Modeling the industry perspective of university-industry collaborative innovation alliances: Player behavior and stability issues

Many firms find it challenging to develop innovations, evidenced by the ever-mounting number of university-industry research alliances. This study examines the strategic choices of actors who participate in collaborative innovation alliances involving partnerships between industry and universities (U-I) based on a stochastic evolutionary game model. White noise was introduced to reflect uncertainty and the stochastic interferences caused by the differences between actors. Using the Itô stochastic differential equation theory, we analyze stability issues of player behaviors in the evolution of a collaborative innovation alliance. The results illustrate that improvements in innovation efficiency can contribute to U-I collaborative innovation alliances. High knowledge complementarity appears to be unbeneficial to the stability of these alliances, and controlling knowledge spillovers may suppress free-rider problems from both sides of the game. Our study contributes to innovation research by providing a decision-making reference for the design of U-I cooperation.

许多企业发现创新具有挑战性，产学研联盟数量的不断增加就证明了这一点。本研究基于随机演化博弈模型，考察了参与涉及产业界和大学之间合作（U - I）的协同创新联盟的参与者的战略选择。引入白噪声以反映不确定性以及参与者之间差异所导致的随机干扰。利用伊藤随机微分方程理论，我们分析了协同创新联盟演化过程中参与者行为的稳定性问题。结果表明，创新效率的提高有助于U - I协同创新联盟。高知识互补性似乎不利于这些联盟的稳定性，并且控制知识溢出可能抑制博弈双方的搭便车问题。我们的研究通过为U - I合作设计提供决策参考，对创新研究做出了贡献。