Secure state reconstruction in differentially flat systems under sensor attacks using satisfiability modulo theory solving

We address the problem of reconstructing the state of a differentially flat system from measurements that may be corrupted by an adversarial attack. In cyber-physical systems, malicious attacks can directly compromise the system's sensors or manipulate the communication between sensors and controllers. We consider attacks that only corrupt a subset of sensor measurements. We show that the possibility of reconstructing the state under such attacks is characterized by a suitable generalization of the notion of s-sparse observability, previously introduced by some of the authors in the linear case. We also extend our previous work on the use of Satisfiability Modulo Theory solvers to reconstruct the state under sensor attacks to the context of differentially flat systems. The effectiveness of our approach is illustrated on the problem of controlling a quadrotor under sensor attacks.

我们解决从可能被对抗性攻击破坏的测量值中重构一个微分平坦系统状态的问题。在信息物理系统中，恶意攻击可直接危及系统的传感器或操纵传感器与控制器之间的通信。我们考虑仅破坏一部分传感器测量值的攻击。我们表明，在这种攻击下重构状态的可能性通过对先前由部分作者在线性情形中引入的s -稀疏可观测性概念的适当推广来表征。我们还将我们先前关于使用可满足性模理论求解器在传感器受攻击情况下重构状态的工作扩展到微分平坦系统的情形。我们的方法的有效性在传感器受攻击情况下控制四旋翼飞行器的问题上得到了说明。