Strategic demand information sharing under partial cross ownership

We consider a two-echelon supply chain with partial cross ownership (PCO) comprising a supplier.and a retailer. The retailer is endowed with superior information about uncertain market poten-.tial. The supplier must produce the product before the market potential is realized. We explore.the retailer’s strategy to share his private demand information with the supplier via cheap talk. We.demonstrate that when the proportion of partial cross holding shares is moderate, the retailer can.disclose private demand information truthfully. Without PCO, this informative equilibrium cannot.be achieved regardless of the acquired signal. With PCO, the retailer wants to obtain a sufficient.production quantity if the realized demand is high and fears the cost of unsold products if the.realizeddemandislow.Thesetwocountervailingincentivescancausetheretailertosharehisinfor-.mation truthfully. We find that this truthful information sharing benefits both the retailer and the.supplier. In addition, we discuss the case of endogenous wholesale price and indicate the con-.ditions in which truthful information sharing can be achieved. Moreover, we find that when the .marketpotentialfollowsageneralcontinuousdistribution,theperfectinformativeequilibriumdoes not exist.

我们考虑一个具有部分交叉所有权（PCO）的两级供应链，它由一个供应商和一个零售商组成。零售商拥有关于不确定市场潜力的优势信息。供应商必须在市场潜力实现之前生产产品。我们探讨零售商通过“廉价磋商”与供应商分享其私有需求信息的策略。我们证明，当部分交叉持股的比例适中时，零售商能够如实披露私有需求信息。如果没有部分交叉所有权，无论获取到何种信号，这种信息性均衡都无法实现。有了部分交叉所有权，如果实际需求高，零售商希望获得足够的产量；如果实际需求低，零售商则担心未售出产品的成本。这两种相互抵消的激励因素会使零售商如实分享他的信息。我们发现这种如实的信息共享对零售商和供应商都有利。此外，我们讨论了内生批发价格的情况，并指出了能够实现如实信息共享的条件。而且，我们发现当市场潜力遵循一般的连续分布时，完全信息性均衡不存在。