Intentional participation in the state

ABSTRACT According to Avia Pasternak, citizens can be held responsible for their state’s wrongdoing if and only if they contribute to maintaining it by acting as intentional participants in its activities. I examine two specific aspects of this general claim. First, I ask whether intentional participation requires that the citizen should accept the state, in the sense of not viewing her membership as unwillingly forced upon her, and conclude that it does not. Second I explore how the claim applies in the case where there has been a discontinuity in the form of the state. I argue that it is not a condition of collective liability today that the predecessor state’s subjects should have been intentional participants at the time at which the wrongdoing occurred.

摘要 根据阿维亚·帕斯特纳克的观点，当且仅当公民作为其国家活动的有意参与者从而对维持国家现状有贡献时，他们才需对其国家的不当行为负责。我对这一普遍论断的两个具体方面进行了探讨。首先，我询问有意参与是否要求公民接受国家，即不认为自己是不情愿地被迫成为其成员，我的结论是并不需要。其次，我探究了在国家形式出现不连续的情况下这一论断如何适用。我认为，当今集体责任的一个条件并非是先前国家的臣民在不当行为发生时应当是有意参与者。