To Protect and to Serve

The consequences of alliance formation for other foreign policies of a state, including defense spending and the initiation of militarized disputes, are examined using a theory of foreign policy that is based on several assumptions. First, states pursue two goods-change (defending those aspects of the status quo that one likes) and maintenance (altering those aspects of the status quo that one dislikes)-through their foreign policies. Second, states select a portfolio of policies designed to produce the most preferred mix of the two goods. Third, all foreign policy behavior, including alliance involvement, requires resources. Fourth, states are rational in their allocation of resources. Together, these imply that an observed alliance must have been the most efficient mechanism available for acquiring the most desired and achievable foreign policy portfolio and have implications for the observation of foreign policy substitutability. The empirical implications of this implication are tested, and results support the model: states are more active in their foreign policies after adding to their alliance portfolios-they increase their rate of conflict initiation, the capital intensiveness of their military establishments, and their defense spending.

利用一种基于若干假设的外交政策理论，对结盟对于一个国家的其他外交政策（包括国防开支以及引发军事化争端）所产生的影响进行了研究。首先，国家通过其外交政策追求两种利益——变革（捍卫现状中自己所喜欢的方面）和维持（改变现状中自己所不喜欢的方面）。其次，国家选择一系列政策组合，旨在产生这两种利益的最理想搭配。第三，所有外交政策行为，包括参与结盟，都需要资源。第四，国家在资源分配上是理性的。综合起来，这些意味着所观察到的联盟必定是获取最期望且可实现的外交政策组合的最有效机制，并且对观察外交政策的可替代性具有影响。对这一推论的实证影响进行了检验，结果支持该模型：国家在增加其联盟组合之后，在外交政策上会更加积极——它们会提高引发冲突的频率、其军事机构的资本密集度以及国防开支。