中国企业惩罚行为的决策动因、直接及溢出效应

Punishment has been defined as a superior's application of a negative consequence or the removal of a positive consequence following a subordinate's undesirable behavior, with the intention of decreasing the frequency of that behavior. Punishment is an often-used management tool in Chinese enterprises, but its result always turns out to be counterproductive. Is punishment really necessary for enterprises? How to use punishment tool in the legal extent? In practice, managers often use punishment by experience. In Chinese academic circles, few studies are focused on this topic. This project seeks to study on the decision-making motivation, direct and spillover effects of punishment behavior in Chinese enterprises by theoretical and empirical approaches. First, we plan to investigate some enterprises in order to grasp the content and approaches of punishment as well as the legality of these behaviors. Using qualitative research, we explore the decision-making motivation and the expected effects of punishment behavior from the perspective of managers. Then, we will focus on three separate empirical studies from different perspectives: From the manager's point of view, we discuss the decision-making motivation of punishment behavior. From the subordinate's perspective, we explore the different effect of both punishment and reward contract on employee behavior based on prospect theory. We also carry on a longitudinal study on the effect of punishment on subordinate's attitude and behavior in this part. From the perspective of the observer, we would like to study on the direct and spillover effects of corporate punishment with the longitudinal data. Finally, legal managerial recommendations would be put forward to optimize punishment behavior in Chinese enterprises. Through systematic analysis of qualitative interview as well as the thorough investigation data, we hope the findings would contribute to current organizational punishment theory and provide some useful recommendations for the management practices in Chinese enterprises.

我国企业中"以罚代管"的做法普遍存在，也倍受实践界和学术界的关注和争议。对于企业是否需要惩罚以及在合法的范围内如何有效地利用惩罚行为等问题的探索，实践者还停留在经验阶段，而我国学术界也缺乏科学的研究。本项目试图对我国企业内惩罚行为的决策动因、直接和溢出效应进行系统的理论和实证研究。首先，通过调查了解我国企业惩罚行为内容、形式及合法性等现状；基于本土化的质性研究，从管理者的视角探索企业惩罚的决策动因和预期成效。然后，从三个视角开展研究：从管理者的角度，实证研究惩罚行为的决策动因；从受罚者的角度，基于前景理论研究惩罚和奖励两种契约对员工行为的差异性影响，并纵向研究惩罚行为对受罚者态度和行为的影响；从观察者的角度，对企业惩罚行为的溢出效应进行纵向研究。最后，对在合法的范围内我国企业惩罚行为的优化提供管理建议。本研究在一定程度上可以丰富激励理论，并为我国企业管理实践提供较好的管理启示。

我国企业中“以罚代管”的做法普遍存在。但是，对于组织惩罚行为还缺乏系统的实证研究。本项目的研究内容包括：.1.对组织惩罚行为的国内外研究现状进行了系统的梳理、总结和评述。.2.领导者惩罚行为的动因研究：（1）先基于某大型企业9个月的跨期纵向配对数据，从组织社会过程中导师影响的视角实证研究新员工为什么会违反组织规则，结果发现了导师对新员工的违反规则行为有直接影响，验证了所谓“上梁不正下梁歪”。（2）实证研究下属逢迎行为对领导惩罚决策的影响，发现下属逢迎行为会导致领导的惩罚忽视，而领导对下属的情感信任在其中起到完全中介作用。.3.领导惩罚行为对组织内员工影响的实证研究。我们基于制造企业的不同样本数据，分别对领导者非权变惩罚行为对员工的组织认同、沉默行为和努力意愿进行了实证研究。此外，还以煤炭企业为例，实证研究了组织非权变惩罚对员工安全操作行为的影响。.4. 奖惩薪酬框架设计对员工行为的影响。基于情景实验方法，本项目探索不同的奖惩薪酬激励情景下，一般自我效能对员工工作努力动机的激发作用。结果发现，奖惩薪酬框架在个体绩效薪酬选择偏好与努力意愿的关系中起到正向调节作用。在奖励型绩效薪酬框架下，个体绩效薪酬选择偏好的差异对其努力意愿的影响作用更强；在惩罚型绩效薪酬框架下，个体绩效薪酬选择偏好对努力意愿的影响作用比较弱。.5.组织惩罚行为的溢出行为研究。本研究指出惩罚行为的溢出效应研究的理论基础主要包括威慑理论以及社会学习理论。实证研究聚焦于探索惩罚行为的若干要素以及观察者对惩罚行为的看法对观察者的态度和行为的影响以及组织公平感的中介效应。.6.项目后期还将实证分析惩罚行为会对受罚者行为的滞后影响。.本项目率先在国内对我国企业惩罚行为进行了系统的理论和实证研究，丰富激励理论，并对我国企业惩罚行为的优化提供管理建议。

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