证券交易所信息披露监管的长短期治理效果研究： 基于问询回函和后续披露的文本分析

Under the new strategy of reforming supervision, the frontline regulation function of the exchanges becomes prominent, and inquiry letters are mainly characterized by mandatory information supplementary and disclosure. However, from the perspective of practice, the low-quality reply and incomplete subsequent information disclosure are universal. Based on of information asymmetry theories and signal transmission theories, this program focuses on listed companies’ replies to the inquiry letters and their subsequent disclosure on what had been inquired, by applying methods of theoretical analysis, text analysis and empirical research comprehensively. This program aims to solve three problems: First, based on machine learning, this program measures the short-term governance effect of inquiry letters by the quality of the replies, as well as the long-term governance effect by the quality of subsequent information disclosure. Second, by comparing the short-term and long-term governance effects of inquiry supervision, this program explores the formation mechanism of their convergence and deviation relationship. Third, from the perspective of information transfer efficiency, this program estimates the economic consequences of the relationship between short-term and long-term governance effects. This program not only generalizes the text analysis method on assessing the quality of the reply and subsequent information disclosure, but also enriches the supervision theories by studying on the mechanism of short-term and long-term governance effects. Moreover, inquiry regulatory optimization path is of high importance and practical value.

在证监会“放松管制、加强监管”的战略下，证券交易所的一线监管功能凸显,其发放的各类问询函以建议上市公司补充信息披露为主要特征。从实践看，回函质量低、后续年度不提升信息披露质量的现象普遍存在。基于“信息不对称”、“信号传递”等理论，以上市公司的回函披露以及后续披露为分析主线，本课题探讨了三方面的问题：第一，通过直接测量回函公告的质量来反映问询监管的短期治理效果，通过直接测量被问询事项的后续披露质量来反映问询监管的长期治理效果。第二，针对问询监管“短期-长期”治理效果之间的模式，考察两者趋同和背离关系的形成机理。第三，从信息传递效率角度，检验“短期-长期”治理效果模式的经济后果。从意义上看，本课题探讨的回函质量和后续披露质量的测度方法具有一定推广价值，问询监管“短期-长期”治理效果的机制分析很大程度丰富了问询监管理论，本课题对优化问询监管也具有现实指导意义。

党的二十大报告强调“要加强和完善现代金融监管”，资本市场一线监管是资本市场高质量发展的基石，是系统提高上市公司质量和持续健康发展的关键制度安排，是防范资本市场风险的第一道防线。本课题着重关注上市公司的回函披露以及后续披露，将两者进行充分结合以讨论如下三类研究话题：第一，通过直接测量回函公告的质量来反映问询监管的短期治理效果，通过直接测量被问询事项的后续披露质量来反映问询监管的长期治理效果。第二，针对问询监管“短期-长期”治理效果之间的模式，考察两者趋同和背离关系的形成机理。第三，从信息传递效率角度，检验“短期-长期”治理效果模式的经济后果。从意义上看，本课题从“非处罚性监管”视角丰富了资本市场监管研究，以往文献主要关注上市公司因违法违规而被处罚的市场反应以及经济后果，属于“处罚性监管”，而近年来逐渐出现的问询函形式的一线监管是典型的“非处罚性监管”。本课题运用机器学习方法，有助于交易所深化科技监管和智能化监管，且以盈余管理等视角进行的深入分析为问询函类型“非处罚监管”提供了首批证据，同时也为国际学术界关于监管机构意见函性质的监管文献提供了中国制度背景的独特证据。此外，对问询函监管与其它监管联动效应的探索有助于完善资本市场一线监管整体框架，更好助力上市公司高质量发展。本课题探讨的回函质量和后续披露质量的测度方法具有一定推广价值，问询监管“短期-长期”治理效果的机制分析很大程度丰富了问询监管理论，本课题证明在监管转型背景下，证监会的核心是“放松管制、加强监管”，并且“要充分发挥交易所一线监管的作用”，从而逐渐突出证券交易所的一线监管职能。

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