市场风险冲击下禽业纵向协作的隐性契约稳定性研究——基于龙头企业视角

This project takes poultry industry as an example to study the impact of marketing risk on the stability of implicit contract. The data comes from 2 rounds of tracking survey of 100 leading enterprises and their related upstream farmers and downstream processing factories. The following method will be applied such as Selective experiment, 2SLS, Shapley value method, Heckman two stage model, and DEA. Five key questions will be answered: (1) Whether the specific marketing risk shock will change the vertical coordination of leading enterprises? (2) Whether the specific marketing risk shock will strengthen leading enterprises' default motivation of explicit or implicit contract? (3) In the case of implicit default, whether the specific marketing risk shock will change the farmers’ share of benefits and risk? (4) In turn, will the elastic implicit contract promote the long-term stability of explicit contract? (5) Accordingly, what policies should be promoted to protect the vulnerable farmers under the changeing of implicit contract? This project take the marketing risk shocks caused by Avian Influenza as a quasi natural experiments. The relevant conclusions have important policy implications for promoting the contract stability and risk response ability in the vertical coordination of poultry industry.

本课题拟以禽业为例，研究市场风险冲击对“隐性契约”稳定性的影响。数据主要来源于覆盖全国10省的100家龙头企业及其上下游关联节点的2轮跟踪调查。课题组将采用选择性实验、2SLS、Shapley值法、Heckman两阶段模型、DEA等方法论述如下5个问题：①特定市场风险冲击是否会改变龙头企业的纵向协作方式？②特定市场风险是否加强了龙头企业对农户“显性违约”或“隐性违约”的动机？③在企业“隐性违约”情景下，农户的利益分配份额及风险分担程度是否发生改变？④这种富有弹性的“隐性契约”变更，是否反而促进了“显性契约”的长期稳定？⑤需要怎样的扶持政策以保护“隐性契约”变更下的弱势农户？本课题以禽流感疫情引致的市场风险冲击为“准自然实验”，相关结论对于提升中国禽业纵向协作的契约稳定性及风险应对能力有重要的政策含义。