The Control of Attention and Other Cognitive Competencies

注意力和其他认知能力的控制

• 批准号: 7813303
• 负责人: DAVID A WASHBURN
• 金额: $ 11.22万
• 依托单位: GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-12-01 至 2014-11-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://reporter.nih.gov/project-details/7813303
• 关键词: Address; Adult; Affect; Age; Animals; Attention; Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder; Back; Behavior; Behavioral; Binding; Brain; Calibration; Capuchin Monkey; Categories; Characteristics; Child; Cognition; Cognitive; Competence; Conflict (Psychology); Controlled Study; Cues; Data; Detection; Development; Diagnostic; Dissociation; Drops; Elements; Ensure; Equilibrium; Event; Eye; Failure; Floor; Flowers; Foundations; Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging; Funding; Genetic; Hand; Heart; Human; Imaging Techniques; Incentives; Individual; Instruction; Investigation; Judgment; Language; Learning; Light; Literature; Macaca; Macaca mulatta; Machine Learning; Measures; Memory; Modeling; Monitor; Monkeys; Motion; Motivation; Movement; Names; Neural Network Simulation; Pan Genus; Participant; Pattern; Performance; Peripheral; Pongidae; Population; Probability; Problem Solving; Process; Published Comment; Race; Recommendation; Recording of previous events; Relative (related person); Research; Research Personnel; Research Support; Response Latencies; Response to stimulus physiology; Rewards; Role; Running; Saccades; Sampling; Scanning; Schedule; Schools; Science; Shapes; Short-Term Memory; Signal Transduction; Source; Stimulus; Suggestion; Sum; Technology; Testing; Time; Training; Uncertainty; Universities; Variant; Workload; base; behavior influence; brain behavior; classical conditioning; cognitive control; comparative; comparison group; computerized; design; executive function; experience; falls; improved; interest; neuroimaging; neuropsychological; operation; programs; relating to nervous system; research study; response; social; species difference; stimulus processing; theories; vigilance; volunteer

[This application has been revised and substantively improved on the basis of reviewers' recommendations. Changes within the proposal are highlighted by a different font (compared to this original font) and are bracketed. The following improvements should be apparent in the present proposal: Many studies from the original proposal have been dropped, and the project has been streamHned. It is difficult to resist being overly ambitious, as was true of the original submission, when proposing five years of experiments from a large and productive research team that is excited about our collaborative opportunities, both among ourselves and with the other investigators in this program who are studying complementary phenomena. On the one hand, the rhesus monkeys tested in these studies complete, as a group, almost 100,000 trials per week across tasks and studies, providing an ample foundation for the present investigations as well as the studies proposed by other researchers in this program. Similarly, this project team tested an average of over 500 undergraduate volunteers per year in the last four years. We certainly want to generate the most science possible across the proposed 5-year funding period. On the other hand, we acknowledge that the more studies that are described in a single proposal, the less clear the details of those studies can be, the less coherent the proposal appears, and the harder it becomes to see the theme that ties the studies together. In organizing the remaining experiments, we have sharpened our construct definitions by ensuring that the tasks in Study 1 reflect the control of attention (selection of some stimuli rather than others) for processing. There is of course a longstanding debate regarding whether attention is selection of stimuli for processing (early selection), or selection of a response (late selection). In light of the reviewers' comments, we avoided this debate in the present proposal by choosing early-selection tasks (tests of how well individuals select some stimuli and ignore others). We moved response-selection tasks, together with other tests of cognitive control, into Study 2. Several very interesting cognitive tests related to executive functioning (including planning, monitoring, and statistical learning were deleted from Studies 2 and 3 so as to maintain theme of "the control of attention" across the project. Although we agree with the reviewer who described these tasks as clever and compelling, we also agreed with the reviewers who saw them as peripheral to the central theme. Study 3 was consequently refocused on the reciprocal role of attention and learning¿which seems critical, given our desire to understand how learning establishes the experiential and executive constraints that vie for control over attention (i.e., of anchoring "executive" in behavior rather than allowing it to remain an undefined homunculus. This study also supports our translational effort to identify particular t3rpes of training (including symbol training) that might alter the control of attention. The net result of these reductions in experiments, together with the decision to move the details of the fMRI testing and analyses to the Core where they belong, provided space for elaborating on the brain-behavior experiments we will tackle during this funding period. We have attempted to show that it is timely to study these cognitive competencies using neuroimaging technologies. We have also added to the preliminary studies to build the foundation for this entire proposal. At the same time, we did add several experiments that were specifically recommended by the reviewers or by our review of the recent literature, including (a) a replication of two previous findings (Ei.i) using conditions that calibrate baseline performance levels across species; (b) addition of the eyes-looking task to complete the possible comparisons within the cognitive-control study E2.1; and (c) addition of CPT-AX testing to distinguish between proactive and reactive responding, consistent with a recent model of cognitive control. The results of Ei.i could potentially change the design of each subsequent experiment. In this revision, we believe that we've achieved a good balance by including the studies that have the greatest probability of addressing our specific aims, and by eliminating relatively uninformative or potentially redundant tests of specific populations or with specific measures. We recognize that one confusing element of the original proposal pertained to which participant groups would be tested on which specific studies. In part, this is a result of our desire to base those decisions on the results of earlier experiments. For example, we don't want to administer a task to children or chimpanzees until it has been shown to be a good task, in the sense of producing meaningful variations as a result of the independent-variable manipulations, in testing with undergraduate participants or monkeys. It is neither practical nor scientifically necessary to test every group (naive and experienced macaques, capuchins, chimpanzees, children, undergraduates with and without ADHD) on every task and condition. However, we want understand attention control from comparative, developmental, neuropsychological, and of course cognitive perspectives, and thus it is necessary to test multiple groups. Additionally, to control for the influence of different levels of motivation, training, and so forth, it is necessary to produce converging evidence by using multiple tasks. Taking all of this into consideration, the final proposal is summarized below: Study 1. The determinants of attention: What controls selection of cues that compete for processing? Subjects = Rhesus monkeys. Capuchin monkeys, undergraduate volunteers; chimpanzees, children and adults with ADHD possible on a subset of tasks, contingent on initial findings; neuroimaging studies likely with a subset of tasks, contingent on initial findings (e.g., fMRI and TCD with humans of Stroop-like selection, ANT, CPT; TMS witii monkeys of anti-saccade, ANT) a. Stroop-like selection: Ei.i=numerical Stroop; Ei.3=ANT; Ei.4= multi-modal "Stroop", social Stroop (E1.4), global/local, bullseye flanker b. Attention scanning: Ei.i=anti-saccade; Ei.2=dual-task paradigms; Ei.3=ANT c. Attention sustaining: Ei.3=CPT, MOT, ANT Study 2. How does attention control relate to other aspects of cognitive control? Subjects = Rhesus monkeys. Capuchin monkeys, undergraduate volunteers; chimpanzees, children and adults with ADHD possible on a subset of tasks, contingent on initial findings;; neuroimaging studies possible with a subset of tasks, contingent on initial findings (e.g., fMRI and TCD with humans of inhibition tasks, running memory; TMS with monkeys of Simon-task) a. Inhibition tasks: E2.i=dots, heart/flower, eyes-looking; E2.4=stop-signal b. Set-switching: E2.2=Shape School, WCST c. Working memory: E2.3=running memory, N-back, symmetry span Study 3. How does learning influence attention control, and how does attention influence learning? Subjects=Rhesus monkeys, Capuchin monkeys; humans and chimpanzees possible , contingent on initial findings a. Relational/Associative learning: E3.i=meaningful failures, meditational paradigm b. Training effects: E3.2=symbol training; E3.3= "executive" training The theme that binds these studies is the competition between stimulus events (e.g., attention capture), stimulus associations (e.g., conditioned or primed attention), and higher-order intentions (e.g., executive attention) for the control of selection and behavior. Although this specific model is not accepted in the literature, there is little reason for concern that the data would be impugned if the framework is rejected. This theoretical perspective echoes the longstanding and widely embraced distinction between top-down and bottom-up processing (a distinction known by many names) and is consistent with the recent effort in comparative cognition to understand cognitive control while acknowledging stimulus control. Our competition framework, inspired by neural-net connectionist modeling, finds theoretical kinship with numerous other theories (e.g., the race model of attention; Bundesen, 2000). Although the distinction between the capture of attention by environmental cues (like motion, sudden change, and dishabituation) and control of attention by experience (as in contention-scheduled, automatic, and primed processing) is unique to the present model, the experiments proposed here will permit empirical test of whether attention is influenced by variables falling into these three specific classes¿or perhaps into just two, or even just one category. In summary, one need not embrace the framework to find value in the studies. What seems unlikely to be fragile about the model is the assumption that multiple potential cues compete for attention (as reflected behavior) at any moment in time; that by varjdng the potency or strength of each of these cues and measuring the results on response latency, accuracy, and pattern, one can identify meaningful individual and group (including species) differences in the control of attention; that these characteristic differences in sensitivity to various competing constraints on attention may also be evident in the control of other cognitive operations; and that reliable variations in the control of attention should be manifest in different patterns of brain activity that correspond to the different patterns of behavioral response. At a large and diverse university like Georgia State where most of the human participants will be tested, concerns about the representativeness of the sample are limited. However, this proposal also extensively employs a colony of highly experienced resident animals at the Language Research Center, and so we are particularly concerned about the suggestion that these animals and their prior experience could seriously compromise the present results. Without doubt, we are able to test these monkeys and apes on tasks that would be difficult or impossible to administer to naive animals. Similarly, these animals have demonstrated some cognitive competencies that were heretofore thought beyond the range for monkeys or apes. Part of the reason we have such confidence in Our hypotheses that monkeys differ from humans in the capacity for executive control of attention is that these particular monkeys seem ideally trained and prepared for comparison with humans on computerized cognitive tasks. Each of the tasks proposed here builds on extant repertoires and prior experience, just as we assume that the humans will enter each test with a history of experiences in attending, learning, and problem solving that serves to prepare them. That said, we do intend to assess the role of experience, in part by testing relatively naive macaques on selected tasks. In sum, we believe that the monkeys' and chimpanzees' history of participation in cognitive research supports and is a strength of the current proposal. As the reviewers correctly note, the critical challenge of such a program of research¿indeed, of every scientific study of different groups, whether the groups are defined by species, age, culture, diagnostic category, performance level, or some other criterion¿is to ensure that the different groups are tested comparably. This team of investigators is highly experienced with such between-groups comparisons, although this alone does not change the difficulty of the task at hand. Individual and group differences in sensitivity to stimulus conditions, delay of reward, and similar variables are inherent in these comparisons, and indeed are a topic of study in this proposal. We have built several validity- and calibration-checks into these studies, and we've expanded the discussion of these in the proposal. Briefly, our confidence in the conclusions from these between-groups comparisons will be increased to the degree that (a) they reflect convergent evidence across tasks and manipulations (e.g., species differences in the capacity for the executive control of attention are seen in Stroop and vigilance tasks, and are similar for manipulations of incentive and for manipulations of concurrent workload); (b) within-subject differences serve as the foundation for between-groups comparisons (e.g., monkeys are not less attentive than chimpanzees, but compared to chimps the monkeys' attention was more affected by increases in stimulus-response association strength); (c) manipulations have similar effects across groups in baseline performance¿verifying that performance is not at ceiling or floor and that the manipulation is sufficiently large to influence behavior¿but different effects across groups in the critical stimulus-conflict conditions (e.g., stimulus movement improves target detection for children and adults, but is more disruptive for children than adults when nontarget stimuli move); and (d) training and/or instructions are provided to ensure that asymptotic or criterial performance is being compared for all groups. Without denjdng the challenge before us, we believe that the reviewers' suggestions have improved our ability to address our specific aims with studies that will withstand the judgment of the literature.

[根据审阅者的建议，已修改并实质上改进了此申请。 提案中的变化由不同的字体（与此原始字体相比）突出显示，并且是 括号。在本提案中应显而易见以下改进： 原始提案中的许多研究已被删除，并且该项目已经流媒体。这很困难 在提出五年的时间时，要抗拒过分雄心勃勃 一个大型和产品研究团队的实验，对我们的协作机会感到兴奋， 在我们之间以及该计划中的其他调查员之间都在研究完成 现象。一方面，在这些研究中测试的恒河猴几乎是 每周进行100,000次跨任务和研究的试验，为本调查提供了充足的基础 以及其他研究人员在该计划中提出的研究。同样，这个项目团队测试了 过去四年中，平均每年有500多名本科志愿者。我们当然想产生 在拟议的5年资金期间，大多数科学可能。另一方面，我们承认 一项提案中描述的更多研究，这些研究的细节越清楚，越少 该提案的一致性出现了，很难看到将研究联系在一起的主题。 在组织其余实验时，我们通过确保 研究1中的任务反映了对加工的关注（选择某些刺激而不是其他刺激）的控制。 当然，关于注意力是否是处理刺激的长期辩论 （早期选择）或选择响应（晚期选择）。鉴于审稿人的评论，我们避免了 通过选择早期选择任务（个人如何选择一些）来辩论本提案中的辩论 刺激并忽略他人）。我们将响应选择任务以及其他认知控制测试一起移动 进入研究2。几项与执行功能相关的非常有趣的认知测试（包括计划， 从研究2和3中删除了监视和统计学习，以维护“控制”主题 注意“整个项目。 引人注目的是，我们还同意审稿人的观点，他们认为他们是中心主题的外围。研究3是 因此，考虑到我们的愿望 了解学习如何建立争夺控制的专家和执行约束 注意（即，在行为上锚定“执行”，而不是让它保持不确定 Homunculus。这项研究还支持我们的翻译工作，以确定特定的T3RPE（包括 符号训练）可能会改变注意力的控制。实验中这些减少的最终结果， 以及决定将fMRI测试的细节移至其属于核心的详细信息， 为在此资金期间将解决的脑海行为实验提供了详细说明的空间。我们 试图证明使用神经影像学研究这些认知能力是及时的 技术。我们还添加了初步研究，以为整个建议建立基础。 同时，我们确实添加了审稿人专门推荐的几个实验或 我们对最近的文献的评论，包括（a）使用条件复制两个先前的发现（EI.I） 校准了物种之间的基线性能水平； （b）增加眼睛看的任务以完成 认知控制研究E2.1中可能的比较； （c）添加CPT-AX测试以区分 在主动和反应响应之间，与最新的认知控制模型一致。 EI.I的结果可能会改变每个后续实验的设计。 在这项修订中，我们认为我们通过包括具有解决特定目标的可能性最大的研究，并消除对特定人群或特定措施的相对无信息或潜在的冗余测试，从而实现了良好的平衡。我们认识到，原始提案中的一个令人困惑的要素与参与者群体有关哪些具体研究的测试。在某种程度上，这是我们渴望将这些决定基于早期实验结果的结果。例如，我们不想对儿童或黑猩猩执行任务，直到被证明是一项好任务，从而在产生有意义的变化的意义上，是由于独立变量的操作而进行的，并在测试中进行了测试。 本科参与者或猴子。测试每个小组既不是实际也不是科学的 （幼稚而有经验的猕猴，卷尾卷，黑猩猩，儿童，有和没有多动症的本科生） 在每个任务和条件上。但是，我们希望了解比较的注意力控制， 发展，神经心理学，当然还有认知的观点，因此有必要测试 多组。此外，控制不同水平的动机，训练等的影响 第四，有必要通过使用多个任务来产生融合的证据。 考虑到所有这些，最终提案总结如下： 研究1。关注的决定者：哪些控制着竞争处理的线索的选择？主题= 恒河猴。卷尾猴，本科志愿者；黑猩猩，儿童和成人 在任务子集中可能进行了多动症，取决于初始发现；神经影像学研究可能与 任务子集，取决于初始发现（例如，fMRI和TCD具有类似于Stroop的人的人， 蚂蚁，CPT； TMS WITII猴子的猴子，ANT） 一个。类似stroop的选择：ei.i =数值stroop; ei.3 = ant; EI.4 =多模式的“ stroop”，社交stroop （e1.4），全球/本地，牛角侧翼 b。注意扫描：ei.i =反扫视； EI.2 =双任务范例； EI.3 =蚂蚁 c。注意：EI.3 = CPT，MOT，ANT 研究2。注意控制与认知控制的其他方面有何关系？受试者=恒河猴。 卷尾猴，本科志愿者；黑猩猩，儿童和成人有多动症的可能性 任务子集，取决于初始发现；神经影像学的研究可能是一部分任务， 取决于初始发现（例如，fMRI和TCD具有抑制任务的人，跑步内存； TMS 与西蒙任务的猴子一起） 一个。抑制任务：e2.i =点，心/花，眼睛看； e2.4 =停止信号 b。设定开关：E2.2 = Shape School，WCST c。工作记忆：e2.3 =跑步内存，n-back，对称跨度 研究3。学习如何影响注意力控制，以及注意力如何影响学习？ 受试者=恒河猴，卷尾猴；人类和黑猩猩可能会取决于初始 发现 一个。关系/关联学习：e3.i =有意义的失败，冥想范式 b。训练效果：E3.2 =符号训练； e3.3 =“执行”培训 结合这些研究的主题是刺激事件之间的竞争（例如，注意捕获）， 刺激关联（例如，有条件或启动的注意力）和高阶意愿（例如，执行 注意选择和行为的控制。尽管该特定模型在 文献，几乎没有理由担心，如果框架被拒绝，数据将被损害。这种理论观点与自上而下的和自下而上的处理之间的长期和广泛的区别相呼应（许多名称已知的区别），并且与比较认知的最新努力一致，以了解认知控制，同时承认刺激控制。我们的竞争框架受神经网络连接主义建模的启发，发现了与许多其他理论的理论上的亲属关系（例如，关注的种族模型； Bundesen，2000年）。尽管通过环境提示（例如运动，突然的变化和不合同性）捕获注意力的区别与经验控制注意力（如在内容 - 安排，自动和启动处理中）是当前模型所独有的，但 此处提出的实验将允许对注意力是否受变量影响的经验检验 这三个特定的类别或仅分为两个，甚至只有一个类别。总而言之，不需要 拥抱框架以在研究中找到价值。似乎不太可能对模型脆弱的是 假设多个潜在提示在任何时候都竞争注意力（作为反射行为）； 通过varjdng，每个提示的效力或强度，并测量响应潜伏期的结果， 准确性和模式，可以识别有意义的个人和群体（包括物种）差异 控制注意力；这些对各种竞争限制的敏感性的特征差异 注意也可能是控制其他认知操作的证据。以及这种可靠的变化 注意力的控制应以不同的大脑活动模式表现出来，与不同的方式相对应 行为反应的模式。 在像佐治亚州这样的大型大学中，大多数人类参与者将接受测试， 对样本的代表性的担忧是有限的。但是，该提议也广泛 员工在语言研究中心拥有经验丰富的居民动物的殖民地，因此我们是 特别关心这些动物及其先前经验可能认真的建议 妥协当前的结果。毫无疑问，我们能够在任务上测试这些猴子和猿 对幼稚的动物很难或不可能。同样，这些动物证明了 迄今为止，一些认知能力超出了猴子或猿类的范围。一部分 我们对我们的假设有信心，以使猴子不同于人类的能力 注意力的执行控制是，这些特定的猴子似乎是经过理想的训练和准备 与人类在计算机化认知任务上的比较。这里提出的每个任务都建立在广泛的基础上 曲目和先前的经验，就像我们认为人类将进入每个测试的历史 在参加，学习和解决问题方面的经验，可以做好准备。也就是说，我们确实打算 评估经验的作用，部分是通过测试所选任务的相对天真的猕猴。总之，我们相信 猴子和黑猩猩参与认知研究的历史支持，是 当前的建议。 正如审稿人正确指出的那样，这样的研究计划的关键挑战确实是每个科学的 研究不同群体的研究，这些群体是否由物种，年龄，文化，诊断类别定义， 性能水平或其他一些标准是为了确保对不同的组进行比较测试。这 调查人员团队在这种组间比较方面经验丰富，尽管仅此而已 不要改变手头任务的困难。对刺激的敏感性的个体和群体差异 这些比较中固有的条件，奖励的延迟和类似变量，实际上是一个主题 在此提案中进行研究。我们已经在这些研究中构建了几个有效性和校准检查，我们已经 在提案中扩大了对这些讨论的讨论。简而言之，我们对这些结论的信心 组间比较将增加到（a）反映跨越趋同证据的程度 任务和操纵（例如，可以看到关注行政人员控制能力的物种差异 在Stroop和警惕任务中，与动机的操纵和操纵相似 并发工作负载）; （b）受试者内部差异是群体间比较的基础（例如，猴子的注意力不如黑猩猩，但与黑猩猩相比，猴子的注意力受到刺激反应缔合强度的增加的影响更大）； （c）操纵在基线性能中具有相似的效果。验证性能不在天花板或地板上，并且操纵足够大以影响行为，但是在严重的刺激体重冲突状况下，各组的效果不同（例如，刺激运动可以改善儿童和成人的目标检测，但对儿童的破坏性更大，而不是成人刺激刺激刺激的刺激刺激刺激刺激运动时更具损害）； （d）提供培训和/或说明，以确保比较所有组的不对称或标准性能。我们认为，没有任何挑战，我们相信审稿人的建议提高了我们通过能够承受文献法官的研究来解决特定目标的能力。