Are Dividends All for Rewarding Investors? Evidence from Payouts Induced by Meeting ROE Target

In general, cash dividends contribute to the improvement of return on net assets, and cash dividends have the halo of "rewarding investors". Then, will cash dividends become a means for companies to covertly manipulate return on net assets? This article conducts research on this issue in the research context of equity incentives for listed companies in China that assess weighted average return on net assets. The results show that observations with return on net assets close to meeting the standard before dividends are more likely to implement dividends, and the dividend payout ratio is also higher. At the same time, due to the weighted adjustment for the dividend implementation time point in the formula for calculating weighted average return on net assets, these companies are also more likely to pay dividends in advance and will comprehensively consider the implementation time point and amount of dividends. Further research in this article also finds that there is a substitution relationship between the dividends of these companies and accrual earnings management and real earnings management. In addition, the dividends implemented to meet the return on net assets standard are not "all benefits and no harm", and this behavior has a damaging effect on company value. Overall, the findings of this article imply that the assessment of return on net assets causes a certain degree of motivation alienation for company management when promoting dividends.

一般而言，现金分红有助于提升净资产收益率，而现金分红又有着“回报投资者”的光环，那么，现金分红是否会成为公司隐蔽的操纵净资产收益率的手段呢？本文以我国上市公司考核加权平均净资产收益率的股权激励为研究情境对此问题展开研究，结果发现，分红前净资产收益率接近达标的观测更可能实施分红，股利支付率也更高；同时，由于加权平均净资产收益率计算公式中对分红实施时点存在加权调整，这些公司还更可能提前分红，并且会综合考量分红的实施时点及金额。本文进一步研究还发现，这些公司的分红与应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理之间存在着相互替代关系。此外，为达标净资产收益率而实施的分红并非“百利而无一害”，这一行为对公司价值有毁损效应。总体上，本文的发现意味着净资产收益率考核使得公司管理层在推动分红时存在一定的动机异化。