Efficient institutions and effective deterrence: on timing and uncertainty of punishment

We carry out the first controlled economic experiment to study the effectiveness of swiftness of punishment in reducing illicit behavior. We consider two dimensions: timing of punishment and timing of the resolution of uncertainty regarding the punishment. We find a surprising inverted u-shaped relation between deterrence and the delays of punishment and uncertainty resolution. Institutions that either reveal detection and impose punishment immediately or maintain uncertainty about the state of detection and impose punishment sufficiently late are equally effective at deterring illicit behavior. Our results yield strong implications for the design of institutional policies to mitigate misconduct and reduce recidivism

我们进行了首个对照经济实验，以研究惩罚的及时性在减少违法行为方面的有效性。我们考虑两个维度：惩罚的时机以及有关惩罚的不确定性得以解决的时机。我们发现威慑力与惩罚延迟以及不确定性解决之间存在一种令人惊讶的倒U型关系。那些要么立即揭露违法行为并实施惩罚，要么对是否被发现的情况保持不确定性并足够晚地实施惩罚的制度，在威慑违法行为方面同样有效。我们的研究结果对旨在减少不当行为和累犯的制度政策设计具有重要意义。