Dynamic Coordination, Runs, and Efficient Policy Design

动态协调、运行和高效的政策设计

• 批准号: ES/T003758/1
• 负责人: Hongda Zhong
• 金额: $ 30.99万
• 依托单位: London School of Economics and Political Science
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Research Grant
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2020 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=ES%2FT003758%2F1
• 关键词: Dynamic; Coordination; Runs; Efficient; Policy

When a firm is in trouble, investors may be able to secure better payoffs if they withdraw investments while the firm is still solvent rather than wait until it is terminated. This higher payoff from a successful exit motivates investors to withdraw early - a phenomenon known as a coordination failure or a "run" - even though the superior outcome for everyone would be for all investors to remain invested. These runs often lead to the inefficient termination of productive firms. The threat of a potential run is so prevalent in many different markets that it has stimulated sustained interest among academics, regulators, and practitioners. Consider the following examples:Example 1 (bank deposits): Depositors may worry that their bank could fail, thereby causing them to lose their deposits. Consequently, depositors may rush to redeem deposits, causing the bank to fail. This phenomenon is referred to as a "bank run."Example 2 (corporate debt): Creditors in distressed companies may have incentives to demand the return of their money over concerns that other creditors are demanding repayment. The sudden demand for repayment from a significant portion of creditors can force productive companies into bankruptcy.Recognizing the significant consequences of potential runs, practitioners and policymakers have developed many policies to foster coordination among investors, for example:Policy 1 (suspension of convertibility): When capital outflows from a bank reach a certain threshold, the bank may suspend convertibility of deposits and distribute the remaining assets among all depositors.Policy 2 (avoidable preference): Repayments made to lenders prior to a company's bankruptcy may be subject to clawback and redistribution among all remaining lenders. Under the avoidable preference legislation in the United Kingdom, the clawback window ranges from six months to two years.The aim of this project is to offer a general framework based on dynamic game theory and analyze the impact of different policies on investors' decisions to run when the firm is still operating. To see why such a systematic investigation is necessary, I sketch an unintended consequence of Policy 2 (repayment clawback). By clawing back more repayments, the remaining lenders receive more in the event of bankruptcy, making bankruptcy less devastating. This channel reduces lenders' incentives to run. Suppose a policymaker would like to keep a firm alive for as long as possible; should the clawback window then be as long as possible? Surprisingly, no! Having a longer clawback window can make creditors more anxious to run because they need to run early enough to ensure that their repayments will fall outside of the clawback window. The firm may fail even sooner. This novel insight allows me to study optimal parameters in these policies, such as the suspension threshold in Policy 1 and the clawback window in Policy 2. Furthermore, based on the analysis of the existing policies, I can propose new policies that could enable better coordination among investors.The project will benefit academics, policymakers, and practitioners. Dynamic coordination games have been difficult to solve traditionally. The general game-theoretic framework developed in this project will be a useful tool to assist future theoretical researchers in studying related problems in many different contexts. The model will also yield many testable implications on investors' behaviour that empirical researchers can verify using economic data. The policy implications from the model will help regulators to design more efficient termination procedures so that coordination failures among investors will be alleviated as much as possible. Practitioners will benefit from a better understanding of the mechanisms driving potential runs among investors, thereby helping them to design contract features that increase coordination among investors and minimize failures of viable businesses.

当公司遇到麻烦时，如果投资者在公司仍然是偿付能力的情况下撤回投资，而不是等到终止。成功退出的这种较高的回报激发了投资者提早撤回 - 这种现象被称为协调失败或“运行” - 尽管每个人的卓越结果都将使所有投资者保持投资。这些运行通常会导致生产公司的效率低下。潜在运行的威胁在许多不同的市场中如此普遍，以至于它激发了学者，监管机构和从业者的持续兴趣。考虑以下示例：示例1（银行存款）：存款人可能会担心其银行可能会失败，从而导致他们损失存款。因此，存款人可能会急于兑换存款，从而导致银行失败。这种现象被称为“银行运营”。例子2（公司债务）：受灾公司中的债权人可能会激励他们要求其资金回报其他债权人要求还款的担忧。大部分债权人对还款的突然需求可能会迫使生产力公司破产。认识到潜在运行的重大后果，从业人员和决策者制定了许多政策来促进投资者的协调，例如：政策1（暂停转换的暂停）：当所有存储者之间的存储率均可予以兑现，并悬浮在债券上，并悬浮了货币，并暂停了货币，并暂停了货币的范围。 （可避免的偏好）：在公司破产之前向贷方进行的还款可能会在所有其余贷方中遭受回避和重新分配。在英国可避免的偏好立法下，回避窗口的范围从六个月到两年。该项目的目的是提供基于动态游戏理论的一般框架，并分析不同政策对公司在公司仍在运营时运行的决定的影响。要了解为什么需要进行系统的调查，我绘制了政策2的意外后果（还款回扣）。通过撤回更多还款，剩下的贷方在破产时获得了更多收益，从而减少破产的毁灭性。该渠道减少了贷方的激励措施。假设一个决策者希望尽可能长时间地保持公司的活力。应该尽可能长时间的回扣窗口吗？令人惊讶的是，不！拥有更长的回扣窗口可以使债权人更渴望运行，因为他们需要足够早跑，以确保其还款将落在回扣窗口之外。该公司可能会更快地失败。这种新颖的见解使我能够研究这些策略中的最佳参数，例如政策1中的悬架阈值和策略2中的回扣窗口。此外，基于对现有政策的分析，我可以提出新的政策，这些政策可以使投资者之间的更好协调。项目项目将使学者，准合伙人和实践者受益。传统上很难解决动态协调游戏。该项目中开发的一般游戏理论框架将是一种有用的工具，可帮助未来的理论研究人员在许多不同情况下研究相关问题。该模型还将对投资者的行为产生许多可检验的含义，而经验研究人员可以使用经济数据来验证。该模型的政策影响将有助于监管机构设计更有效的终止程序，以便尽可能缓解投资者之间的协调失败。从业者将从更好地理解投资者中推动潜在运行的机制中受益，从而帮助他们设计合同功能，以增加投资者之间的协调性并最大程度地减少可行企业的失败。

项目成果

Equity Issuance Methods and Dilution

股权发行方式及稀释情况

• DOI: 10.1093/rcfs/cfac029
• 发表时间: 2023
• 期刊: The Review of Corporate Finance Studies
• 作者: Burkart M

Market Structure of Intermediation

中介市场结构

• DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4185231
• 发表时间: 2022
• 期刊: SSRN Electronic Journal
• 作者: Zhong H

A Dynamic Model of Optimal Creditor Dispersion

最优债权人分散的动态模型

• DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12974
• 发表时间: 2020
• 期刊: The Journal of Finance
• 作者: ZHONG H

Share Issues versus Share Repurchases

• DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3489555
• 发表时间: 2019-11
• 期刊: ERN: Other Econometrics: Applied Econometric Modeling in Financial Economics - Econometrics of Corporate Finance & Governance (Topic)
• 作者: P. Bond;Yue Yuan;Hongda Zhong

Dynamic Coordination and Bankruptcy Regulations

动态协调和破产法规

• 作者: Zhong H