中国上市公司经理层管理防御行为与激励约束机制的实验研究

According to relevant literature, the difference between the principal-agent theory and managerial entrenchment was clarified in this project. The method of the theory study and experimental research was used to comprehensively find out the status quo and characteristics of the managers managerial entrenchment behavior of the enterprise management level during China economic transition and transformation period, and also to reveal motives, behaviors, influence factors, dependent pathway and economic consequences of managers' managerial entrenchment (MME). The index number system and the practical application of program of managers' managerial entrenchment were set up. The reciprocity and the behavioral game theory were employed to analyze the interactive mechanism between MME and the incentive and constraint mechanism. Based on that, more finite experiments were repeated to estimate the parametric interaction on the comprehensive marginal effect of MME, and seek the equilibrium condition of the "mutually beneficial" between shareholders and managers. Together with the empirical research results and the continual improvement and optimization of real feedback, the mutually beneficial incentive and constraint mechanisms between shareholders and managers was attempted to build to alleviate the agency problems in China listed companies. This would lay a foundation for improving the corporate governance efficiency. Meanwhile, the policy suggestions for the perfect incentive and constraint mechanisms of China corporate managers was proposed to reduce the policy risk and cost of the design scheme.

本项目在梳理与借鉴相关文献基础上，厘清委托代理理论与经理管理防御假说之间的区别与联系；采用理论探索与实验研究的方法，全面、准确地认识我国经济转轨加转型期企业经理层管理防御的现状及其特征，深刻揭示上市公司经理层管理防御的动机、行为、影响因素、所依赖路径及其经济后果；构建我国上市公司经理层管理防御指数体系与实际应用方案；借鉴行为经济学中的互惠理论和行为博弈来分析经理层管理防御与激励、约束机制单因素之间的相互作用机理，在此基础上，通过有限重复实验测试多参变量交互作用对经理层管理防御程度的综合边际效应，寻求股东与经理层之间"互惠共赢"的均衡条件；结合实证研究结果与现实反馈情况不断进行改进与优化，试图建立股东与经理层之间互惠共赢的激励约束机制，为我国上市公司缓解代理问题，提高公司治理效率奠定基础，同时也为我国完善公司经理层激励与约束机制提供了政策建议，降低了设计方案实地试点的政策风险和成本。