡，并且平衡关系无法可靠地近似实际的经济行为。 在评估经济模型的评估中，提出了该信息分析作为纪律的新来源。 当均衡的收敛需要无法以持续的方式传达的信息时，提出了两个研究方向。 首先，可以从可观察变量的历史行为中推断出其他信息，然后可以在调整过程的设计中使用此信息。 其次，平衡概念可能会更改以体现更适度的最优标准。 后一种方法是针对公司理论提出的，当时沟通仅限于会计信息。