研发公共服务外包的激励与控制研究：基于不完全合同与控制权分配的视角

Comparing to the R&D outsourcing of the firms, the mechanisms of outsourcing of the public R&D are short of flexibility. In fact, there are more principal-agent problems in the process of the public R&D than those of the firms, such as the lack of the R&D investment, the inferior quality of R&D, the problem of path-transforming and cross-funding in R&D Outsourcing. the most current studies on the outsourcing of the public R&D focus on the monetary incentives and performance assessment criteria of the public R&D, while ignoring the importance of incompleteness of the R&D contract. According to the plan of this research project, we will build several theoretical principal-agent models with the theoratical approaches of game theory and of the theory of incomplete contract and control right, in which the allocations of the key control right in the public R&D are the main variables. Firstly, we will analyze the optimal organizations for the government to choose to outsource the public R&D. Then we study the mechanisms including the payoff incentiveness and the allocations of the control right for the government in the process of the public R&D. Especially, We will also study the machenism in which the endogeneous contractual incompeletness is one way to incentive and control the agents in the process of public R&D. This research will bring a new view for the studies of the outsourcing of the public R&D, will enrich the issues of the studies on the machenism design, and will give some suggestions for the government to outsource the public R&D.

研发公共服务外包缺乏像企业研发外包一样灵活性的合同设计，现实中也往往存在更突出的代理问题，如激励不足、质量难控制、交叉资助、路径转移等。现有研究在激励方面更强调财政支付等货币性激励的作用，在控制方面则尽可能完善研发绩效的考核指标，而忽视了合同的不完全性。本项目从研发外包的交易成本出发，以控制权分配这个组织的核心要素为关键变量，运用不完全合同与控制权理论及博弈论的方法，构建多主体参与的委托代理模型，首先研究政府对研发公共服务外包组织形式的最优选择，进而研究在不同的组织形式下，如何设计能权衡事前激励和事后控制的、包括货币性激励和控制权分配多种方式的研发公共服务外包合同机制。尤其重点研究将内生化的合同不完全性作为实现激励和控制变量选择的机制。本项目为研发公共服务外包制度的理论研究提供了新的视角，拓展了相关机制设计理论研究的内容。本项目的研究结论能够为研发公共服务外包制度和政策的设计提供理论依据。