The Control of Attention and Other Cognitive Competencies

注意力和其他认知能力的控制

• 批准号: 7813303
• 负责人: DAVID A WASHBURN
• 金额: $ 11.22万
• 依托单位: GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY
• 依托单位国家: 美国
• 财政年份: 2009
• 资助国家: 美国
• 起止时间: 2009-12-01 至 2014-11-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://reporter.nih.gov/project-details/7813303
• 关键词: Address; Adult; Affect; Age; Animals; Attention; Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder; Back; Behavior; Behavioral; Binding; Brain; Calibration; Capuchin Monkey; Categories; Characteristics; Child; Cognition; Cognitive; Competence; Conflict (Psychology); Controlled Study; Cues; Data; Detection; Development; Diagnostic; Dissociation; Drops; Elements; Ensure; Equilibrium; Event; Eye; Failure; Floor; Flowers; Foundations; Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging; Funding; Genetic; Hand; Heart; Human; Imaging Techniques; Incentives; Individual; Instruction; Investigation; Judgment; Language; Learning; Light; Literature; Macaca; Macaca mulatta; Machine Learning; Measures; Memory; Modeling; Monitor; Monkeys; Motion; Motivation; Movement; Names; Neural Network Simulation; Pan Genus; Participant; Pattern; Performance; Peripheral; Pongidae; Population; Probability; Problem Solving; Process; Published Comment; Race; Recommendation; Recording of previous events; Relative (related person); Research; Research Personnel; Research Support; Response Latencies; Response to stimulus physiology; Rewards; Role; Running; Saccades; Sampling; Scanning; Schedule; Schools; Science; Shapes; Short-Term Memory; Signal Transduction; Source; Stimulus; Suggestion; Sum; Technology; Testing; Time; Training; Uncertainty; Universities; Variant; Workload; base; behavior influence; brain behavior; classical conditioning; cognitive control; comparative; comparison group; computerized; design; executive function; experience; falls; improved; interest; neuroimaging; neuropsychological; operation; programs; relating to nervous system; research study; response; social; species difference; stimulus processing; theories; vigilance; volunteer

[This application has been revised and substantively improved on the basis of reviewers' recommendations. Changes within the proposal are highlighted by a different font (compared to this original font) and are bracketed. The following improvements should be apparent in the present proposal: Many studies from the original proposal have been dropped, and the project has been streamHned. It is difficult to resist being overly ambitious, as was true of the original submission, when proposing five years of experiments from a large and productive research team that is excited about our collaborative opportunities, both among ourselves and with the other investigators in this program who are studying complementary phenomena. On the one hand, the rhesus monkeys tested in these studies complete, as a group, almost 100,000 trials per week across tasks and studies, providing an ample foundation for the present investigations as well as the studies proposed by other researchers in this program. Similarly, this project team tested an average of over 500 undergraduate volunteers per year in the last four years. We certainly want to generate the most science possible across the proposed 5-year funding period. On the other hand, we acknowledge that the more studies that are described in a single proposal, the less clear the details of those studies can be, the less coherent the proposal appears, and the harder it becomes to see the theme that ties the studies together. In organizing the remaining experiments, we have sharpened our construct definitions by ensuring that the tasks in Study 1 reflect the control of attention (selection of some stimuli rather than others) for processing. There is of course a longstanding debate regarding whether attention is selection of stimuli for processing (early selection), or selection of a response (late selection). In light of the reviewers' comments, we avoided this debate in the present proposal by choosing early-selection tasks (tests of how well individuals select some stimuli and ignore others). We moved response-selection tasks, together with other tests of cognitive control, into Study 2. Several very interesting cognitive tests related to executive functioning (including planning, monitoring, and statistical learning were deleted from Studies 2 and 3 so as to maintain theme of "the control of attention" across the project. Although we agree with the reviewer who described these tasks as clever and compelling, we also agreed with the reviewers who saw them as peripheral to the central theme. Study 3 was consequently refocused on the reciprocal role of attention and learning¿which seems critical, given our desire to understand how learning establishes the experiential and executive constraints that vie for control over attention (i.e., of anchoring "executive" in behavior rather than allowing it to remain an undefined homunculus. This study also supports our translational effort to identify particular t3rpes of training (including symbol training) that might alter the control of attention. The net result of these reductions in experiments, together with the decision to move the details of the fMRI testing and analyses to the Core where they belong, provided space for elaborating on the brain-behavior experiments we will tackle during this funding period. We have attempted to show that it is timely to study these cognitive competencies using neuroimaging technologies. We have also added to the preliminary studies to build the foundation for this entire proposal. At the same time, we did add several experiments that were specifically recommended by the reviewers or by our review of the recent literature, including (a) a replication of two previous findings (Ei.i) using conditions that calibrate baseline performance levels across species; (b) addition of the eyes-looking task to complete the possible comparisons within the cognitive-control study E2.1; and (c) addition of CPT-AX testing to distinguish between proactive and reactive responding, consistent with a recent model of cognitive control. The results of Ei.i could potentially change the design of each subsequent experiment. In this revision, we believe that we've achieved a good balance by including the studies that have the greatest probability of addressing our specific aims, and by eliminating relatively uninformative or potentially redundant tests of specific populations or with specific measures. We recognize that one confusing element of the original proposal pertained to which participant groups would be tested on which specific studies. In part, this is a result of our desire to base those decisions on the results of earlier experiments. For example, we don't want to administer a task to children or chimpanzees until it has been shown to be a good task, in the sense of producing meaningful variations as a result of the independent-variable manipulations, in testing with undergraduate participants or monkeys. It is neither practical nor scientifically necessary to test every group (naive and experienced macaques, capuchins, chimpanzees, children, undergraduates with and without ADHD) on every task and condition. However, we want understand attention control from comparative, developmental, neuropsychological, and of course cognitive perspectives, and thus it is necessary to test multiple groups. Additionally, to control for the influence of different levels of motivation, training, and so forth, it is necessary to produce converging evidence by using multiple tasks. Taking all of this into consideration, the final proposal is summarized below: Study 1. The determinants of attention: What controls selection of cues that compete for processing? Subjects = Rhesus monkeys. Capuchin monkeys, undergraduate volunteers; chimpanzees, children and adults with ADHD possible on a subset of tasks, contingent on initial findings; neuroimaging studies likely with a subset of tasks, contingent on initial findings (e.g., fMRI and TCD with humans of Stroop-like selection, ANT, CPT; TMS witii monkeys of anti-saccade, ANT) a. Stroop-like selection: Ei.i=numerical Stroop; Ei.3=ANT; Ei.4= multi-modal "Stroop", social Stroop (E1.4), global/local, bullseye flanker b. Attention scanning: Ei.i=anti-saccade; Ei.2=dual-task paradigms; Ei.3=ANT c. Attention sustaining: Ei.3=CPT, MOT, ANT Study 2. How does attention control relate to other aspects of cognitive control? Subjects = Rhesus monkeys. Capuchin monkeys, undergraduate volunteers; chimpanzees, children and adults with ADHD possible on a subset of tasks, contingent on initial findings;; neuroimaging studies possible with a subset of tasks, contingent on initial findings (e.g., fMRI and TCD with humans of inhibition tasks, running memory; TMS with monkeys of Simon-task) a. Inhibition tasks: E2.i=dots, heart/flower, eyes-looking; E2.4=stop-signal b. Set-switching: E2.2=Shape School, WCST c. Working memory: E2.3=running memory, N-back, symmetry span Study 3. How does learning influence attention control, and how does attention influence learning? Subjects=Rhesus monkeys, Capuchin monkeys; humans and chimpanzees possible , contingent on initial findings a. Relational/Associative learning: E3.i=meaningful failures, meditational paradigm b. Training effects: E3.2=symbol training; E3.3= "executive" training The theme that binds these studies is the competition between stimulus events (e.g., attention capture), stimulus associations (e.g., conditioned or primed attention), and higher-order intentions (e.g., executive attention) for the control of selection and behavior. Although this specific model is not accepted in the literature, there is little reason for concern that the data would be impugned if the framework is rejected. This theoretical perspective echoes the longstanding and widely embraced distinction between top-down and bottom-up processing (a distinction known by many names) and is consistent with the recent effort in comparative cognition to understand cognitive control while acknowledging stimulus control. Our competition framework, inspired by neural-net connectionist modeling, finds theoretical kinship with numerous other theories (e.g., the race model of attention; Bundesen, 2000). Although the distinction between the capture of attention by environmental cues (like motion, sudden change, and dishabituation) and control of attention by experience (as in contention-scheduled, automatic, and primed processing) is unique to the present model, the experiments proposed here will permit empirical test of whether attention is influenced by variables falling into these three specific classes¿or perhaps into just two, or even just one category. In summary, one need not embrace the framework to find value in the studies. What seems unlikely to be fragile about the model is the assumption that multiple potential cues compete for attention (as reflected behavior) at any moment in time; that by varjdng the potency or strength of each of these cues and measuring the results on response latency, accuracy, and pattern, one can identify meaningful individual and group (including species) differences in the control of attention; that these characteristic differences in sensitivity to various competing constraints on attention may also be evident in the control of other cognitive operations; and that reliable variations in the control of attention should be manifest in different patterns of brain activity that correspond to the different patterns of behavioral response. At a large and diverse university like Georgia State where most of the human participants will be tested, concerns about the representativeness of the sample are limited. However, this proposal also extensively employs a colony of highly experienced resident animals at the Language Research Center, and so we are particularly concerned about the suggestion that these animals and their prior experience could seriously compromise the present results. Without doubt, we are able to test these monkeys and apes on tasks that would be difficult or impossible to administer to naive animals. Similarly, these animals have demonstrated some cognitive competencies that were heretofore thought beyond the range for monkeys or apes. Part of the reason we have such confidence in Our hypotheses that monkeys differ from humans in the capacity for executive control of attention is that these particular monkeys seem ideally trained and prepared for comparison with humans on computerized cognitive tasks. Each of the tasks proposed here builds on extant repertoires and prior experience, just as we assume that the humans will enter each test with a history of experiences in attending, learning, and problem solving that serves to prepare them. That said, we do intend to assess the role of experience, in part by testing relatively naive macaques on selected tasks. In sum, we believe that the monkeys' and chimpanzees' history of participation in cognitive research supports and is a strength of the current proposal. As the reviewers correctly note, the critical challenge of such a program of research¿indeed, of every scientific study of different groups, whether the groups are defined by species, age, culture, diagnostic category, performance level, or some other criterion¿is to ensure that the different groups are tested comparably. This team of investigators is highly experienced with such between-groups comparisons, although this alone does not change the difficulty of the task at hand. Individual and group differences in sensitivity to stimulus conditions, delay of reward, and similar variables are inherent in these comparisons, and indeed are a topic of study in this proposal. We have built several validity- and calibration-checks into these studies, and we've expanded the discussion of these in the proposal. Briefly, our confidence in the conclusions from these between-groups comparisons will be increased to the degree that (a) they reflect convergent evidence across tasks and manipulations (e.g., species differences in the capacity for the executive control of attention are seen in Stroop and vigilance tasks, and are similar for manipulations of incentive and for manipulations of concurrent workload); (b) within-subject differences serve as the foundation for between-groups comparisons (e.g., monkeys are not less attentive than chimpanzees, but compared to chimps the monkeys' attention was more affected by increases in stimulus-response association strength); (c) manipulations have similar effects across groups in baseline performance¿verifying that performance is not at ceiling or floor and that the manipulation is sufficiently large to influence behavior¿but different effects across groups in the critical stimulus-conflict conditions (e.g., stimulus movement improves target detection for children and adults, but is more disruptive for children than adults when nontarget stimuli move); and (d) training and/or instructions are provided to ensure that asymptotic or criterial performance is being compared for all groups. Without denjdng the challenge before us, we believe that the reviewers' suggestions have improved our ability to address our specific aims with studies that will withstand the judgment of the literature.

[本应用程序已根据审稿人的建议进行了修改和实质性改进。 提案中的更改以不同的字体（与原始字体相比）突出显示，并且 在本提案中，以下改进应该是显而易见的： 最初提案中的许多研究已被放弃，该项目的流转也很困难。 避免过于雄心勃勃，就像最初提交的提案中提出的五年计划一样 来自一个大型且富有成效的研究团队的实验，他们对我们的合作机会感到兴奋， 我们自己以及该计划中正在研究互补的其他研究人员 一方面，这些研究中测试的恒河猴作为一个群体几乎完成了。 每周进行 100,000 次跨任务和研究的试验，为当前的调查提供充足的基础 以及该项目中其他研究人员提出的研究，该项目团队测试了一项。 过去四年里，平均每年有超过 500 名本科生志愿者。 另一方面，我们承认，在拟议的 5 年资助期内，大多数科学都是可能的。 单个提案中描述的研究越多，这些研究的细节越不清晰，就越少 提案显得连贯一致，就越难看出将这些研究联系在一起的主题。 在组织剩余的实验时，我们通过确保 研究 1 中的任务反映了处理过程中注意力的控制（选择某些刺激而不是其他刺激）。 当然，关于注意力是否是对刺激的选择进行处理，存在着长期的争论。 （早期选择），或选择响应（晚期选择）根据审稿人的意见，我们避免了这种情况。 通过选择早期选择任务（测试个人选择某些任务的能力）在本提案中进行辩论 我们移动了响应选择任务以及其他认知控制测试， 进入研究 2。几个与执行功能相关的非常有趣的认知测试（包括计划、 研究 2 和研究 3 中删除了监测和统计学习，以保持“控制 尽管我们同意审稿人的观点，他将这些任务描述为聪明且 令人信服的是，我们也同意审稿人的观点，认为它们是研究 3 的次要主题。 因此，重新关注注意力和学习的相互作用。考虑到我们的愿望，这似乎很关键 了解学习如何建立竞争控制权的经验和执行约束 注意力（即，将“执行力”固定在行为中，而不是让它保持未定义的状态） 这项研究还支持我们确定特定训练目标（包括 符号训练）可能会改变注意力的控制实验中这些减少的最终结果， 连同将功能磁共振成像测试和分析的细节移至其所属核心的决定， 为我们将在本次资助期间进行的大脑行为实验进行详细阐述提供了空间。 试图表明使用神经影像学研究这些认知能力是及时的 我们还添加了初步研究，为整个提案奠定了基础。 同时，我们确实添加了几个审稿人或专家特别推荐的实验 我们对最近文献的回顾，包括（a）使用条件复制先前的两个发现（Ei.i） (b) 增加看眼睛的任务来完成 认知对照研究 E2.1 中可能的比较；以及 (c) 添加 CPT-AX 测试以区分 主动反应和反应反应之间的关系，与最近的认知控制模型一致，Ei.i 的结果可能会改变每个后续实验的设计。 在本次修订中，我们认为，通过纳入最有可能实现我们特定目标的研究，并通过消除对特定人群或采取特定措施的相对无信息或潜在冗余的测试，我们已经实现了良好的平衡。原始提案中令人困惑的部分涉及哪些参与者群体将接受哪些具体研究的测试，部分原因是我们希望根据早期实验的结果做出这些决定，例如，我们不想进行管理。儿童或黑猩猩的任务直到它被证明是一项好任务，从独立变量操作产生有意义的变化的意义上来说，在测试中 对每个组进行测试既不实际，也不具有科学意义。 （天真的和有经验的猕猴、卷尾猴、黑猩猩、儿童、患有或不患有多动症的大学生） 然而，我们想通过比较来理解注意力控制， 发展的、神经心理学的，当然还有认知的观点，因此有必要测试 此外，还可以控制不同级别的动机、训练等的影响。 第四，有必要通过使用多个任务来产生收敛的证据。 考虑到所有这些，最终提案总结如下： 研究 1. 注意力的决定因素：什么控制着竞争处理的线索的选择？ 恒河猴、大学生志愿者、儿童和成人； ADHD 可能发生在一部分任务上，这取决于神经影像学研究的初步结果； 任务子集，取决于最初的发现（例如，对人类进行类似斯特鲁普选择的功能磁共振成像和TCD， ANT，CPT 与抗扫视猴子，ANT） a.类Stroop选择：Ei.i=数值Stroop；Ei.3=ANT；Ei.4=多模态“Stroop”，社交Stroop； (E1.4)，全局/局部，靶心侧翼 b.注意力扫描：Ei.i=反眼跳；Ei.2=双任务范例； c. 注意力维持：Ei.3=CPT、MOT、ANT 研究 2：注意力控制与认知控制的其他方面有何关系？ 受试者 = 恒河猴。 卷尾猴、大学生志愿者、患有多动症的儿童和成人 任务子集，取决于初步发现；；可以使用任务子集进行神经影像研究， 取决于初步发现（例如，功能磁共振成像和 TCD 与人类的抑制任务、运行记忆；TMS 与西蒙任务的猴子） a. 抑制任务：E2.i=点、心/花、眼睛看； b. 组合切换：E2.2=形状学校、WCST c.工作记忆：E2.3=运行记忆，N-back，对称跨度 研究3.学习如何影响注意力控制，注意力如何影响学习？ 受试者=恒河猴、卷尾猴；可能是人类和黑猩猩，具体取决于最初的情况 发现 a. 关系/联想学习：E3.i=有意义的失败，冥想范式 b. 培训效果：E3.2=符号培训；E3.3=“执行”培训； 这些研究的主题是刺激事件之间的竞争（例如，注意力捕获）， 刺激关联（例如，条件性或启动性注意力）和高阶意图（例如，执行 注意）用于控制选择和行为，尽管这种特定模型不被接受。 文献中，没有理由担心如果框架被拒绝，数据会受到质疑，这种理论观点呼应了自上而下和自下而上处理之间长期存在且广泛接受的区别（有许多名称的区别）并且是一致的。随着最近在比较认知方面的努力，以理解认知控制，同时批准刺激控制，我们的竞争框架受到神经网络联结主义模型的启发，发现了与许多其他理论的理论亲缘关系（例如，注意力的竞赛模型；Bundesen，2000）。通过环境线索（如运动、突然变化和去习惯）捕获注意力与通过经验控制注意力（如在竞争计划、自动和启动处理中）之间的区别是当前模型所独有的， 这里提出的实验将允许实证检验注意力是否受到变量的影响 这三个特定类别??或者也许只分为两类，甚至只分为一类。 总之，不需要。 拥抱这个框架来寻找研究的价值，这个模型似乎不太脆弱。 假设多个潜在线索在任何时刻都会争夺注意力（作为反映的行为）； 通过改变每个线索的效力或强度并测量响应延迟的结果， 准确性和模式，人们可以识别有意义的个体和群体（包括物种）差异 注意力的控制；这些特征对各种竞争性约束的敏感性差异 注意力在其他认知操作的控制中也可能很明显；并且 注意力的控制应该体现在与不同的大脑活动相对应的不同模式中。 行为反应模式。 在乔治亚州立大学这样的大型多元化大学，大多数人类参与者都将接受测试， 对样本代表性的担忧是有限的，但这一提议也具有广泛性。 在语言研究中心雇用了一群经验丰富的常驻动物，所以我们 特别关注这些动物及其先前的经历可能会严重影响的建议 毫无疑问，我们能够测试这些猴子和猿类的任务。 同样，这些动物也证明了对幼稚动物进行给药是困难或不可能的。 迄今为止，一些认知能力被认为超出了猴子或猿类的能力范围。 为什么我们对我们的假设如此有信心，即猴子与人类的能力不同 对注意力的执行控制是这些特定的猴子似乎经过了理想的训练和准备 与人类在计算机化认知任务上的比较这里提出的每项任务都建立在现有的基础上。 曲目和先前的经验，就像我们假设人类将带着历史记录参加每次测试一样 参与、学习和解决问题的经验可以帮助他们做好准备。 评估经验的作用，部分是通过在选定的任务上测试相对天真的猕猴总而言之，我们认为。 猴子和黑猩猩参与认知研究的历史支持了认知研究，并且是认知研究的优势 当前的提案。 正如审稿人正确指出的那样，这种研究计划面临的严峻挑战是事实上，对于每一个科学 对不同群体的研究，无论这些群体是按物种、年龄、文化、诊断类别来定义的， 性能水平，或其他一些标准¿是为了确保不同群体的测试具有可比性。 研究人员团队在这方面经验丰富，尽管进行组间比较，仅此一点就可以 不会改变手头任务的难度，个体和群体对刺激的敏感性差异。 条件、奖励延迟和类似的变量是这些比较中固有的，并且确实是一个主题 我们在这些研究中建立了多项有效性和校准检查。 简而言之，扩大了提案中对这些内容的讨论，我们对这些结论的信心。 组间比较将增加到以下程度：(a) 它们反映了不同领域的趋同证据 任务和操作（例如，注意力执行控制能力的物种差异 在斯特鲁普和警戒任务中，对于激励的操纵和对 (b) 受试者内差异是组间比较的基础（例如，猴子的注意力并不比黑猩猩差，但与黑猩猩相比，猴子的注意力更容易受到刺激-反应关联强度增加的影响）（c）； ）操作在各组的基线表现中具有相似的效果¿验证性能是否达到上限或下限，并且操作是否足够大以影响行为？但在关键的刺激冲突条件下，不同群体的影响不同（例如，刺激移动改善了儿童和成人的目标检测，但当非目标刺激移动时，对儿童的破坏性比成人更大）；以及（d）提供培训和/或指导为了确保对所有群体的渐近或标准表现进行比较，在不否认我们面临的挑战的情况下，我们相信审稿人的建议提高了我们通过经得起文献判断的研究来解决我们特定目标的能力。