Closed Loop Supply Chain under Power Configurations and Dual Competitions

This paper investigates pricing and collecting decisions in a closed loop supply chain (CLSC) under different power configurations and dual competitions. If the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) could sell products directly and collect used products, OEM has to compete with both forward retailer and reverse collector, simultaneously, and OEM possesses different bargaining powers. Specifically, we examine the following model1: (1) Ml: OEM holds the first position in both forward and reverse channels; (2) M2: OEM holds the first (second) position in the forward (reverse) channel; (3) M3: OEM holds the second position in both channels. We conduct a systematic comparison of forward competition, reverse competition and dual competitions across the above models. From the perspective of the entire supply chain, the outcome of model selection hinges on the extent of competition. If the competition is sufficient, two forward leaders will engage in a price battle which results in great losses for both. Then Ml is preferred. Otherwise, M3 outperforms.

本文研究了不同权力配置和双重竞争下闭环供应链（CLSC）中的定价和回收决策。如果原始设备制造商（OEM）能够直接销售产品并回收旧产品，那么OEM必须同时与正向零售商和逆向回收商竞争，并且OEM拥有不同的议价能力。具体而言，我们研究了以下模型：（1）M1：OEM在正向和逆向渠道中均占据首位；（2）M2：OEM在正向（逆向）渠道中占据首位（第二位）；（3）M3：OEM在两个渠道中均占据第二位。我们对上述模型中的正向竞争、逆向竞争和双重竞争进行了系统比较。从整个供应链的角度来看，模型选择的结果取决于竞争的程度。如果竞争充分，两个正向领导者将展开价格战，导致双方都遭受重大损失。那么M1更优。否则，M3表现更佳。